Case law

Meccon, Inc. v. University of Akron

126 Ohio St. 3d 231 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 21, 2010

We also explained that the purposes of competitive bidding, which are to prevent excessive costs and corrupt practices and to provide open and honest competition in bidding for public-improvement contracts, clearly militate … Ultimately, refusal to bid harms the public as the pool of qualified bidders shrinks.

Noseda v. Delmul

123 Ohio St. 647 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 20, 1931

E., 178, 179, that the words, “he drove his team walking towards the crossing,” are clearly a statement of finding of fact. … While this is a qualified statement, it is a statement of fact. The special verdict then states that the driver of the automobile was unable to divert the course of the automobile after it suddenly began to skid.

State v. Jackson

57 Ohio St. 3d 29 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 9, 1991

In this case, Jackson clearly understood his right not to talk to the police and exercised that right on September 5 and 6. … Although residual doubt does qualify as a significant “other factor,” we choose to give it no weight under the circumstances of this case. See R.C. 2929.04(B)(7); State v.

Lehman v. McBride

15 Ohio St. (N.S.) 573 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1863

To qualify a person for voting for township officers, residence in the township, is clearly necessary. But it does not follow, as a logical consequence, that the right to vote can be exercised only within the township. … We think, clearly not.

Durkin v. Williams

169 Ohio St. 3d 10 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 3, 2022

The appellate court’s mandate establishes the law of the case on the legal questions involved in that appeal, State ex rel. Baker v. … The necessary second step in evaluating John’s prohibition claim involves determining whether his argument so clearly establishes a violation of the mandate that Judge Williams’s lack of jurisdiction was patent and unambiguous

Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Spurlock

96 Ohio St. 3d 18 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 19, 2002

The burden is on the ‘next friend’ clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court. {¶14} “These limitations on the ‘next friend’ doctrine are driven by the recognition … The court found 4  January Term, 2002 that Leona Weber had not alleged facts that would qualify her as a “next friend” under Section 2242

State ex rel. Dobson v. Handwork (Slip Opinion)

159 Ohio St. 3d 442 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 26, 2020

Id. at ¶ 26. {¶ 15} Here, Judge Handwork clearly exercised judicial power. … The judge’s postjudgment orders do not qualify as “in aid of the appeal” inasmuch as they do not address “collateral issues like contempt, appointment of a receiver and injunction.” State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v.

State ex rel. Renner v. Athens Cty. Bd. of Elections

176 Ohio St. 3d 1 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 1, 2024

BACKGROUND {¶ 2} Renner is a resident and a qualified elector of Athens County, and she is the current mayor of the Village of Chauncey. … ANALYSIS {¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Renner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) she has a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) the board has a clear legal duty to provide

Disciplinary Counsel v. Anthony

138 Ohio St. 3d 129 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 24, 2013

Anthony signed a contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) only three months before the panel hearing and therefore did not establish that his addiction qualified as a mitigating factor under BCGD Proc.Reg … The record in this case does not establish that the panel complied with the notice requirements of that rule.

Anderson v. Millikin

9 Ohio St. (N.S.) 568 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1859

this country and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities … This is nowhere more fully and clearly admitted than in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 408 .

State v. Carrick

131 Ohio St. 3d 340 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 22, 2012

Contrary to the appellate court’s analysis in the conflict case, Compher, and Carrick’s assertions in this case, the statute at issue here does provide adequate qualifying language to prevent the statute from being unconstitutionally … Carrick has failed to establish “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statute was so unclear that he could not reasonably understand that it prohibited the acts in which he engaged.”

State v. French

72 Ohio St. 3d 446 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 5, 1995

Therefore, French waived the state’s burden to lay a foundation establishing substantial compliance with statutory and Department of Health regulations. … Clearly, without expert testimony, prejudice could result from a jury giving too much weight to the test result itself rather than focusing on the critical issue of the defendant’s conduct.

Simmons-Harris v. Goff

86 Ohio St. 3d 1 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 27, 1999

Direct government subsidies to a religious school are clearly unconstitutional. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 , 106 S.Ct. at 751 , 88 L.Ed.2d at 854 . … However, at this time, it is clearly established that bills enacted by the General Assembly may be challenged “on the basis that the original bill contained more than one subject in violation of Section 15(D), Article II

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. City of Painesville

15 Ohio St. 2d 125 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 10, 1968

If the result affects only the municipality itself, with no extraterritorial effects, the subject is clearly within the power of local self-government and is a matter for the determination of the municipality. … Therefore, this court determines that appellee is excluded from the operation of Ordinance No. 18-65 by virtue of having complied with the conditions enumerated in Section 4905.65 (B) (3), Revised Code, which qualify it for

State ex rel. Lecklider v. School Employees Retirement System

104 Ohio St. 3d 271 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 2004

Baluch felt that he was not qualified to give a recommendation concerning whether Lecklider was physically unable to do her job. {¶ 5} In June 2002, the medical advisory committee of SERS concluded that a second medical evaluation … Nevertheless, he noted that because “[sjtrenuous lifting * * * may clearly be a precipitating event in the recurrence of a rectocele,” he thought that a “permanent restriction on lifting, limiting her to 25 pounds would be

Village v. General Motors Corp.

15 Ohio St. 3d 129 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1984

It will be the claimant’s burden to establish, by way of expert testimony, that his injury was caused by a working condition within a definite time span. … A heart attack brought on by a sudden and dramatic stimulus, such as a severe muscular strain, is clearly compensable under our statute.

State ex rel. Norman v. Industrial Commission

1 Ohio St. 3d 263 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 18, 1982

Clearly, then, the commission acted properly in considering the report of Dr. Caruso, which contradicted that of Dr. DiMauro, in rendering its decision. … Comm., supra [(1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 55 ( 11 O.O.3d 216 )], do not require the commission to accept the factual findings stated in a properly qualified medical report at face value and unquestioningly adopt them as those of

State ex rel. Weinberger v. Miller

87 Ohio St. (N.S.) 12 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 3, 1912

One who rejoices in the performance of every clearly ascertained duty, will often find himself in disagreement with one who regards some duties of that character as unpleasant. … We *71 have seen as results of that judgment, not only the imperative disfranchisement of all constitutionally qualified electors who cannot read, but the most intelligent voters driven to annoying, and sometimes vain, search

Scott v. News-Herald

25 Ohio St. 3d 243 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 6, 1986

. * * *” Clearly, the head of a city school district has substantial responsibilities in the operation of the system. … In establishing an analytical framework to separate fact from opinion, a number of possibilities are open to us.

Standard Fire Insurance v. City of Fremont

164 Ohio St. (N.S.) 344 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 14, 1955

Of course, this common-law immunity has no application where the municipal functions are of a proprietary or private nature. … “Another reason forbidding the construction urged is that the language of the statute clearly indicates that it is to the physical highway that it refers in its method of construction, maintenance, defects, and repair.