Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • State ex rel. Juvenile Department v. Smith

    205 Or. App. 152 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 19, 2006

    The decision to seek a guardian for purposes of making health care decisions is clearly a “decision concerning [T] of substantial legal significance.” … Brad Lechman-Su is qualified, suitable and willing to serve as the guardian [.]”

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Southwest Oregon Dairy Herd Improvement Ass'n v. Morgan

    17 Or. App. 300 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · May 6, 1974

    There the court pointed out that in adopting ORS 657.045 (2) (d), the Oregon legislature clearly intended to adopt the federal definition of “agricultural labor.” In Lucas County Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass’n. v. … And the legislature was careful to point out that the activities specified in subsection (2) (d) not directly related to the production of the farm qualifies as agricultural labor ‘only if such service is performed as an

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • SAIF Corp. v. Banderas

    252 Or. App. 136 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 29, 2012

    A “direct medical sequela” is “a condition which originates or stems from an accepted condition that is clearly established medically.” OAR 436-035-0005(6). … Substantial evidence must support the board’s finding that a condition — the “direct medical sequela” — originates or stems from an accepted condition and that it is clearly established medically.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.

    152 Or. App. 421 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 11, 1998

    OEC 702 provides: “If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience … It argues that Silverman’s testimony did not meet the burden for establishing the admissibility of scientific evidence.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • JH KELLY, LLC v. Smith

    244 Or. App. 123 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jun 29, 2011

    While the language used in the various opinions is qualified with words like ‘significant,’ ‘material,’ ‘pathological,’ ‘affirmative evidence’ and ‘objective worsening,’ the preponderance of the medical evidence establishes … It clearly does. Dr. Verheyden, who first diagnosed claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome and performed surgery on claimant’s hand, concluded that claimant’s condition was caused by his 30 years of employment.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Hickey v. Settlemier

    116 Or. App. 436 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Nov 18, 1992

    the defendant juxtaposes a series of facts so as to imply a defamatory connection between them, or creates a defamatory implication by omitting facts, he may be held responsible for the defamatory implication, unless it qualifies … correctly, does not omit facts necessary to put them in context, and does not juxtapose the facts in a far-fetched way to create libelous implications, is not liable even if the conclusion to be drawn from the facts is clearly

    Reversed on other grounds by Hickey v. Settlemier, 318 Or. 196 (1993)Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Oliver v. Employment Division

    40 Or. App. 487 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jun 11, 1979

    And the local office does not establish the labor market area. … The transcript quite clearly establishes there were plenty of potential employers (restaurants and service stations) within the area the claimant was actually searching during the weeks in issue.

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Norwood v. Premo

    287 Or. App. 443 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 23, 2017

    Baker-Krofft, 348 Or 655 , 239 P3d 226 (2010) (in bench trial, sufficiency of evidence may be challenged either by formal motion for judgment of acquittal or by clearly raising issue in closing argument). 1 At the conclusion … Also under preexisting law, an unloaded firearm did not qualify as a dangerous weapon. Id.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • State v. Wiborg

    285 Or. App. 131 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 26, 2017

    Does the Statute Clearly Indicate an Intent to Dispense with a Culpable Mental State? … As Strickland reasons, the long-established definition of “knowingly”—the culpable mental state that the legislature chose for ORS 165.570(1)—means that the person “acts with an awareness that [his conduct] is of a nature

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Pete's Mountain Homeowners Ass'n v. Clackamas County

    227 Or. App. 140 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 1, 2009

    Petitioners’ argument is that, because their Measure 37 claim is subject to the goal-post statute, it is immune from the effect of Measure 49. … It is clearly the more general statute and must, as a result, yield to the more specific Measure 49.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Adair Homes, Inc. v. Jarrell

    59 Or. App. 80 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 8, 1982

    The agreement was qualified in one other respect: the contract price, as then determined, was subject to the approval of plaintiffs president (Marsh). … The problem with defendant’s argument is that he did not establish that this provision is a liquidated damages clause.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Burcham v. Franke

    265 Or. App. 300 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 4, 2014

    We would, accordingly, have rejected the state’s argument that absence of consent could be established by a victim’s age alone. B. … In short, because the state clearly raised, and the trial court clearly considered, the argument that the “mentally incapacitated” issue applied only to Counts 2, 4, and 6, we conclude that that issue was preserved.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • D & M Products, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Board

    30 Or. App. 707 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 22, 1977

    Petitioner argues that this deletion clearly indicates that the legislature intended to preclude imposition of a prior knowledge requirement. We disagree. … This contention is clearly untenable since neither the union nor SAIF were involved in the employe’s hiring.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Oregon Racing, Inc. v. Oregon State Lottery

    310 Or. App. 281 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Mar 31, 2021

    This approach to the gambling statutes eliminates the need for a special immunity statute because the ‘player’ would not violate the law. … For example, a per- son qualified as a “player” if the person did not “otherwise render material assistance to the establishment, conduct or operation thereof by performing, without fee or remuneration, acts directed toward

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State v. Sampson

    167 Or. App. 489 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · May 24, 2000

    To qualify as a DRE officer, an officer must have experience in traffic enforcement. … The HGN test’s scientific nature is well established. O’Key, 321 Or at 296.

    Cited 36 timesPublished
  • State v. Cassidy

    331 Or. App. 69 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 22, 2024

    As defendant saw it, the legislature “clearly meant to protect businesses like hotels and cab services from people evading payment because they are commercial and held open to the public for the purpose of generating income … As the state sees it, a “vacation rental used to generate profit” qualifies as a “business facility” under ORS 164.125(1)(b).

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Trout v. Liberty Northwest Insurance

    154 Or. App. 89 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · May 27, 1998

    “And finally, under the common meaning of the word employee, plaintiff would not qualify as the employee of Harris, the general.” … Thus, the statutes establish the procedure for determining the extent to which a “paying agency” may receive a share of any sum recovered if a worker elects under ORS 656.578 to seek damages from the employer or a third person

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • State v. Seay

    347 Or. App. 180 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 19, 2026

    Although the facts underlying defendant’s guilty plea would have qualified as first-degree abuse of corpse had the statute existed at the time, he was in fact not con- victed of that crime. … ORS 137.225(6) (f) establishes that the set aside statute does not apply to convictions for any sex crime, apart from a few limited exceptions not applicable to this case.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • MID-CENTURY INS. COMPANY v. Perkins

    209 Or. App. 613 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 13, 2006

    Paragraph 2 establishes the policy limits for an occurrence when there are multiple persons who are injured. … And in the third use of the word in the sentence, the word “coverage” is qualified to refer specifically to the “insured’s uninsured motorist coverage.”

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Nordbye v. BRCP/GM ELLINGTON

    246 Or. App. 209 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 26, 2011

    The Department is an agency established under state statute. See ORS 456.555(1). … The oral advice of a federal employee, given on an ad hoc basis to a state agency, simply does not qualify.

    Cited 7 timesPublished

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