Case law

Brodie v. Summit County Children Services Board

51 Ohio St. 3d 112 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 23, 1990

When considering a motion for summary judgment for the defense of qualified immunity, the judge may determine not only the currently applicable law, but whether the law was clearly established at the time the alleged act … “If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. * * *” Id. at 818-819 . See, also, Anderson v.

Summerville v. City of Forest Park

128 Ohio St. 3d 221 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 27, 2010

Chapter 2744 or another provision of the law, including federal qualified immunity. … immunity if their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Vacha v. City of North Ridgeville

136 Ohio St. 3d 199 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 17, 2013

The court held that because an intentional tort may arise out of the employment relationship between a political subdivision and its employee, North Ridgeville did not establish that it was entitled to immunity as a matter … The court of appeals simply held that North Ridgeville did not establish entitlement to immunity as a matter of law. Id. at ¶ 23.

King v. Williams

5 Ohio St. 3d 137 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 8, 1983

The issue presented in this case is whether the driver of an emergency medical services vehicle operated by the city of Akron, and the city itself, qualify for immunity from liability under R.C. 701.02. … Appellee Williams was clearly employed by the city of Akron as a member of the fire department. In addition, the evidence is uncontradicted that the ambulance was on an emergency run at the time of the accident.

Greene County Agricultural Society v. Liming

89 Ohio St. 3d 551 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 6, 2000

The functions at issue clearly are not ones “imposed upon the state as an obligation of sovereignty.” … We stress that, upon remand, Mangan’s personal immunity is an open question, at this time neither established nor foreclosed.

Foran v. Fisher Foods, Inc.

17 Ohio St. 3d 193 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 5, 1985

We note that appellant’s complaint sounds strictly in negligence and any allegation of intentional conduct is clearly lacking. … If so, then appellee may invoke the constitutional and statutory immunity, thereby precluding appellant’s suit. Each lower court answered the query in the affirmative. We agree with their assessments.

Hecht v. Levin

66 Ohio St. 3d 458 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 23, 1993

The statute created a qualified immunity applying only to members of such committees. Id. … R.C. 2305.28 clearly creates a qualified privilege within its purview. On its face, moreover, it purports to apply to grievances filed against lawyers with local bar associations.

Pauley v. City of Circleville

137 Ohio St. 3d 212 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 16, 2013

that qualify as a recreational use are diverse. … “To qualify for recreational-user immunity, property need not be completely natural, but its essential character should fit within the *218 intent of the statute.” Id.

Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority

131 Ohio St. 3d 418 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 16, 2012

The appellate court disagreed, holding that “all of Sampson’s claims, including his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, clearly arose out of his employment relationship, thus barring CMHA from asserting … We hold that the evidence presented to the trial court established a genuine issue of material fact that would allow Sampson’s claims to survive summary judgment.

Greene Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming

89 Ohio St. 3d 551 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 6, 2000

The functions at issue clearly are not ones “imposed upon the state as an obligation of sovereignty.” {¶ 35} As to R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(b), the trial court based its decision finding the Society immune on this provision … We stress that, upon remand, Mangan’s personal immunity is an open question, at this time neither established nor foreclosed.

Donnelly v. Herron

88 Ohio St. 3d 425 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 17, 2000

The determination would not be in the least difficult if the court merely followed the well-established going-and-coming rule.” … In addition, any employee who seeks workers’ compensation benefits must be in the service of a qualifying employer, and if we held *429 that a coemployee is not in the service of a qualifying employer while driving in the

Yates v. Mansfield Board of Education

102 Ohio St. 3d 205 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 2, 2004

When the abuse was reported in this case, a relationship was established between the Clark children and DSS.” … Chapter 2744,141 Ohio Laws, Part 1,1699,1743, was not yet effective, and the public-duty rule was clearly viable.

Rogers v. City of Dayton

118 Ohio St. 3d 299 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 21, 2008

Instead, Dayton established a self-insurance program to directly pay damages in civil actions, consistent with R.C. 2744.08(A)(2)(a). … Chapter 2744 immunity.

Willitzer v. McCloud

6 Ohio St. 3d 447 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 7, 1983

It is a well-established rule that judges, counsel, parties, and witnesses *449 are absolutely immune from civil suits for defamatory remarks made during and relevant to judicial proceedings. … While performing these functions, he is entitled to only a qualified immunity.

C&D Partnership v. City of Gahanna

15 Ohio St. 3d 359 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1984

Clearly, the intent of the legislation was to require council to exercise an independent duty in reviewing the plat and that this duty extend beyond technical compliance, i.e., statutory compliance. … Similarly, immunity, either absolute or qualified, attaches to officials in Section 1983 lawsuits.

M.J. DiCorpo, Inc. v. Sweeney

69 Ohio St. 3d 497 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 29, 1994

The absolute privilege or “immunity” for statements made in a judicial proceeding extends to every step in the proceeding, from beginning to end. See Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts (5 Ed.1984) 819, Section 114. … immunity.”

Cater v. Cleveland

83 Ohio St. 3d 24 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 19, 1998

Thus, once immunity is established under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), the second tier of analysis is whether any of the five exceptions to immunity in subsection (B) apply. Former R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) through (5). … Indoor pools clearly are “within” buildings.

Hecht v. Levin

66 Ohio St. 3d 458 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 23, 1993

The statute created a qualified immunity applying only to members of such committees. Id. … No. 84. 7  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 17} R.C. 2305.28 clearly creates a qualified privilege within its purview.

Hauser v. Dayton Police Dept. (Slip Opinion)

140 Ohio St. 3d 268 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 28, 2014

Wathen, 115 F.3d at 405 (conceding that a “narrow and literal reading” of 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) implies that an employer’s agent is a statutory employer for liability purposes, but rejecting that reading as producing “a result clearly … While it comes close, Genaro does not qualify as binding precedent on the immunity question in this case. {¶ 17} The certified question in Genaro involved private-sector supervisors and managers, and it asked only whether

Bigelow v. Brumley

138 Ohio St. 574 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 12, 1941

to recognize rather than restrict the existence *Page 583 of occasions of absolute privilege, since the Ohio Constitution has no provision regarding privilege in judicial proceedings, which type of privilege nevertheless clearly … This is true of the judicial immunity ( Hoar v. Wood , 44 Mass. 193 ) and of the *Page 586 executive immunity ( Mellon v. Brewer, supra ).