Case law

Veolia Water N. Am. Operating Servs., Inc. v. Testa (Slip Opinion)

146 Ohio St. 3d 52 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 2, 2016

by the taxpayer which describes the pollution control activities. 6  January Term, 2016 STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE VEOLIA PLANT TO QUALIFY … industrial-water-pollution control {¶ 19} The exempt-facility provisions at R.C. 5709.20 et seq. constitute tax-reduction provisions that call for the applicant to meet a stringent burden of proof: Veolia must show that the statutes “ ‘clearly

State v. Jamison

49 Ohio St. 3d 182 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 7, 1990

The probative value of other robberies to prove identity is clearly illustrated in this case. … Appellant’s voluntary drug use does not qualify as duress or coercion, factor (2). While drugs may have caused appellant to rob, drugs did not prompt the murder.

Evans v. State

123 Ohio St. 132 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 17, 1930

Also the fact that the phrase “before or after the trial” qualifies this initial phrase only is shown by the fact that a second provision is enacted, namely, that the grand jury may represent to the court that any such accused … It is true that it might be more clearly phrased. It is also true that the first clause, which provides for suggestion by the attorney that the accused is insane, calls for the certificate of a reputable physician.

State v. Gross

97 Ohio St. 3d 121 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 30, 2002

Several of the photographs establish the location of a wound but fail to depict the wound as clearly as another photograph that presents a closer view of the wound — which in turn fails to establish the location of the wound … as clearly as the more distant photograph.

State ex rel. Taylor v. Cowen

96 Ohio St. (N.S.) 277 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 19, 1917

Under the conceded facts the respondent must establish his tenure under the appointment of May 27, 1915, which was for a term of four years from June 17 following. … Under that appointment he gave a valid bond in the sum of $10,000 and duly qualified thereunder.

State ex rel. Rose v. Lorain County Board of Elections

90 Ohio St. 3d 229 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 5, 2000

Accordingly, I would hold that the board of elections neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded applicable law in denying relators’ demand to place the referendum issue on the November 7, 2000 election ballot. … I would therefore deny the writ and leave well-established precedent undisturbed. This holding would not jeopardize the right to referendum; it would just require that the right be exercised in proper legal form.

Hicks v. Westinghouse Materials Co.

78 Ohio St. 3d 95 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 2, 1997

Accordingly, we cannot say that the decision of the trial court to grant appellees’ peremptory strike was clearly erroneous. … We qualify this conclusion 6  January Term, 1997 with caution.

Roe v. Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region

122 Ohio St. 3d 399 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 1, 2009

This concern clearly places the cart before the horse. … This case has clearly not been brought against a political subdivision.

State ex rel. Wilson v. Preston

173 Ohio St. (N.S.) 203 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 14, 1962

E. (2d), 67, Hart, J., defined a cause of action “as the fact or facts which establish or give rise to a right of action, the existence of which affords a party a right to judicial relief.” … In cases involving a state’s immunity from suit, there are certain areas wherein the state’s immunity does not extend to its officers.

Greer-Burger v. Temesi

116 Ohio St. 3d 324 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 12, 2007

If an objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized * * *.” Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. … for * * * retaliation,” Greer-Burger, 2006-Ohio-3690 , 2006 WL 2023571 , ¶ 36, the court of appeals failed to consider Greer-Burger’s concealment of her retaliation charge as it relates to the bankruptcy process. {¶ 27} Clearly

Corrigan v. Illum. Co. (Slip Opinion)

2017 Ohio 7555 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 13, 2017

But they have not established reversible error. Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10-27(E)(1) requires electric utilities to maintain a right-of-way vegetation-control program. … Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973). {¶ 25} Decided correctly, this case could easily qualify as a textbook example of mootness.

R.K.E. Trucking, Inc. v. Zaino

98 Ohio St. 3d 495 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 7, 2003

When asked whether the Tax Commissioner’s agent had requested RKE to establish those percentages, the witness responded, “I’m sure it came up.” … “The Tax Commissioner’s findings are presumptively valid, absent a demonstration that those findings are clearly unreasonable or unlawful.” Hatchadorian v.

State v. Silverman

121 Ohio St. 3d 581 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 9, 2009

. {¶ 40} The majority concludes that the text of Evid.R. 807 does not require a competence determination and opines that the Said court “sweepingly declared, without any authority, that ‘Evid.R. 807 clearly does not dispose … In other words, under unique circumstances, we make a qualified assumption that the declarant related what she believed to be true at the time she made the statement.

State ex rel. DeBlase v. Ohio Ballot Bd.

173 Ohio St. 3d 191 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 1, 2023

The petition must contain the signatures of at least 1,000 qualified electors of the state. Id. … As to the first two elements, absent evidence of fraud or corruption (which relators do not allege here), the standard is whether the board abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law in determining that the

State ex rel. Attorney General v. Mulhern

74 Ohio St. (N.S.) 363 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 26, 1906

The code is to be regarded as a whole, established uno flatu; and in order to harmonize apparently conflicting provisions, the court will look through the entire work, and gather such assistance as may be afforded by a complete … as provided by law, ’ ’ clearly implying that it is incumbent upon the general assembly to so provide.

State ex rel. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Industrial Commission

52 Ohio St. 3d 144 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 3, 1990

Upon its face, R.C. 1.48 establishes a threshold analysis which must be utilized prior to inquiry under Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.” Van Fossen, supra, paragraph one of the syllabus. … This statute is clearly prospective only in nature, as it affects only the calculation of awards for injuries occurring after October 1, 1963.

Phillips v. South Range Local School District Board of Education

45 Ohio St. 3d 66 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 23, 1989

This court reasonably concluded that under the circumstances in those cases the teachers had qualified for their continuing contracts. … The law of Ohio as previously pronounced by this court is clearly contrary to the conclusions reached here by the majority relying, in the main, upon the law as cited from other states.

State v. Pinkney

36 Ohio St. 3d 190 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 4, 1988

Clearly, the credibility of a witness may be affected by his ability to state correctly and clearly the facts as he remembers them and as they took place. … to establish the element of “knowingly.”

State ex rel. Riffe v. Brown

51 Ohio St. 2d 149 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 8, 1977

The brief filed on his behalf has not set forth any authority for the Secretary of State to set or establish the effective date of a law. 4 Rather, counsel for respondent chooses to rely on an alleged “longstanding practice … In the cause sub judice, we find that Section 5 of the law, conceded to be not subject to referendum, is clearly a condition upon the remaining sections of the law.

NCR Corp. v. Lindley

18 Ohio St. 3d 332 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 31, 1985

In order to facilitate the determination of whether a purchase qualifies for the direct-use-in-making-retail-sales exemption, the commissioner promulgated guidelines, contained in Ohio Adm. … We are compelled to reject this contention under the established principle that this court will not condition a sales or use tax exemption upon managerial prudence in acquiring the property.