Case law

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  • In Re Academy Answering Services, Inc.

    90 B.R. 291 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Jul 22, 1988

    In order to qualify under § 7430 a party must satisfy three criteria: it must substantially prevail; it must have exhausted its administrative remedies; and, it must establish that the position of the United States in the … In its extensive discussion of sovereign immunity in In re Inslaw, 76 B.R. 224, 228-37 (Bankr.D.Dist.Col.1987), the court summarized its reasons for rejecting the government’s claim of immunity: The “plain language” of Section

    Reversed on other grounds by United States v. Academy Answering Service, Inc. (In Re Academy Answering Service, Inc.), 100 B.R. 327 (1989)Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Storey v. City of Toledo (In Re Cook United, Inc.)

    117 B.R. 301 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Jun 26, 1990

    Accordingly, with both the governmental unit’s (City’s) claim and the estate’s claim arising under the same occurrence, a limited waiver of the City’s sovereign immunity has been established. … Conclusion A waiver of sovereign immunity has been established under § 106 of the Bankruptcy Code, and the City’s motion to dismiss is hereby denied. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . See, "Occurrence”: A coming or happening.

    Criticized by William Ross, Inc. v. Biehn Construction, Inc. (In Re William Ross, Inc.), 199 B.R. 551 (1996)Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Pitts v. Ohio Department of Taxation (In Re Pitts)

    241 B.R. 862 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Sep 9, 1999

    The first and most obvious source is the Bankruptcy Clause contained in Article I of the United States Constitution which clearly confers upon Congress the authority to establish uniform bankruptcy laws in the United States … Waiver and Consent to be Sued It is a long established principle that a state may waive its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and consent to be sued in federal court. See, e.g., Clark v.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • In Re Phillips

    45 B.R. 529 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Nov 23, 1984

    The Owens Illinois Employee Benefit Book clearly states that severance pay is available only “if you should lose your job through no fault of your own.” … The Ohio statute does not provide a definition of reasonably necessary, therefore, the court looks to the legislative history and the case law to establish a standard. The U.S.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Maus v. Joint Township District Mem. Hospital (In Re Maus)

    282 B.R. 836 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · May 14, 2002

    In its defense, however, the Creditor argues that its garnishment action is immune from attack because of what is known as the small preference exception as set forth in § 547(c)(8). … Such an interpretation would clearly be contrary to Congress’ intentions. Id. (internal citations omitted).

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • In Re LTV Steel Co., Inc.

    264 B.R. 455 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Jul 2, 2001

    Second, a state’s sovereign immunity may be circumvented if the state expressly waives its sovereign immunity. College Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. … The Tribe’s lawsuit sought a declaratory judgment to establish its right to exclusive use and occupancy of the submerged lands as well as establishing the invalidity of all state laws that regulated or affected the submerged

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Hunter v. Ferris (In re Ferris)

    30 B.R. 746 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Jun 17, 1983

    Debtors allege that they were not entitled to a tax refund for 1980, and that they would have offered the Trustee copies of their W-2 forms to establish this fact. c.) … order to respond to a material question or to testify; (B) on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination, to respond to a material question approved by the court or to testify, after the debtor has been granted immunity

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Hunter v. WSOS Community Action Commission (In Re Nolen)

    175 B.R. 214 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Sep 13, 1994

    Thus, a review of the Plan clearly demonstrates that it is subject to ERISA. Third, the Plan satisfies the anti-alienation requirement of ERISA under 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (d)(1). … The Code provisions noted above clearly indicate that the method of calculation does not effect the “pension plan” status of a plan.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • In Re Wiggins

    60 B.R. 89 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Feb 13, 1986

    Both parties have admitted that this plan qualifies for the tax benefits available under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). … In the absence of other considerations, this conclusion would appear to allow any ERISA plan to automatically qualify for immunity under Section 541(c)(2).

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Matter of Lumara Foods of America, Inc.

    50 B.R. 809 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Jun 12, 1985

    Similarly, the taxing priority of Section 64a(4) was modified to expand the enumerated list of qualified taxes and was clarified to expressly require that these taxes were to be pre-petition taxes. Id. at 357-358. … It is noted that when Lumara filed its petition for relief it did not become immune to the reach of federal, state or local taxing authorities. Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441 , 24 S.Ct. 695 , 48 L.Ed. 1060 (1904).

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • In Re Fichter

    45 B.R. 534 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Nov 28, 1984

    Clearly the question is not whether all annuities (and any plan merely labeling itself annuity) are exempt under Ohio law but whether this annuity qualifies according to the requirements of O.R.C. § 3911.10. … That court answered in the following manner: Congress did allow differences between qualified pension plans and IRAs to remain and chose to establish and regulate them according to different statutory formulas.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Damschroeder v. Williams (In Re Williams)

    398 B.R. 464 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Aug 22, 2008

    To qualify as the type of marital debt excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(15), the Plaintiff bears the burden to establish the existence of three elements: (1) the debt in question is to a spouse, former spouse or child … It is established jurisprudence that the court from which an order or judgment is rendered is in the best position to interpret its own order or judgment. Amado v.

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Corzin v. Lawson (In re Lawson)

    570 B.R. 563 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Mar 31, 2017

    A Plaintiff movant must establish all essential elements supporting its claim in this fashion; a defendant must establish that any one (or more) essential elements of Plaintiffs claim fails, or establish all elements of one … See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (a) (all ERISA-qualified plans must provide for qualified joint and survivor annuities whenever a vested participant does not die before the date benefits begin, and for a qualified preretirement

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • In Re Westfall

    365 B.R. 755 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · May 17, 2007

    Clearly, “price” and “value given” may include an amount greater than the actual value of the collateral. … Clearly, the dual status rule was adopted in commercial transactions. See O.R.C. § 1309.103(F).

    Cited 27 timesPublished
  • In Re Monro

    282 B.R. 841 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Jun 6, 2002

    (iii) The plan or contract is not qualified under the “Internal Revenue Code of 1986,” 100 Stat. 2085 , 26 U.S.C. § 1 , as amended. … However, as the above language clearly shows, there exist significant differences between paragraphs (A)(10)(a) and (A)(10)(b).

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • In Re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc.

    221 B.R. 737 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Jun 11, 1998

    “Current” clearly refers to the postpetition prerejeetion period. … Therefore, the only real support for an allocation interpretation stems from the *740 fact that a performance date interpretation conflicts with the principle of creditor equality and established law governing administrative

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Gertz v. Warner (In re Warner)

    570 B.R. 582 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Apr 14, 2017

    A Plaintiff movant must establish all essential elements supporting its claim in this fashion; a defendant must establish that any one (or more) essential elements of Plaintiffs claim fails, or establish all elements of one … The effect of this is that although contingent interests are clearly property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 541(a), the contingency of the interest may prevent the bankruptcy trustee from ever utilizing the property

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • In Re Leadbetter

    111 B.R. 640 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Mar 1, 1990

    primary purpose of providing benefits upon retirement by reason of age, health, or length of service, and which is either (A) qualified under section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, or any successor thereto, or (B) established … It merely is a qualified deferred compensation program which was not intended to provide for the maintenance and support of its beneficiaries.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Adams v. Adams (In Re Adams)

    241 B.R. 880 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Oct 15, 1999

    In this case, however, there is absolutely no doubt that the Plaintiff has met this burden as the facts of this case clearly shows that on November 18, 1998, the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, through an entry of divorce … It should be noted for the record that the attorney representing the Defendant in the Parties’ divorce action never actually prepared the qualified domestic relations order as required by the state court.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Matter of Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.

    85 B.R. 437 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio · Dec 7, 1987

    Hott’s qualifications as an expert real estate appraiser are hardly established by his affidavit. … What is clearly perceived is *441 his reliance on other persons’ opinions who may or may not themselves be qualified to testify under Fed.R.Evid. 702.

    Cited 10 timesPublished

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