Case law

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  • State ex rel. McCann v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (Slip Opinion)

    155 Ohio St. 3d 14 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 21, 2018

    The Certification of the Petition to the Ballot {¶ 7} The referendum petition needed 116 valid signatures to qualify for the ballot. … The instruction clearly requires the circulator to both complete and sign the statement.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • ShadoArt Prods., Inc. v. Testa (Slip Opinion)

    146 Ohio St. 3d 263 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 16, 2016

    In light of this conclusion, ShadoArt’s claim for exemption turns on whether it satisfies the well-established requirements set forth in R.C. 5709.12 and 5709.121. … Thus, “an entity that leases property to another must establish its charitable status based on the range of its own activities and may not rely upon the activities of a particular lessee.” (Emphasis sic.)

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Snapp v. Merchants & Manufacturers' Insurance

    8 Ohio St. (N.S.) 458 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1858

    This rule is entirely applicable to the clause in question, which was manifestly intended to limit and qualify the general liability which, by the terms of the policy, the insurer assumed in regard to all “perils of the river … But no ingenuity of construction can give to particulars a more comprehensive meaning than to the general term within which they are clearly embraced.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Morgridge v. Converse

    150 Ohio St. 239 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 4, 1948

    assigned as a homestead, which is exempt from “sale,” and the exemption in lieu of homestead which is exempt from “levy and sale,” and held that “the exemption which the statute allows by way of homestead is, in a sense, but a qualified … In view of the statute and the decision of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy case, supra, the court clearly had authority to set off the homestead.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Goomai v. H&E Ent., L.L.C.

    178 Ohio St. 3d 174 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 9, 2024

    The magistrate reasoned, “To qualify as a prevailing party, Plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of their claim, either through injunctive action or an enforceable judgment.” Hamilton C.P. No. … In Hewitt, a plaintiff in a federal civil-rights action established that a prison official had violated his constitutional rights but was ultimately denied relief on the basis of qualified immunity. Id.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • McFee v. Nursing Care Management of America, Inc.

    126 Ohio St. 3d 183 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 22, 2010

    by the General Assembly, the agency has usurped the legislative function, thereby violating the separation of powers established in the Ohio Constitution. … childbearing leave, that leave must be reasonable in duration. {¶ 31} The tension between subsections (G)(2) and (G)(5) is apparent; (G)(2) appears to indicate that a policy providing no leave is discriminatory, while (G)(5) clearly

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Davidson v. Miners & Mechanics Savings & Trust Co.

    129 Ohio St. 418 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 8, 1935

    The entire stream cannot be diverted through one channel to the exclusion of the other, when the other holds a waiting and qualified recipient. … In this the court clearly committed error.” This position was reaffirmed in the same case reported in 143 Mo., 137 , 44 S. W., 730 .

    Cited 26 timesPublished
  • Matheny v. Golden

    5 Ohio St. 361 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1856

    been employed, which, in its ordinary signification, would have been clearly understood to express it. … This is clearly a mistake.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Terry v. Sperry

    130 Ohio St. 3d 125 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 12, 2011

    The statute does not establish a minimum number of vines needed for cultivation to constitute viticulture; the growing and harvesting of grapes on the Sperry property thus satisfies the term “viticulture.” … To qualify as “agriculture” under R.C. 519.01’s definition, the Sperrys’ vinting and selling activity must be secondary to the production of agricultural products (i.e., the grapes).

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • State ex rel. Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose (Slip Opinion)

    156 Ohio St. 3d 425 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 11, 2019

    We grant writs of prohibition only when the General Assembly clearly intended to limit the statutory authority of a court. See State ex rel. Sanquily v. Lucas Cty. … The issue whether a writ of prohibition is warranted is governed by well-established legal principles that have been adequately briefed by the parties.

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp.

    130 Ohio St. 3d 196 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 5, 2011

    The Huffs contend that this statement distinguishes their case from Hill and Norfolk & W. because it assigns to both Ohio Edison and Asplundh clearly defined duties — to safeguard the public — for the Huffs’ benefit. *201 … It is clear that this portion of the agreement establishes safety guidelines designed to protect persons and property from injury while the contractor performs its work.

    Cited 59 timesPublished
  • Athens v. McClain (Slip Opinion)

    163 Ohio St. 3d 61 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 5, 2020

    Over two-thirds of the references to “levy” were clearly used in relation to a tax, fine, duty, or contribution. … Regarding the first prong, the centralized-administration scheme can clearly stand on its own, as long as the state finds an alternative way to finance it.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. West v. Feyler

    137 Ohio St. 602 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 13, 1941

    All regulations for the protection or promotion of the public health, additional to those established by general law and for the violation of which penalties are imposed, shall be made by ordinance and enforced as provided … case, it was said (at page 7): “The Griswold Act (108 Ohio Laws, part 2, 1085) amended the above section and omitted therefrom all language having reference to civil service, thereby manifesting a legislative intent, as clearly

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • State ex rel. Crosset Co., Inc. v. Conrad

    87 Ohio St. 3d 467 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 18, 2000

    establish the rate of the successor. “(4) Where a legal entity succeeds in the operation of a portion of a business of one or more legal entities having an established coverage or having had experience in the most … In order to authorize the administrator, the new employer must qualify as a successor in interest. R.C. 4123.32(D).

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Carnes v. Kemp

    104 Ohio St. 3d 629 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 30, 2004

    .” {¶ 23} An adult child may have various reasons to file a paternity action: to establish inheritance rights, to qualify for governmental benefits from the puta *634 tive parent, to explore medical history, etc. … The legislature has clearly stated in R.C. 2105.26(C) that such support cannot be collected. R.C. 3111.05 provides only a statute of limitations for establishing paternity.

    Cited 51 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. Kilby v. Summit County Board of Elections

    133 Ohio St. 3d 184 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 20, 2012

    Because relator has not established his entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief, we deny the writs. … The term of each Councilman MEMBER shall commence on the first day of January following his/HER election, and shall continue until his/HER successor is elected and qualified.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • State v. Anderson

    30 Ohio St. 2d 66 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 3, 1972

    “I am now about to call the roll of those present in the order in which your name is listed on the roll and Avill ask that you answer clearly as I call your name if you consider yourself eligible under the test I have just … Illinois, supra, at page 522, footnote 21. 2 Compliance with the requirements of Witherspoon necessarily includes sufficient latitude in the voir dire examination of prospective jurors in a capital case to establish that

    Cited 26 timesPublished
  • Groch v. General Motors Corp.

    117 Ohio St. 3d 192 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 21, 2008

    Once vested, such a cause of action clearly becomes a substantive right for purposes of Section 28, Article II. … immunity for athletic coaches, actions by a roller skater with supporting affidavits in a medical claim, and so on.”

    Cited 123 timesPublished
  • Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission

    58 Ohio St. 2d 120 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 9, 1979

    The commission acknoAvledged that the standard applied in this cause does not establish rigid criteria for the future. … The staff used the latest known tax rate, established late in 1976, and the company used an estimated or forecasted 1977 tax rate.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • State ex rel. Miller v. Cuyahoga County Board of Elections

    103 Ohio St. 3d 477 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 19, 2004

    Fisher, a qualified Cuyahoga County elector, protested Miller’s nominating petition on the basis that Miller’s middle name of “Russo” violated applicable legal requirements. … from fraud or corruption or that the board abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law in striking his claimed middle name of “Russo” from the ballot and ordering that his name appear as “Scott Miller,” he

    Cited 13 timesPublished

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