Case law

Chance v. Coquille Indian Tribe

327 Or. 318 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jul 16, 1998

Defendants deny that the *322 contract or any other legal document of the Tribe contains anything that qualifies as a waiver of sovereign immunity. … Defendants argue that the quoted contract provision is incomprehensible and cannot qualify as an unequivocal waiver of immunity.

Tennyson v. Children's Services Division

308 Or. 80 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jun 13, 1989

Under section 1983, there are two types of immunity: qualified and absolute. 3 Qualified immunity is the norm for executive officials. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 807 , 102 S Ct 2727 , 73 L Ed 2d 396 (1982). … It protects conduct that “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, 457 US at 818 ; see also Anderson v.

Coleman v. Oregon Parks & Recreation Department

347 Or. 94 · Oregon Supreme Court · Sep 24, 2009

ORS 105.688(2)(a) and (c) together require that, to qualify for immunity, a landowner must impose no fee to enter or use its land, except a fee of less than $75 per cord to use the land for woodcutting. … Because the state did not establish that it made “no charge for permission to use” Tugman Park, it did not establish that it was entitled to recreational immunity under ORS 105.682 or that it was “entitled to prevail as a

State v. Randolph

17 L.R.A. 470 · Oregon Supreme Court · Oct 17, 1892

Both proceed upon the hypothesis that the act grants privileges or immunities to one class of persons while it denies the same privileges or immunities to another class. … The act does not grant privileges or immunities to any citizen or class of citizens either within or without the state; it only establishes a rule of evidence by which qualification to practice medicine and surgery is to

Schutz v. La Costita Iii, Inc.

364 Or. 536 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 14, 2019

(concluding that stepfather buying drinks for stepson in public tavern qualified as social host). … Regardless, the current pleadings seem to indicate that defendants would qualify as social hosts.

Ramstead v. Morgan

219 Or. 383 · Oregon Supreme Court · Dec 16, 1959

After considerable hesitation, we are of the opinion that the question should be answered in the affirmative, that a case like this is clearly within the spirit, if not the letter, of the established *393 rule. … It is argued that the words “in good faith” were not intended to qualify this indefeasible immunity but were inserted in the statute to preserve to the person defamed his common law action for malicious prosecution.

Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State

331 Or. 634 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 8, 2001

to have violated ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ … Thus, the defense of qualified immunity is lost if two elements are present: (1) a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) that the right violated, at the time of the violation, was clearly established.

Turner v. State Ex Rel. Department of Transportation

359 Or. 644 · Oregon Supreme Court · May 26, 2016

Dept. of Transportation that removing parking spaces or reconfiguring parking on Highway 101 at Collins Street would qualify as low-cost. … Because we have determined that ODOT has failed to establish under the requisite summary judgment stan- dard a factual proposition that is essential to its affirmative defense of discretionary immunity based on the STIP selec

Vokoun v. City of Lake Oswego

335 Or. 19 · Oregon Supreme Court · Oct 24, 2002

Therefore, they assert, the city failed to establish its immunity. … Such decisions do not qualify for discretionary immunity. See Mosley, 315 Or at 89 (describing decisions made by employees in course of day-to-day activities as not qualifying for discretionary immunity).

Fay v. City of Portland

311 Or. 68 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jan 17, 1991

a claim of qualified immunity maybe established. … The only immunity in dispute in the present case at this time is absolute judicial immunity. No claim of qualified immunity has been raised or argued by the parties.

Garrison v. Deschutes County

334 Or. 264 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jun 21, 2002

On plaintiffs’ appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that: (1) the doctrine of qualified immunity protected the exercise of discretion by county employees in designing the transfer station; and (2) the county’s failure … As this court stated in Mosley , “[n]ormally, a choice within the permissible range, in order to qualify for immunity, is one that has been made by a supervisor or policy-making body.” 315 Or at 92.

Westfall v. State of Oregon

355 Or. 144 · Oregon Supreme Court · Apr 10, 2014

The PTA’s choice to have the sentence run consecutive to sen- tences imposed the same day, plaintiff argued, was not the sort of decision that qualified for discretionary immunity. … When Discretionary Immunity Applies to Employees Who Apply Policy In this case, the department established a gen- eral policy that, for purposes of our analysis in this case, Cite as 355 Or 144 (2014) 159 we

Turner v. Dept. of Transportation

Oregon Supreme Court · May 26, 2016

Dept. of Transportation that removing parking spaces or reconfiguring parking on Highway 101 at Collins Street would qualify as low-cost. … Because we have determined that ODOT has failed to establish under the requisite summary judgment stan- dard a factual proposition that is essential to its affirmative defense of discretionary immunity based on the STIP selec

Mosley v. Portland School District No. 1J

315 Or. 85 · Oregon Supreme Court · Dec 24, 1992

Normally, a choice within the permissible range, in order to qualify for immunity, is one that has been made by a supervisor or policy-making body. Lowrimore v. Dimmitt, supra, 310 Or at 296 ; Fazzolari v. … Plaintiffs fourth allegation — that defendant was negligent in failing to stop the fight before the knife was used — is not as clearly a policy judgment as are the facts asserted in plaintiffs first allegation.

Wright v. White

166 Or. 136 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 4, 1941

See, to the same effect, 1 Chitty on Pleadings, 89. *145 The first case in which the rule of immunity was invoked in hehalf of an officer of the naval or military establishment is Sutton v. Johnstone, 1 Eng. Rul. … but applying to the acts of officers of the army and navy in the enforcement of military discipline the same rule of public policy that gave rise to the immunity of judges — an immunity established “to secure their independence

Praggastis v. Clackamas County

305 Or. 419 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 29, 1988

All judgments shall specify clearly the judgment debtor, judgment creditor, the amount to be recovered, the relief granted or other determination of the action. … Where the clerk neglected to notify a party as to the date of entry of judgment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the clerk was not qualified for absolute immunity because the actions were

Starrett/Nichols v. Myers

330 Or. 147 · Oregon Supreme Court · Apr 6, 2000

Voluntary compliance creates qualified immunity from civil liability.” … Voluntary compliance creates qualified immunity from civil liability. For lawful transfers, generally requires record destruction within 24 hours; current law authorizes record retention for five years.

Blacknall v. Westwood Corporation

307 Or. 113 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 16, 1988

If it did, it is immune from tort liability to the plaintiff. If it did not, it is not immune. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the defendant. We affirm. … ORS 656.407(1) requires every employer to “establish proof with the director that the employer is qualified either: (a) As a carrier-insured employer by causing a guaranty contract issued by a guaranty contract insurer to

Lowell v. Medford School Dist. 549C

370 Or. 79 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jul 28, 2022

Unless such an executive officer can claim immunity on the basis of a quasi-judicial or legis- lative function, he is held to be subject to qualified privilege only.” W. Page Keeton, Dan B. … immunity would apply).

Santiam Fish & Game Ass'n v. State Tax Commission

229 Or. 506 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jan 17, 1962

As a corollary to that rule, the taxpayer has the burden of showing that it is qualified to claim the tax immunity. … For while it is now clearly established that a charity may carry on some commercial business without losing •its exemption [citing authorities], we think it is equally clear that an organization of a commercial character