Case law

State Auto Mutual Ins. v. Chrysler Corp.

36 Ohio St. 2d 151 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 19, 1973

Appellant maintains in its brief: “The time has come, in the slow and orderly development of the law of products liability in the state of Ohio, for this court to clearly enunciate the ‘practical equivalent of the doctrine … In a sense, Crooks was the only “expert” qualified to testify in this particular case, since he is the only witness who examined the hose in detail.

State v. McCarthy

26 Ohio St. 2d 87 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 28, 1971

Bernius , on its facts, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. Neither party has cited the case of State v Carder (1966), 9 Ohio St. 2d 1 , 222 N.E. 2d 620 . … However, she stated at trial that she still loved the defendant, and it was not established that she desired to engineer his conviction.

State Ex Rel. Knowlton v. Noble County Board of Elections

125 Ohio St. 3d 82 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 23, 2010

Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76 , 2008-Ohio-333 , 881 N.E.2d 1214 , ¶ 28. {¶ 18} Knowlton has established the first and third requirements for the writ. … Knowlton claims that the board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded R.C. 311.01(B)(9) in denying his protest to Hannum’s candidacy.

State ex rel. Wolfe v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections

88 Ohio St. 3d 182 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 17, 2000

. {¶ 11} The board determined that Wolfe did not establish compliance with R.C. 311.01(B), which provides: “On and after January 1, 1988, except as otherwise provided in this section, no person is eligible … Tracy (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 189, 192, 712 N.E.2d 1249, 1251-1252. {¶ 20} Based on the foregoing, the board neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded R.C. 311.01(B)(9) by granting the protest and invalidating

Disciplinary Counsel v. Porter (Slip Opinion)

166 Ohio St. 3d 117 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 2021

the existence of a qualifying mental disorder. … V(13)(C)(7), an attorney must establish that (1) a qualified healthcare professional has diagnosed the attorney with a disorder, (2) the disorder contributed to cause the misconduct, (3) the attorney has achieved a sustained

In re Disqualification of Nicely

135 Ohio St. 3d 1237 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 26, 2012

Affiants allege that after the communication, Judge Nicely acted on Meier’s recommendation and qualified Dr. Silberg as an expert. … Silberg’s qualifications with Meier, and she denies that her encounter with Meier had any influence on her decision to qualify the expert.

O'Keefe v. McClain (Slip Opinion)

2021 Ohio 2186 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 30, 2021

, 206 N.E.2d 2, to establish that he can defeat exemption by showing “material change.” … Nothing in R.C. 5715.27 authorizes stripping property of its exempt status just because it no longer qualifies for an exemption it once qualified for, as long as that property currently qualifies for an exemption that is

East Canton Education Ass'n v. McIntosh

85 Ohio St. 3d 465 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 19, 1999

, prima facie, the elements of the torts upon which he bases his claims; (3) whether the appellants established the elements of common-law immunity defenses warranting entry of summary judgments in their favor; and (4) whether … clearly were related to McIntosh’s continuation in his public position.

State v. Derighter

145 Ohio St. 552 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 1, 1945

Malloy, being not a legally qualified voter in said Precincts F and U in said ward 22 in said city of Cleveland; and the said defendants John T. … And if it is competent to prove a conspiracy, it follows that any evidence tending to establish the conspiracy is also competent.

Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield

1994 Ohio 432 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 13, 1994

The authority vested in municipalities to enact zoning ordinances is clearly defined in this state. … Based upon the foregoing, Gerijo clearly failed to satisfy one of the requisite elements for invalidating Fairfield's zoning enactment.

Kraynak v. Youngstown City School District Board of Education

118 Ohio St. 3d 400 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 5, 2008

. {¶ 7} The jury returned a verdict in favor of the school district, concluding that the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that Marino knew or suspected that D.K. had suffered or faced abuse, and therefore she … of the statute changes the standard from “knows or suspects” (a subjective standard) to “knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect based on facts that would cause a reasonable person in a similar position to suspect,” a clearly

State v. Berry

25 Ohio St. 2d 255 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 17, 1971

C. 2945.21 clearly provides: “Neither the state nor a defendant may be deprived of any of the challenges by reason of such order of exercising the same, or the time and manner of exercising the same.” … Martin (1955), 164 Ohio St. 54 , 57, it was stated: “It has been established, as a general policy, that the Supreme Court will not determine as to the weight of the evidence.

State v. Gilliam

70 Ohio St. 3d 17 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 3, 1994

In the present case, we initially find that Moore’s statement falls within an established hearsay exception as a statement against interest, Evid.R. 804(B)(3). … To qualify as a statement against interest, it must be shown that the statement “tended to subject” the declarant to criminal liability so that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement

Cleveland Telephone Co. v. City of Cleveland

98 Ohio St. (N.S.) 358 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 21, 1918

The cities of Ohio were thereafter to have “immunity” from classification by the general assembly. “Section 2 [part 1]. … The broad circle of power herein granted is clearly comprehensive enough to include all kinds of regulation.

State v. Evans

144 Ohio St. 3d 1202 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 9, 2015

Judge Gaul issued entries removing Wolpert as defendant’s attorney in the underlying case, appointing the public defender’s office to represent defendant, and barring Wolpert from appearing in his courtroom until Wolpert “clearly … “To permit each of the trial and appellate courts to establish rules that generally limit the ability of *1204 attorneys to practice their profession, or that impose specific disciplinary standards upon the attorneys of this

State v. Rohdes

23 Ohio St. 3d 225 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 7, 1986

The trial court accepted Korb’s statements to be qualified as exceptions to the hearsay rule as excited utterances under Evid. R. 803(2). The appellate court and appellee rely only on Evid. … language of R.C. 2929.71 requiring that the offender be convicted of a felony and of a specification charging him with “having a firearm on or about his person or under his control while committing the felony” (emphasis added) clearly

Bank of Toledo v. City of Toledo

1 Ohio St. (N.S.) 622 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 15, 1853

If, therefore, the doctrine be not clearly and satisfactorily established by this case-, it is not well sustained by authority. … The supreme court of the United States have greatly restricted and qualified the doctrine promulgated as law established by the decision in the Dartmouth College case.

In Re B.C.

141 Ohio St. 3d 55 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 16, 2014

B.C. had not received any medical treatment since October 2010, was behind on his immunizations, and was delayed in his speech. … . {¶ 5} A case plan was established with the goal of reunification of mother and son.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner (Slip Opinion)

145 Ohio St. 3d 192 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 3, 2016

Insufficient Evidence Was Presented to Establish that Corner Charged a Clearly Excessive Fee {¶ 27} In his second objection, disciplinary counsel contends that Corner charged a clearly excessive … Hayes Dairy Prods., Inc., 373 So.2d 102, 118 (La.1979). {¶ 28} Galanis established a default rule that in the state of Indiana, clients who enter into contingent-fee agreements with successive attorneys should pay

Panther II Transportation, Inc. v. Village of Seville Board of Income Tax Review

138 Ohio St. 3d 495 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 19, 2014

Indeed, the constitutionality of such taxes was established many years after the enactment of the preemption provision. See Angell v. … former iteration, are of interest in this case: former R.C. 4921.18, which imposed fees on former motor-transportation companies, is now codified at various divisions of R.C. 4921.19, while former R.C. 4921.25 — the tax-immunity