Case law

State v. D'Ambrosio

73 Ohio St. 3d 141 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 16, 1995

Defendant’s age of twenty-six clearly negates R.C. 2929.04(B)(4). … Appellant also qualified as an expert with the M-16 and other firearms. The Army offered to promote appellant if he re-enlisted at the conclusion of his initial term, but he declined.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Hilburn

135 Ohio St. 3d 1 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 3, 2012

Hilburn also explained that she had recently been diagnosed as a Type II diabetic and that for some months she had had difficulty thinking clearly. … On November 13, 2007, Hilburn filed a complaint to establish a parent-child relationship on Tribune’s behalf in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. {¶ 18} Hilburn filed an amended

MIB, Inc. v. Tracy

83 Ohio St. 3d 154 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 23, 1998

The facts in this case clearly show that MIB’s members do come into possession of information from MIB’s computers. … The Tax Commissioner further contends that MIB does not qualify for the exemption because MIB does not provide access to credit information.

State ex rel. Brothers v. Zellar

7 Ohio St. 2d 109 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 13, 1966

of the Governor and consent of the Senate) and qualifies. … qualified.

Doe v. Columbus

2026 Ohio 1095 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 1, 2026

However, R.C. 2505.02 provides limited circumstances under which interlocutory orders qualify as “final orders” and may be appealed immediately. See Glenn at ¶ 10. … Therefore, the preliminary-injunction order at issue here will qualify as a final and appealable order if it meets both conditions set forth in R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). A.

Campanella v. Lindley

67 Ohio St. 2d 290 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 22, 1981

In order to qualify as a “tax” computation, the commissioner’s action must relate to the taxable status of the property in question. See Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Bowers (1961), 172 Ohio St. 14 . … Such discretion is clearly absent in this case. Here, the taxable status of the property had already been established, without objection.

Negin v. Board of Building & Zoning Appeals of the City of Mentor

69 Ohio St. 2d 492 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 26, 1982

The majority opinion concludes that a nonconforming use was established as to the minimum area and frontage requirements for home construction. … Clearly, the resulting traffic congestion in the street could present serious dangers to the public welfare. Furthermore, the majority opinion cites Curtiss v.

State ex rel. Moorehead v. Industrial Commission

112 Ohio St. 3d 27 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 20, 2006

Assembly, when considering the worker’s entitlement to a scheduled loss benefit. {¶ 16} Similarly, there is no language in R.C. 4123.57(B) requiring that an injured worker be consciously aware of his paralysis in order to qualify … awarded scheduled loss compensation, writing: {¶ 17} “What is of paramount importance in this case is that words such as ‘awareness’ or ‘consciousness’ cannot be added under the guise of legislative history to a statute which clearly

T. & O. C. Ry. Co. v. Dages, Andrews & Co.

57 Ohio St. (N.S.) 38 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 26, 1897

Much of the doctrine .maintained by counsel for the carrier is established law. … In one case as clearly as in the other, considerations of public policy justify the conclusion that, if the carrier, for the purpose of obtaining patronag’e, and with actual knowledge of all the material facts, waives its

Arnott v. Arnott

132 Ohio St. 3d 401 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 18, 2012

for federal and/or state estate-tax purposes, in this case, the federal and/or Ohio qualified-use value.” … for judicial discretion, and where a court determines that a controversy is so contingent that declaratory relief does not lie, this court will not reverse unless the lower court's determination is clearly

Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp.

67 Ohio St. 2d 456 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 5, 1981

Kaplan was qualified by the trial court to testify as an expert witness. … Appellees qualified Dr.

In re Application for Formation of the Cleveland Trust Co.

38 Ohio St. 2d 183 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 22, 1974

C. 1111.03 establishing geographic limitations on branch banking. … in another municipality in which there was already established another banking institution.

State ex rel. Ohioans for Secure & Fair Elections v. LaRose (Slip Opinion)

2020 Ohio 1459 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 14, 2020

By dividing the petition into two amendments, the ballot board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded the law. … Relying upon these representations when it voted to divide the Ohio-SAFE amendment, the board acted contrary to clearly established law. {¶ 50} The board’s merit brief argues that “if [Ohio-SAFE’s] purpose [was] to

PIE Mutual Insurance v. Ohio Insurance Guaranty Ass'n

66 Ohio St. 3d 209 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 12, 1993

The monies reserved in the OIGA fund are clearly not for the protection of insurance companies. … Moreover, it can be argued that OIGA is statutorily immune from lawsuits, such as those in the instant case, where a party claims damages due to OIGA’s failure to properly perform its powers and duties as stated in R.C. 3955.08

State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections (Slip Opinion)

142 Ohio St. 3d 370 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 16, 2014

sore-loser candidacies (and the overall effect on Ohio’s electoral integrity) are lessened within the context of educational and/or highly localized positions.” {¶ 47} The notion that boards of education are somehow immune … The claim that Ohio has an interest in preventing candidacies that may conceivably be prompted by short- term goals is absurd, and that interest is clearly unmanageable.

Summit United Methodist Church v. Kinney

7 Ohio St. 3d 13 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 9, 1983

The property qualified for exemption as it was used primarily for public worship. The incidental uses were not controlling. … Clearly, the church maintains this property “primarily for public worship” as defined in Bishop , not for the benefit of the public university.

Mastran v. Urichich

37 Ohio St. 3d 44 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 25, 1988

Similarly, the reasons underlying the exceptions to the hearsay rule involve circumstances tending to establish a statement’s trustworthiness notwithstanding that it was made outside the presence of the factfinder. … R. 102 provides that the rules shall be construed to state the common law of Ohio unless the rules clearly indicate that a change is intended. Evid.

Eddy v. Farmers Property Cas. Ins. Co.

2026 Ohio 626 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 26, 2026

The court based its holding neither on an established common-law exception to the privilege nor on the privilege statute. … The doctrine provides a qualified privilege, generally protecting from disclosure the “files and mental processes of lawyers” made in anticipation of litigation. Hickman at 514.

State v. Esparza

39 Ohio St. 3d 8 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 5, 1988

Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument must similarly fail, as the decision to request the presentence report was clearly one of sound trial strategy. See Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 . … The court thus upheld the practice of “death qualifying” a jury.

State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections (Slip Opinion)

2014 Ohio 4022 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 16, 2014

sore-loser candidacies (and the overall effect on Ohio’s electoral integrity) are lessened within the context of educational and/or highly localized positions.” {¶ 47} The notion that boards of education are somehow immune … The claim that Ohio has an interest in preventing candidacies that may conceivably be prompted by short- term goals is absurd, and that interest is clearly unmanageable.