Case law

Ries v. Ohio State University Medical Center

137 Ohio St. 3d 151 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 17, 2013

to this court, Ries contends that “[a] physician whose state employment duties are education-related must be shown to be engaging in education-related activity at the time he allegedly renders negligent care in order to qualify … Theobald, 111 Ohio St.3d 541 , 2006-Ohio-6208 , 857 N.E.2d 573, at ¶ 23 . {¶ 23} Thus, Theobald did not establish a categorical rule that a physician who is a member of the faculty of a state medical college is immune for

Donnelly v. Herron

88 Ohio St. 3d 425 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 17, 2000

The determination would not be in the least difficult if the court merely followed the well-established going-and-coming rule.” … In addition, any employee who seeks workers’ compensation benefits must be in the service of a qualifying employer, and if we held that a coemployee is not in the service of a qualifying employer while driving in the employer

McConnell v. Dudley (Slip Opinion)

2019 Ohio 4740 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 20, 2019

analysis, R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)—as noted above—establishes an exception to political-subdivision immunity for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the political subdivision’s employees. {¶ 26} R.C. 2744.02(B … But political subdivisions do not drive. {¶ 29} Further, it is the employee’s conduct, not the political subdivision’s, that establishes the exception from immunity under the statute.

State v. Conrad

50 Ohio St. 3d 1 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 21, 1990

Therefore, the courts below clearly erred in finding that defendant’s waiver of rights before the grand jury acted as a waiver of the immunity accorded to her prior testimony. … In line with such purpose, the Kastigar court established a two-prong test that the prosecution must satisfy where a witness makes the claim that his or her immunized testimony was used: (1) the government must deny any use

Semadeni v. Ohio Department of Transportation

75 Ohio St. 3d 128 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 4, 1996

Even then, the program established funding for only ten percent of the qualifying bridges in Ohio. … We hold that, pursuant to R.C. 2743.02, ODOT is not immune from plaintiffs claims of liability.

Marrek v. Cleveland Metroparks Board of Commissioners

9 Ohio St. 3d 194 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 22, 1984

Portage Homes, Inc. (1982), 2 Ohio St. 3d 26 , and held that the abolition of sovereign immunity as applied to municipal corporations also abrogates the doctrine of governmental immunity for park districts established pursuant … Clearly, it engages in some activities which promote the state’s sovereign interests.”

Butler v. Jordan

92 Ohio St. 3d 354 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 25, 2001

The court of appeals held that R.C. 5104.11 imposed a duty upon appellant to inspect and license 2 type-B day-care homes and that the failure to carry out that duty qualified as an exception to immunity under R.C. 2744.02 … Furthermore, Pease misused Rhodes to apply limitations on political subdivision liability that were clearly not intended.

Semadeni v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.

75 Ohio St. 3d 128 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 4, 1996

The policy established that "[a] total index number of 10 or more shall be considered sufficient justification for the installation of protective fencing" but that "retrofitting of bridges which qualify according to the total … Even then, the program established funding for only ten per cent of the qualifying bridges in Ohio.

State v. White

142 Ohio St. 3d 277 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 18, 2015

Pretrial Dismissal Based on Civil Immunity {¶ 40} Next, the state urges that Ohio does not permit pretrial dismissals of criminal charges based on civil immunity principles, nor does an officer’s qualified immunity for civil … It explained: “That the ‘knowingly’ element of felonious assault can be negated by a factually-mistaken belief is clearly *293 established in Ohio’s mistake-of-fact defense.

State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus

33 Ohio St. 3d 118 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 2, 1987

The foregoing statute makes it plain that once the prosecution requests immunity in writing for a witness who has invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege and the trial court explains the scope of immunity allowed under R.C. … Clearly, that decision lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. It is well-established that when a court has discretion to act, its only duty is to exercise that discretion. State, ex rel. Butler, v.

Federal Public Housing Authority v. Guckenberger

143 Ohio St. 251 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 26, 1944

enjoying a wholly unjustifiable immunity therefrom. … Clearly the appellant is a proprietor, and as such cannot be heard to complain when its property is-not permitted to escape the tax burden common to all proprietors.

Vandercar, L.L.C. v. Port of Greater Cincinnati Dev. Auth.

176 Ohio St. 3d 472 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 23, 2024

find 21  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO that such an expansion of a public school board’s contractual liability should be created through clearly … A port authority may levy a property tax within its jurisdiction if approved by the qualified electors in a primary or general election, and its board of directors becomes the taxing authority if such a levy is approved.

Estate of Graves v. City of Circleville

124 Ohio St. 3d 339 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 28, 2010

Chapter 2743 (the chapter that established the Court of Claims). Wallace, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002-Ohio-4210 , 773 N.E.2d 1018 , ¶ 19. … Chapter 2744, the legislature clearly rejected the judicial abrogation of common-law sovereign immunity and provided broad statutory immunity to political subdivisions and their employees, subject to certain exceptions.

Truman v. Walton

59 Ohio St. 517 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 31, 1899

The defendant in error filed in the court of common pleas the following petition : Plaintiff says that the defendant is, and was at the time of the grievances hereinafter complained of, the duly elected, qualified and acting … But no discussion of the immunity extended to courts of general jurisdiction for their mistakes is necessary, and it is equally unnecessary to enter upon any extended comparison between the immunity with which the two classes

NACCO Industries, Inc. v. Tracy

79 Ohio St. 3d 314 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 6, 1997

Before we proceed, however, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s caveat that a “court must proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly established. … We have no evidence clearly establishing that a substantial burden on the federal government’s borrowing power would actually be imposed.

Stevens v. Ackman

91 Ohio St. 3d 182 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 28, 2001

Thus, it does not establish the requirements that would be necessary for a case involving a wrongful death to be a special proceeding. In the same way, no other provision within R.C. … Chapter 2125 establishes the necessary requirements. {¶ 33} When a court considers whether a particular statute specially creates an action or proceeding that may qualify as a special proceeding for purposes of R.C

Superior Uptown, Inc. v. City of Cleveland

39 Ohio St. 2d 36 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 3, 1974

It is apparent that both parties used the phrase “Superior Uptown” to indicate the owner of the subject realty, and that this phrase clearly referred to appellee. … Another real estate broker stated that insurance rates on mercantile establishments in the area would be pro *39 hibitively high.

Ditmyer v. Board of County Commissioners of Lucas County

64 Ohio St. 2d 146 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 17, 1980

By this constitutional provision, sovereign immunity is a part of the substantive law of Ohio, and, therefore, abrogation of any such immunity must emanate primarily from the General Assembly. See Schaffer v. … Clearly, snow removal, which does not mend, remedy, *149 restore, or renovate roads, is not encompassed within the usual definition of repair.

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres

113 Ohio St. 3d 266 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 9, 2007

sanctions against everyone rather than against a political subdivision or its employees. {¶ 22} Appellees also assert that there is no clear intention to impose liability on a county home because a county home does not qualify … 2744.03 reinstates that immunity.

Hill v. Urbana

79 Ohio St. 3d 130 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 25, 1997

A political subdivision clearly engages in a proprietary function in the establishment, maintenance, and operation of a municipal water supply system, and therefore can be liable for acts of negligence in the performance … Clearly, we are not compelled to resolve whether Urbana’s actions fall within a statutory exception to immunity in order to decide whether R.C.