Case law

In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of O'Byrne

298 Or. 535 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jan 22, 1985

No risk as he [O’Byrne] will pay us interest on our money until we are qualified.” … Therefore, it was clearly intended the $46,000 would be used by me as I needed it while taking the time to get a venture going for us.

State v. Isom

313 Or. 391 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jul 9, 1992

The jury instructions, when read as a whole, clearly instructed the jury to consider all mitigating evidence, whether or not that mitigating evidence was causally related to the crime. … We nonetheless will address defendant’s argument in the methodology long-established by this court — first under Oregon statutory law, then under the Oregon Constitution, and finally under the United States Constitution.

Federal Securities Co. v. Federal Securities Corp.

129 Or. 375 · Oregon Supreme Court · Feb 19, 1929

Those circumstances may authorize the inference that the omission of the qualifying phrase was inadvertent. … We quote the following from the decision: “A corporate charter grants no immunity in the use of a deceptive name. The same rule applies to corporate names as applies to the name of natural persons.

Benton County v. Friends of Benton County

294 Or. 79 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 23, 1982

Kenagy did not have a sufficient interest to qualify as a petitioner before LUBA. It did not question that the organization would qualify if he did. … This language was deleted by the amendments establishing LUBA.

Seaton v. Security Savings & Trust Co.

131 Or. 261 · Oregon Supreme Court · Oct 18, 1929

L., requires proof of the agreement by competent or satisfactory evidence, but failed to define these qualifying words; (2) because, to adopt the plaintiff’s contention, the court did not make clear to the jury that any direct … His testimony may be used, perhaps to corroborate other evidence in the case, but it is not sufficient, in itself, to establish his claim.

State v. Hart

299 Or. 128 · Oregon Supreme Court · May 7, 1985

As the state gradually established a monopoly over the institution of punishment, and a division between civil and criminal law emerged, the victim’s right to compensation was incorporated into civil law. … We adhere to our view expressed in Dillon : “* * * [Restitution was clearly not intended to be the equivalent of a civil award. For example, it does not necessarily fully compensate the victim.

State Ex Rel. Cutlip v. Common Council

171 Or. 329 · Oregon Supreme Court · Apr 13, 1943

Inasmuch as this is now the established view, it is unnecessary to examine the early cases construing the constitutional amendments herein discussed. The defendants place much reliance upon the case of McKeon v. … Johns case is clearly distinguishable from the present one.” The ruling in McKeon v. Portland, supra, is further clarified in Greig v. Owyhee Irrigation District, 102 Or. 265, 273 , 202 P. 222 , thus: “. . .

Williams v. Portland General Electric Co.

195 Or. 597 · Oregon Supreme Court · Aug 13, 1952

In this case, the misleading and inconsistent instructions of which we have taken note clearly warranted the entry of the attacked order. … The trial judge, in entering his challenged order, said: “The evidence clearly supported most, if not all, of the charges of negligence made in the complaint.

Eklof v. Persson

369 Or. 531 · Oregon Supreme Court · Apr 21, 2022

The state reasoned that, in this case, petitioner was required to “allege and prove facts establishing that she could not reasonably have raised [her] claims in a timely post-conviction proceeding— that is, establishing that … See OEC 201(b).4 As with the above questions, the text and con- text of ORCP 23 A do not clearly resolve the issue, other than directing us to the broad requirements of “justice.”

Clark v. Jones

173 Or. 106 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 30, 1943

As to the distinction between these two qualified or determinable estates, see: Thompson on Real Property (Permanent Edition) § 2158; 19 Am. … Obviously, such a proposed sale would clearly *113 indicate an intention to discontinue use of the property for a public school: Johnson v. Lane, 199 Ark. 740 , 135 S. W. (2d) 853 .

McKinney v. Cooper

163 Or. 512 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jan 19, 1940

The law applicable herein is so well settled and established in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that there is no need of encumbering the reports by a restatement *519 thereof. Irwin v. … Clearly, the matter of which the plaintiff complains was pertinent and relevant to the issues, and it so appears from the face of the complaint.

State v. Parkerson

371 Or. 716 · Oregon Supreme Court · Dec 21, 2023

Defendant does not dispute that he may qualify as a dangerous offender under ORS 161.725; rather, defendant contends that the trial court did not comply with the sentencing procedures required by ORS 161.735. … Under either standard, however, reaching an issue is clearly discretionary. The majority is perfectly within its discretion to reach the issue here. I merely exercise my dis- cretion in the opposite direction.

Skidmore v. Skidmore

197 Or. 409 · Oregon Supreme Court · Feb 26, 1953

This is a material change in circumstances after the decree and stands undisputed and established.” … The plaintiff was clearly the prevailing party in the contempt proceeding. The reasonableness of the amount awarded has not been questioned. The fourth assignment of error lacks merit.

Loe Et Ux v. Lenhard

227 Or. 242 · Oregon Supreme Court · May 17, 1961

A trespass, once established, carries with it liability for resulting harm. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or 86 , supra. … The plaintiffs urge that their substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute satisfies the act when the legislative intent is clearly met.

Walsh v. Oregon Railway & Navigation Co.

10 Or. 250 · Oregon Supreme Court · Oct 15, 1882

But let it be conceded that the decided weight of judicial authority maintains that where a passenger projects his arm, elbow or head out of a car window, voluntarily, and without any qualifying circumstances impelling him … Justice Johnson says: “The fact of negligence is very seldom established by such direct and positive evidence that it can be taken from the consideration of the jury and pronounced upon as matter of law.

Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Roberts Bros.

192 Or. 23 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jun 27, 1951

It is now clearly apparent, however, that a wrong result was reached, and that an affirmance would make final a judgment which we now know cannot be justified under the law. “In A. Santaella & Co. v. Otto F. Lange Co. … None of the dissenting judges dissented on the ground that the transactions were not interstate or not illegal under the Sherman Act if they were not rendered immune by the Miller-Tydings Amendment.

Libby v. Olcott

66 Or. 124 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jul 22, 1913

The act clearly designates them, not as laws thereafter to be passed, but in the words “all measures passed by the twenty-seventh legislative assembly of the State of Oregon *129 upon which the referendum may he invoked.” … It qualifies the reservation of power by the people which they call the referendum. To the legislative assembly they have committed the authority to call special referendum elections.

Smith v. Durant

271 Or. 643 · Oregon Supreme Court · Apr 1, 1975

Defendant contends that Marshall should be “clarified” and “qualified,” if not reconsidered and overruled, and should not be applied to this case because prejudice may result in that the jury may reason that because there … established.

Thorsen v. Hooper

57 Or. 75 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jun 28, 1910

Thereafter Buell died intestate, and the plaintiffs were appointed and duly qualified as the representatives of his estate. … The issues were thus clearly defined and findings of fact should have been made thereon.

Archer v. Gage

126 Or. 532 · Oregon Supreme Court · May 13, 1928

One who has driven motor vehicles for a. considerable period is qualified to express his opinion on the subject. … If the very able counsel who offered this testimony had considered it substantive testimony tending to establish his case, he would have offered it on his direct ease.