Case law

State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene (Slip Opinion)

160 Ohio St. 3d 82 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 6, 2020

. {¶ 9} But Greene has provided an affidavit claiming that the records do not exist, and McDougald has not done anything to rebut that affidavit so as to clearly show that the documents exist and hence that he has … Therefore, permitting McDougald to amend his complaint and merit brief to establish the manner of service would be a futile act. McDougald’s motion for leave to amend is denied. D.

Barker v. Scovill, Inc.

6 Ohio St. 3d 146 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 3, 1983

statutorily-protected class, (2) that he was discharged, (3) that he was qualified for the position, and (4) that he was replaced by, or his discharge permitted the retention of, a person who did not belong to the protected … First, appellant did not establish a prima facie case of age discrimination as she failed to prove that she had been discharged.

Evely v. Carlon Co.

4 Ohio St. 3d 163 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 20, 1983

The general principles applicable to qualified privilege were set forth in Hahn v. … In a memo of January 30, 1978, which has been furnished to plaintiff, Carlon’s President stated ‘Our problems at Aurora are clearly indicated by the attached turnover list.

Stewart v. Southard

17 Ohio St. 402 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1848

These princi *404 pies are clearly applicable, and must be conclusive of the merits of this declaration, unless we should depart from them. … No necessity demands the establishing of such a principle. There is another objection however to the declaration.

Franchise Developers, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati

30 Ohio St. 3d 28 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 8, 1987

In addition, we believe the court of appeals erred in finding that land use regulations are clearly prohibited in the instant overlay zoning scheme. … Municipal governing bodies are better qualified, because of their knowledge of the situation, to act upon these matters than are the courts. “* * * The power of a municipality to establish zones, to classify prop *34 erty

State v. Popovich

118 Ohio St. 227 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 14, 1928

Where there is a graduation of penalty prescribing a higher penalty for each succeeding offense, this would furnish a fine form of immunity from prosecution, to say the least. … The trial court was wholly without authority to grant the motion of the accused for a directed verdict of not guilty in his fav- or, and the action of the trial court in so doing was clearly erroneous.

State ex rel. Bobovnyik v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections (Slip Opinion)

161 Ohio St. 3d 349 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 7, 2020

That representation qualified Bobovnyik for a homestead exemption to reduce the taxes on the property, which was titled solely in his name. … That is, how can one really question Bobovnyik’s intent after he clearly took steps to try to establish his residency in Mahoning County? {¶ 22} But the board did not disbelieve Bobovnyik’s stated intent.

Circleville Light & Power Co. v. Buckeye Gas Co.

1 Ohio Law Rep. 793 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 8, 1903

Examination demonstrates that in making the revision the word seventy is a clerical mistake, and that thirty-Ove hundred and fifty-one was clearly intended. … In other phrase, it claims a monopoly in supplying that article unless it shall be *801 qualified by a vote of tbe people.

State ex rel. Watson v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections

88 Ohio St. 3d 239 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 28, 2000

They could instead obtain two years of qualifying post-secondary education. R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b). … Respondents board and its members did not abuse their discretion or clearly disregard applicable law in denying certification of Watson’s candidacy.

State ex rel. Weller v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Elections (Slip Opinion)

2019 Ohio 4300 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 18, 2019

Weller does not allege fraud or corruption, so the question is whether the board abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law. … A sufficient number of qualified electors signed that petition. No protest was brought against his candidacy.

State ex rel. Cist v. City of Cincinnati

101 Ohio St. (N.S.) 354 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 22, 1920

1920, the question of establishing in the city of Cincinnati from 2 o’clock, A. … This is clearly ■ authorized by the provisions of Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution.

Willacy v. Cleveland Bd. of Income Tax Rev. (Slip Opinion)

159 Ohio St. 3d 383 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 4, 2020

As discussed above, the income at issue is “qualifying wages,” not “intangible income.” … The word “current” clearly does not apply in this case. {¶ 50} Likewise, in Internatl. Harvester Co. v.

Richards v. City of Cincinnati

31 Ohio St. (N.S.) 506 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1877

The dedicators undoubtedly intended to make the grant to the public absolute and perpetual, but sought to secure to themselves, their heirs and assigns, quoad other property, an immunity from public burdens, from which it … improvement and repair of highways, any more than it can be exempted from liability to be appropriated for the establishment of a highway, where public necessity demands it.

Byrnes v. LCI Communication Holdings Co.

77 Ohio St. 3d 125 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 11, 1996

The Barker analysis requires that the plaintiff-employee demonstrate “(1) that he was, a member of the statutorily-protected class, (2) that he was discharged, (3) that he was qualified for the position, and (4) that he was … The evidence here clearly does not support such a causal link or nexus.

Watkins v. Department of Youth Services

143 Ohio St. 3d 477 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 14, 2015

. *485 Law and Analysis Statutes of Limitations {¶ 31} In accordance with R.C. 2743.02(A)(1), the state “waives its immunity from liability * * * and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of … The state voluntarily consents to be sued and may qualify and draw perimeters around the granted right without violating equal protection.” Conley at 290-291 , citing Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v.

Board of Education v. Board of Revision

57 Ohio St. 2d 62 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 14, 1979

Clearly, the statute is directed at requiring the commissioner to establish a uniform system of establishing “value” once the property is determined by the county auditor, upon application by an owner, to be used exclusively … Of course, an owner does not automatically qualify. An owner must file an application, pursuant to R. C. 5713.31.

State ex rel. Walsh v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections

1992 Ohio 99 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 13, 1992

Therefore, relator was clearly qualified to register. … This case does not establish respondent's theory that a statement of candidacy cannot be signed before thirty days have passed after a change of registration.

Johnson v. McClain (Slip Opinion)

164 Ohio St. 3d 379 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 18, 2021

And as the BTA correctly recognized below, the division of labor between the tax commissioner and the auditor reflects “two distinct aspects” of “the process by which the value of land qualifying for CAUV is established.” … former R.C. 5715.01(A), whereas a county auditor’s duty is to serve as the “assessor of all the real estate in the auditor’s county for purposes of taxation,” R.C. 5713.01(A). {¶ 17} Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-34(E) clearly

State v. Simko

71 Ohio St. 3d 483 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 30, 1994

. *489 Clearly, the instant facts present a more compelling case of kidnapping than even Seiber . … However, this disorder does not qualify as a “mental disease or defect” under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3). See Seiber, supra, 56 Ohio St.3d at 9 , 564 N.E.2d at 415 .

Fries v. Greg G. Wright & Sons, L.L.C.

149 Ohio St. 3d 1233 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 22, 2016

In response, Judge Martin asserts that his letter clearly stated that it was an order, regardless of how the clerk of court’s office entered it on the journal. … Whether the judge’s letter qualified as an enforceable order is not an issue that should be decided in an affidavit of disqualification, and therefore this is not the appropriate forum to decide whether the judge mischar-acterized