Case law

Holcomb v. Sunderland

321 Or. 99 · Oregon Supreme Court · May 12, 1995

Plaintiff also asserts that denial of credit for time served would violate his state and federal constitutional rights to equal privileges and immunities and equal protection, respectively. 1 Defendants and the state, which … We turn then to consider whether a sentence of probation, with jail time as a condition of probation, qualifies as a judgment of imprisonment for which back time credit must be afforded.

Mid-County Future Alternatives Committee v. City of Portland

310 Or. 152 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jul 17, 1990

“Conversely, a general law addressed primarily to substantive social, economic, or other regulatory objectives of the state prevails over contrary policies preferred by some local governments if it is clearly intended to … In a city, not more than 15 percent of the qualified voters may be required to propose legislation by the initiative, and not more than 10 percent of the qualified voters may be required to order a referendum on legislation

Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing

Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 7, 2024

Oregon law establishes that “a presump- tion will be indulged against an intention to contract for immunity from the consequence of one’s own negligence.” Waterway Terminals v. P.S. … “A contract will not be construed to provide immunity from consequences of a party’s own negligence unless that inten- tion is clearly and unequivocally expressed[.]”

Nearing v. Weaver

295 Or. 702 · Oregon Supreme Court · Oct 4, 1983

Helikson, 277 Or 781 , 562 P2d 540 (1977), in which plaintiffs legal interest also was established by a specific court order designed to protect plaintiff against the very harm that occurred. … Nonetheless it clearly gave rise to a duty of defendants toward the plaintiffs under the 1977 act.

Portland Police Ass'n v. Civil Service Board

292 Or. 433 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jan 26, 1982

Justice Larsen dissented, saying: “The overriding question to be asked here is whether this Court is going to permit a Commission established by the legislature to ‘enact’ rules contrary to those established by the legislature … And, clearly, the Commission itself was not given any authority in the Act to remedy all of society’s ills on its own.” 412 A2d at 879 .

Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing

Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 7, 2024

Oregon law establishes that “a presump- tion will be indulged against an intention to contract for immunity from the consequence of one’s own negligence.” Waterway Terminals v. P.S. … “A contract will not be construed to provide immunity from consequences of a party’s own negligence unless that inten- tion is clearly and unequivocally expressed[.]”

Johnson v. SAIF Corp.

343 Or. 139 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jul 26, 2007

* * immunity.” … those in favor of immunity. 9 C.

Clarke v. Oregon Health Sciences University

343 Or. 581 · Oregon Supreme Court · Dec 28, 2007

Early cases, Smothers explained, held that “the purpose of the remedy clause is to save from legislative abolishment those jural rights which had become well established prior to the enactment of our Constitution.” … Justice Linde concurred separately, asserting that “the court has allowed legislative immunization of cities from tort liability only on condition that the individuals who are personally responsible for harm qualifying as

United Contracting Co. v. Duby

134 Or. 1 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 19, 1930

The same principle is *17 very clearly expressed in the following much quoted language taken from Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. … He is bound to establish it. The state is a political corporate body, can act only through agents, and can command only by laws.

State v. Little

241 Or. 557 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 10, 1965

Therefore, the defendant argues, the legislature intended to make persons under sixteen immune from criminal liability. … However, under ORS 419.533 (1) (c), an intent to permit the juvenile court to remand a child at some future time is clearly expressed in the section.

Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Spokesman Publishing Co.

127 Or. 196 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 13, 1928

It must be conceded that the evidence introduced by defendant is sufficient to establish that plaintiff is doing business within the state. The evidence was *201 uncontradicted. … We are of the opinion that plaintiff is not deprived of the right of access to our courts because it transacted other business in the state without having paid the required license fee and otherwise qualifying to do intrastate

Heino v. Harper

306 Or. 347 · Oregon Supreme Court · Aug 2, 1988

Restatement (Second) Torts § 895F (1979) provides: “(1) A husband or wife is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship. “(2) Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish … that, “whatever may be our views we do not feel justified in declining to accept it as the established law of this state.”

Grubb v. JOHNSON

205 Or. 624 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 23, 1955

Co., et al., supra, a portion of the alleged libel came within the doctrine of qualified privilege. … The court said that the evidence clearly disclosed a privileged communication.

State v. Oatney

369 Or. 555 · Oregon Supreme Court · Apr 21, 2022

documents are rel- evant and admissible for [defendant’s] defense,” but argued that, because defendant “seeks to make selective use of sup- pressed evidence and lead the jury to inaccurate inferences,” that “evidence would clearly … that the defense arguments permitted by paragraph (3) would mis- lead the trier of fact and open the door to permit the state to call Johnston to testify, the state argues that, “[a]s a general matter, it is well established

Budget Rent-A-Car of Washington-Oregon, Inc. v. Multnomah County

287 Or. 93 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jul 12, 1979

Dept., which gave such commerce a degree of "free trade” immunity from state taxes, see 430 US at 278-279 ; but it is not necessarily discriminatory. … power comprised in that general authority were specifically listed in ORS 203.030 to 203.065. "(2) The power granted by this section is in addition to other grants of power to counties, shall not be construed to limit or qualify

State ex rel. Travis v. Imbler

236 Or. 493 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 4, 1964

Judge Higgins was elected to the office of county judge of Hood River county at the general election held November 8, 1960, qualified, and ever since has been the occupant of the office. … Jackson County, 177 Or 200, 211 , 161 P2d 782 , “the term of his office and the immunity of his salary from reduction during his term of office were protected by Article VII, § 1.”

Moro v. State of Oregon

357 Or. 167 · Oregon Supreme Court · Apr 30, 2015

See ORS 238.600(1) (“It is the intent of the Legislative Assembly that [PERS] be qualified and maintained under sections 401(a), 414(d) and 414(k) of the Internal Revenue Code as a tax-qualified defined benefit governmental … Thus, the legislature clearly intended that the 1995 offset would not be contractual.

Zockert v. Fanning

310 Or. 514 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 8, 1990

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL The pioneers who adopted the Oregon Constitution clearly had in mind that assistance of counsel was among the privileges of Oregon citizenry. 7 Events since statehood only reinforce the strength of entitlement … We conclude that the scope of the constitution’s qualifying words, “upon the same terms,” in the context *522 of this case, would cover all parents threatened by permanent termination of parental rights.

Kalyton v. Kalyton

45 Or. 116 · Oregon Supreme Court · Dec 14, 1903

thus rendering them self-supporting and partially qualified to compete with the Caucasian race. … of their minds, followed by cohabitation, and, under the rule announced, established the existence of a valid marriage.

George v. City of Portland

114 Or. 418 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 18, 1925

lawful business, the management of which might be injurious to the public, may be regulated so as to limit the place or to prescribe the manner in which it shall be conducted, provided that in doing so no privileges or immunities … This freedom, however, is not an absolute, but a qualified right, and is, therefore, subject to reasonable restraint in the interest of the public welfare.” 12 C. J. 1200.