Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
1,811 results
1.82s
308 Or. 508 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 30, 1989
Although Article IV, section 24, assumes the preexistence of sovereign immunity, nothing in its language establishes that immunity. … In any event, abolition by this court of common-law sovereign immunity would have no effect on the outcome of this case because the OTCA establishes partial immunity by statute. See Heino v.
Abrogated on other grounds by Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83 (2001)Cited 99 timesPublished256 Or. 485 · Oregon Supreme Court · Sep 18, 1970
The defendants are State Highway Commission officials and employees and their alleged negligence was in planning, establishing and maintaining the highway at the place of the accident. … We do not construe this statute as clearly evidencing a legislative intent to change the law and to take away the immunity granted to public employees.
Cited 80 timesPublishedRagsdale v. Department of Revenue
321 Or. 216 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jun 2, 1995
In contrast, under Oregon Laws 1991, chapter 796, every state retiree who qualifies for benefits (based on years of service) will receive the benefits, regardless of the state retiree’s residency. … A tax rebate or tax benefit program only for state employees clearly would be impermissible. The Oregon law, however, is not a tax rebate program or a tax benefit. Everyone’s income is taxed equally.
Cited 11 timesPublished196 Or. 1 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jun 25, 1952
an established shop.” … Had the article used the word “shop” without the qualifying adjective there might be merit in the defendants’ contention, for, while the plaintiffs undoubtedly had a shop, the question is whether they “operated” from an established
Cited 32 timesPublishedErrand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc.
320 Or. 509 · Oregon Supreme Court · Feb 2, 1995
EDMUNDSON: “How about the earlier assertion that if an on-the-job condition does not qualify as a compen-sable claim, the employer would then be subject to liability for civil action?” … EDMUNDSON: “Web, if it was clearly not compen-sable, would your answer change?” KEENE: “Once it was litigated and turned out not to be? No. Because that’s what happened in my case.” SEN.
Cited 35 timesPublished365 Or. 504 · Oregon Supreme Court · Aug 15, 2019
Sabin was qualified to make those projections based on what she observed." … Charlene Sabin was qualified to make the projections in this regard based on what she observed during the evaluation. "4.
Cited 22 timesPublished126 Or. 588 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jun 26, 1928
The insurance commissioner, if he finds the agent qualified, shall thereupon issue to each such agent a license setting forth that such agent is entitled to act for the company appointing him for the balance of the current … It is further provided that the insurance commissioner shall thereupon issue to each such agent who is qualified a certificate setting forth that such agent is entitled to act for the company appointing him for the balance
Cited 8 timesPublishedNilsen v. DAVIDSON INDUSTRIES, INC.
226 Or. 164 · Oregon Supreme Court · Feb 21, 1961
Minimum safety standards are established, ORS 479.710 to 479.740, and labels for new electrical installations to be issued by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor required, ORS 479.550 to 479.570. … The offense and the penalty and the persons to whom they apply are expressly and clearly stated and it is simply a case where the defendants have misconstrued the exemption.
Cited 6 timesPublished303 Or. 580 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jul 8, 1987
First, as we stated in Stevenson , “[t]he burden is on the state to establish its immunity. * * * [Evidence of how the decision was made is necessary.” 290 Or at 15 . … If it is a continuing non-decision which is in issue, then clearly the state has not met its burden to establish its immunity.
Cited 37 timesPublishedBusch v. McInnis Waste Systems, Inc.
366 Or. 628 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jul 9, 2020
qualify- ing as a legal injury remain liable.” … in Article IV, section 24, of the Oregon Constitution, “established sovereign immunity as a constitutional doctrine.”3 Rather, sovereign immunity was a common-law doctrine that “was part of this state’s law at the time of
Cited 17 timesPublished158 Or. 61 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 3, 1937
Irwin, to establish by a preponderance of the testimony, that Mr. … It was not necessary to admit all the words charged, in order to rely upon a plea of qualified privilege.
Cited 21 timesPublishedUnited States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co.
273 Or. 162 · Oregon Supreme Court · Sep 18, 1975
Oregon cases cited by defendant are clearly distinguishable from the fact situation at bar. … Defendant argues on appeal that plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action for indemnity because it did not plead ultimate facts to establish its own liability to the injured employe and because defendant is not liable
Cited 24 timesPublishedTijerina v. Cornelius Christian Church
273 Or. 58 · Oregon Supreme Court · Sep 5, 1975
Nonetheless, the record is sufficient for us to determine that defendant’s land does not come within the limitations of duty established by ORS 105.665. … to owners of all land opened to recreation with the express purpose of avoiding a grant of immunity to all recreational land.
Cited 17 timesPublished349 Or. 267 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 18, 2010
Although a person certainly may hike on a road, nothing in the statute suggests that hiking is the only outdoor activity on a road that would qualify as a “recreational purpose” within the meaning of ORS 105.672(5). … The TMP notes that BLM “is not a public road authority and cannot dedicate public roads” and that BLM roads do not fit the criteria for public roads established by the United States Secretary of Transportation. *277 Regarding
Cited 8 timesPublished374 Or. 699 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jan 22, 2026
In this case, the common-law model clearly provides a remedy for the alleged breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care. … See ORS 656.012 (establishing the work- ers’ compensation system to provide benefits and medical care regardless of fault).
Cited 4 timesPublishedStevenson v. State Ex Rel. Department of Transportation
290 Or. 3 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 4, 1980
We noted that our prior case law had established that public employes were not liable for negligently performing a discretionary function, and identified two possible reasons for the doctrine of public employes’ immunity: … The burden is on the state to establish its immunity. In some instances, the nature of the function alone is sufficient to establish immunity. In other instances, evidence of how the decision was made is necessary.
Cited 72 timesPublished296 Or. 718 · Oregon Supreme Court · Apr 17, 1984
Sorrentino, 248 NY 626 , 162 NE 551 (1928), and the qualified phrasing of the rule in other jurisdictions. 189 Or at 296-301 . … Instead, the Restatement propounded the rule as follows: “(1) A parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship. “(2) Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish
Cited 55 timesPublished127 Or. 680 · Oregon Supreme Court · Dec 2, 1928
It only establishes a rule of evidence by which qualifications to practice medicine and surgery is to be determined. … Any citizen may qualify himself in the manner pointed out by the law, and the privilege to so qualify is denied to no one.
Cited 3 timesPublished253 Or. 658 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jul 16, 1969
not a conversion, or so narrow as to exclude conduct which clearly is.” ③ The first Restatement of Torts was guilty of the same semantic fault. … This is a part of the larger problem of establishing the scope of the privilege or immunity for governmental officers. ⑤ *667 The problem is concisely stated in 2 Harper & James on Torts, § 29.10, pp. 1640, 1641-42 (1956)
Cited 78 timesPublished318 Or. 593 · Oregon Supreme Court · Apr 14, 1994
Health care providers may opt out, are immune from civil, criminal liability for good faith compliance. Criminal penalties for violations.” … Petitioners Myers et al argue that the certified question is deficient because “[t]he chief purpose [of the proposed measure] is clearly to remove criminal sanctions to doctor assisted suicide.”
Cited 3 timesPublished
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