Case law

State Ex Rel. West v. Feyler

137 Ohio St. 602 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 13, 1941

All regulations for the protection or promotion of the public health, additional to those established by general law and for the violation of which penalties are imposed, shall be made by ordinance and enforced as provided … case, it was said (at page 7): “The Griswold Act (108 Ohio Laws, part 2, 1085) amended the above section and omitted therefrom all language having reference to civil service, thereby manifesting a legislative intent, as clearly

State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nix

2024 Ohio 4669 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 25, 2024

“To establish standing, a relator in quo warranto need not prove his own title beyond all doubt. He need only establish his claim in good faith and upon reasonable grounds.” (Cleaned up.) State ex rel. Swanson v. … This precautionary result, which the statute plainly envisions, is not clearly and convincingly unconstitutional, even though Reynolds’s guilty verdict was eventually reversed. III.

Egan v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp.

25 Ohio St. 3d 176 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 30, 1986

Lee, a Minor, 129 Ohio St. 69, 76 [ 1 O.O. 366 ], * * * that where an employee sustains an injury through the negligence or misconduct of his employer, which is clearly outside the scope of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, … If he refuses to sign the form, he might be denied treatment, at least until some method of payment is established.

Collins v. Millen

57 Ohio St. (N.S.) 289 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 14, 1897

The distinction, however, between a mere change of phraseology and the introduction of an entire clause into a statute, the apparent effect of which is to clearly qualify the former statute, is wide and clear. … Whatever the rule may be as to a mere change of phraseology thus accomplished, the mere circumstances that an entire and clearly qualifying clause has been brought into a statute in the course of a general revision of the

Jones v. Wilson Carr & Co.

16 Ohio St. (N.S.) 419 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1866

On the other hand, the statute clearly regards the claimant as the actor' throughout the proceeding. … He may know nothing of it till after its conclusion ; *when, if the claimant establish his right, the justice must order the restitution of the property to the claimant.

State ex rel. Parraz v. Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. (Slip Opinion)

141 Ohio St. 3d 31 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 2, 2014

A discharge may constitute a voluntary abandonment of employment when it is the result of “the claimant’s violation of a written work rule or policy that (1) clearly defined the prohibited conduct, (2) had been previously … “[T]o qualify for [temporary-total-disability] compensation, the claimant must show not only that he or she lacks the medical capability of returning to the former position of employment but that a cause-and-effect relationship

Bohmann v. Board of Education

2 Ohio St. 3d 136 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 5, 1983

R.C. 3319.17 clearly provides that certain procedures must be followed when there is a reduction in the number of teachers due to decreased enrollment of pupils. … For, it is well-established that this court is limited in its analysis to construction and interpretation of statutes as written. See First National Bank of Wilmington v.

Ohio v. Carder

9 Ohio St. 2d 1 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 28, 1966

Defendants still to be tried at that time would be entitled to strict observance of constitutional doctrines already clearly foreshadowed. … “Qualified by these cautions in receiving and considering such evidence, you must determine whether or not the confessions, admissions or statements made by the defendant were voluntary or involuntary.

Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utilities Commission

61 Ohio St. 3d 396 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 14, 1991

The Copley Village complexes were determined by Ohio Edison not to qualify for the residential rate for the reason that all the common-area lighting at Copley Village was outdoors (and not qualifying as “incidental”), and … The commission also ignored the well-established “filed rate doctrine.”

State ex rel. Horner v. Anderson

41 Ohio St. 2d 166 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 5, 1975

The intent of the commission was clearly to bring constitutional provisions into conformance with practice and to provide a definite and regular starting date for the second regular session of the General Assembly. … the convening of the first regular session and more than ten days before the adjournment sine die of the second regular session to fill an office for which a fixed term expires or a vacancy otherwise occurs is considered qualified

State ex rel. Crosset Co. v. Conrad

87 Ohio St. 3d 467 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 19, 2000

The language of the statute clearly refers to a voluntary act of the employer and not the involuntary transfer of the employer’s business through an intermediary bank. … A qualifying employer has complete discretion, subject of course to the Bureau’s approval, whether to participate in a retrospective-rating plan. Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-43(A) and 4123-17-42(C)(1).

Goomai v. H&E Ent., L.L.C.

2024 Ohio 5711 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 9, 2024

The magistrate reasoned, “To qualify as a prevailing party, Plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of their claim, either through injunctive action or an enforceable judgment.” Hamilton C.P. No. … In Hewitt, a plaintiff in a federal civil-rights action established that a prison official had violated his constitutional rights but was ultimately denied relief on the basis of qualified immunity. Id.

Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Associates, Inc.

108 Ohio St. 3d 494 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 3, 2006

Instead, we are asked to determine whether the Schirmers are able to establish the last two elements of medical negligence: causation and damages. {¶ 39} The Schirmers do not assert that the defendants caused the preexisting … We will not hold that a genetically unhealthy child is inherently less valuable than a healthy child and thereby force courts to decide which children qualify as unhealthy and what costs qualify as extraordinary.

State ex rel. Wilson v. Hisrich

69 Ohio St. 3d 13 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 25, 1994

3501.38 of the Revised Code unless one of the following occurs: « * * * “(C) The candidate’s candidacy or the petition violates the requirements of this chapter, Chapter 3513. of the Revised Code, or any other requirements established … Moreover, relator was *15 clearly given an opportunity to be heard at the February 24 hearing. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion or constitutional deprivation on this issue.

White v. City of Findlay

108 Ohio St. (N.S.) 475 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 23, 1923

The plaintiff in error comes into this court as a matter of right, claiming that the act is unconstitutional because of an alleged discrimination and immunity existing in the act in favor of occupants *476 or owners of bona … Is the classificátion made in Subsection 2 of Section 2 of the Crabbe Act, and in the ordinance here attacked, clearly and obviously unreasonable? The court holds that it is not.

State ex rel. Clough v. Franklin Cty. Children Servs. (Slip Opinion)

144 Ohio St. 3d 83 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 27, 2015

However, that statement of client rights is qualified by the phrase “so long as such access is not prohibited by law.” … This does not qualify as good cause.

City of Youngstown v. Moore

30 Ohio St. (N.S.) 133 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1876

The petition is spread at large upon the record, and the issues in the case clearly made by answer and reply. … In 1828, whilst the city of Youngstown was a village, Holmes’ road was established a public highway. It bounded plaintiffs’ lots on the south and west. Holmes’ road was laid out and established sixty feet wide.

Goodson v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.

2 Ohio St. 3d 193 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 5, 1983

A motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of the city-defendants alleging that they had state governmental immunity in the ownership and/or operation of the hospital. … This court in effect was stating in Hicks that under those facts where it was shown that the party defendant clearly had his day in court on the specific issue brought into litigation within the later proceeding, the non-party

Daloia v. Franciscan Health System of Central Ohio, Inc.

79 Ohio St. 3d 98 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 25, 1997

to those powers granted by law, and until actual distribution of the trust property, shall have the following rights, powers, duties, and immunities to be exercised without court order or other authority upon such terms … Specifically, the court of appeals held that “the trust agreements clearly provided that appellant’s trustee powers ended upon distribution of the gifts to St. Anthony.

Marrone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.

110 Ohio St. 3d 5 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 14, 2006

The trial court certified Amato as a class action, finding prior notice in administrative rules that generically prohibited advertising that did not *9 clearly and conspicuously state any material omissions or modifications … It is well established that the FTC recognized that no one test could accurately determine the amount of tar and nicotine to which an “average” smoker would be exposed, but it also recognized that if one standardized test