Case law

LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek & Merklin

114 Ohio St. 3d 323 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 18, 2007

. {¶ 15} In Scholler, 10 Ohio St.3d 98 , 10 OBR 426, 462 N.E.2d 158 , this court recognized that attorneys have a qualified immunity from liability to third parties for acts or omissions concerning the representation of a … For that reason, the legal work done by defendants regarding that transfer does not implicate the fiduciary duties discussed in either Arpadi or Crosby , the privity exception of Simon is clearly inapplicable, and LeRoy and

Muenchenbach v. Preble Cty.

91 Ohio St. 3d 141 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 13, 2001

The term “general” is very clearly used not to modify the term “employed,” but to modify “highway transportation.” … Chapter 4511, it is modified or qualified by the phrase “being used in constructing” or “while being used in * * * construction.” See R.C. 4511.64 and 4511.69.

Hill v. City of Urbana

79 Ohio St. 3d 130 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 25, 1997

Chapter 2744 abrogates the common-law public-duty doctrine and the special-duty exception of governmental immunity. … Clearly, Urbana was involved in a proprietary function at the time of the accident. See, also, Ranells v.

Community Insurance v. Ohio Department of Transportation

92 Ohio St. 3d 376 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 25, 2001

Clearly, R.C. Chapters 2743 and 2744 involve different entities and raise different issues. R.C. Chapter 2743 waives state immunity. R.C. Chapter 2744 grants immunity to political subdivisions. Menefee v. … Judge Holmes, writing a separate concurrence in Lumbermens, stated, “If it be the legislative intent to establish the state policy that, under the limited waiver of governmental immunity of this chapter, a subrogated insurer

Krause v. State

31 Ohio St. 2d 132 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 19, 1972

The Constitutions of 1803 and 1851 were silent on the question of governmental immunity, but case law by this court clearly shows that it existed in Ohio. See State v. … Rptr. 89, 92 , 359 P. 2d 457, 460 , the California Supreme Court rejected a contention that the amendment established a substantive rule of immunity and stated: “If the section has any substantive significance it would appear

Butler v. Jordan

92 Ohio St. 3d 354 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 25, 2001

time.” 2  January Term, 2001 appellant to inspect and license2 type-B day-care homes and that the failure to carry out that duty qualified … Pease uses the term negligence to represent the carelessness of the city engineer in carrying out a task established by the political subdivision.

American Chemical Society v. Leadscope, Inc.

133 Ohio St. 3d 366 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 18, 2012

PREI, however, does not establish a two-part test for malicious prosecution. Rather, it establishes a two-part test for defeating a claim of Noerr-Pennington immunity. … ACS seeks to extend NoerrPennington immunity in this case to make it immune from liability for filing suit against the defendants. {¶ 131} PREI establishes that a party claiming immunity may still be liable if the suit at

Westropp v. E. W. Scripps Co.

148 Ohio St. 365 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 6, 1947

‘It is undisputed that there is a qualified privilege to publish matters affecting the interest of the general public, but there is some disagreement as to its extent. … But even as to the conduct of public affairs, which is a matter of legitimate public concern, immunity has been limited quite strictly in the case of false statements of fact, as distinguished from discussion in the form

Cooperman v. University Surgical Associates, Inc.

32 Ohio St. 3d 191 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 2, 1987

Immunity, for purposes of a federal claim, is clearly a question of federal law. Hampton v. Chicago (C.A. 7, 1973), 484 F. 2d 602 , 607, certiorari denied (1974), 415 U.S. 917 ; accord Martinez v. … Id, Here, appellee has not alleged or argued that the taking is pursuant to an established state procedure.

Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce

96 Ohio St. 3d 266 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 4, 2002

That the state already enjoys some measure of qualified immunity for discretionary functions cuts against recognition of an additional rule insulating public entities from liability merely because of their public status. … Montpelier (1993), 161 Vt. 168, 178-179, 638 A.2d 561 (declining to adopt the public-duty rule as a means of limiting municipal liability when qualified official immunity for discretionary functions already existed).

Hoskins v. Cleveland

2026 Ohio 1225 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 8, 2026

Political subdivisions—Immunity from suit—R.C. … When an exception applies, immunity can be reinstated if the political subdivision establishes one of the defenses found in R.C. 2744.03(A). See McConnell v.

Sanderbeck v. County of Medina

130 Ohio St. 3d 175 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 20, 2011

R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(e) specifically defines the maintenance and repair of roads to be a governmental function. {¶ 12} Nonetheless, R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) establishes an exception to this immunity: “[P]olitical subdivisions … a claimant to establish that an exception to immunity exists by merely asserting that a road does not have a certain skid-resistance number.

Campbell v. Burton

92 Ohio St. 3d 336 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 25, 2001

(Emphasis added.) {¶ 35} As individual employees of Fairborn, Mallonee and Clifton were also entitled to qualified immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). … in connection with a governmental or proprietary function, the following defenses or immunities may be asserted to establish nonliability.”

Turner v. Central Local School District

85 Ohio St. 3d 95 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 24, 1999

In answering the question in the affirmative, we reasoned: “Because primary assumption of risk, when applicable, prevents a plaintiff from establishing the duty element of a negligence case and so entitles a defendant to … Central, a school district and thus a political subdivision, clearly had the right to rely upon the immunity provisions found in the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, R.C. Chapter 2744. See R.C. 2744.01(F).

Brown v. City of Cleveland

66 Ohio St. 2d 93 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 29, 1981

At this stage of Ohio jurisprudence, it would almost seem unnecesssary to state that zoning ordinances which are enacted pursuant to a municipality’s police powers are presumed valid until the contrary is clearly shown by … Thus, appellant’s non-conforming use is not immune from compliance with the foregoing parking provisions of the zoning code. Appellant’s immunity argument runs contrary to the prevailing law.

Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc.

68 Ohio St. 2d 20 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 4, 1981

C. 5321.04 clearly imposes a duty to repair on landlords. In light of the public policy and drastic changes made by the statutory scheme of R. C. … However, in addition to negligence per se, proximate cause for the injuries sustained must be established. Schell and Patton, supra.

NACCO Industries, Inc. v. Tracy

79 Ohio St. 3d 314 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 6, 1997

Before we proceed, however, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s caveat that a “court must proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly established. … We have no evidence clearly establishing that a substantial burden on the federal government’s borrowing power would actually be imposed. {¶ 24} Section 3124 is an indication of an intent to immunize only the federal

Wallace v. Ohio Department of Commerce

96 Ohio St. 3d 266 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 4, 2002

That the state already enjoys some measure of qualified immunity for discretionary functions cuts against recognition of an additional rule insulating public entities from liability merely because of their public status. … Montpelier (1993), 161 Vt. 168, 178-179 , 638 A.2d 561 (declining to adopt the public-duty rule as a means of limiting municipal liability when qualified official immunity for discretionary functions already existed).

State ex rel. Hoel v. Brown

105 Ohio St. (N.S.) 479 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 5, 1922

“A trial by court of justice, according to the regular and established course of judicial proceedings.” “Process due according to the law of the land.” … It must have been clearly intended that a “complaint and hearing” should be allowed “to all officers.”

Ladrigan v. Clermont Cty., Ohio Sewer & Water Co.

81 Ohio St. 3d 359 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 8, 1998

. {¶ 4} Like this court in Hill, the court of appeals below concluded that “R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(c) clearly defines ‘[t]he establishment, maintenance, and operation of a * * * municipal corporation water supply system … where an exception to immunity applies.