Case law

Bundy v. State

143 Ohio St. 3d 237 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 4, 2015

The court of appeals therefore agreed that for his time in prison that was solely attributable to his AWA address-verification conviction, Bundy qualified as a wrongfully imprisoned individual. {¶ 14} The state sought this … It does not necessarily establish that the charged offense was not committed or that the defendant was innocent.

Cleveland Construction, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati

118 Ohio St. 3d 283 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 21, 2008

Cleveland Construction must first establish that it had a constitutionally protected property interest before it may claim a violation of procedural due process rights. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. … Failure of a bidder to comply with these requirements may be cause for rejection of the bid.” {¶ 10} Clearly, the Cincinnati Municipal Code and the bidding documents are united in emphasizing the city’s broad discretion to

Grace Cathedral, Inc. v. Testa

143 Ohio St. 3d 212 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 2, 2015

The fact that he does, that his wife also helps in the work, and that their child lives with them should clearly not detract from the fact that the building is used exclusively for public worship. … The criterion for establishing the taxable or exempt status of the building is its use, not the percentage of all time during the year that it is in use.

State ex rel. Teece v. Industrial Commission

68 Ohio St. 2d 165 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 23, 1981

The determination of disputed factual situations is clearly within the jurisdiction of the commission (State, ex rel. General Motors Corp., v. Indus. … Comm., supra, do not require the commission to accept the factual findings stated in a properly qualified medical report at face value and unquestioningly adopt them as those of the commission.

Procter & Gamble Co. v. Lindley

17 Ohio St. 3d 71 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 15, 1985

In each case, the suppliers must satisfy rigorous qualifying standards. The procedures for the granting of a contract are also comparable in both cases. … To hold otherwise could only serve to punish appellant’s careful reliance on established precedent.

Warrensville Heights City School District Board of Education v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision

145 Ohio St. 3d 115 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 13, 2016

or otherwise better offer” and therefore established the purchase price. … liquidated for the benefit of creditors,” Cincinnati School Dist., 127 Ohio St.3d 63, 2010-Ohio-4907, 936 N.E.2d 489, ¶ 3, and “[a] sale conducted under duress is characterized by ‘compelling business circumstances * * * clearly

Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co.

53 Ohio St. 2d 241 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 29, 1978

If this court were to hold otherwise, it would be tantamount to rewriting the agreement and establishing restrictions not expressed by the parties thereto. … A restriction of these terms could easily have been achieved by use of a qualifying adjective such as “crude” or “natural” Because the parties executing this agreement did not choose to qualify the terms of “oil” and “gas

Wampler v. Higgins

93 Ohio St. 3d 111 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 29, 2001

Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue, the Court has clearly ruled that questions as to other privileges derived from the First Amendment, such as the qualified privilege as to public officials … described as a “well established genre” of opinionated speech.

Guckenberger v. Toledo & Cincinnati Rd.

144 Ohio St. 571 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 14, 1945

Clearly at that time these structures were not the property of the railroad company, but were the property of the United States government.. … disastrous as to sell the machinery itself. ’ ’ *577 As its conclusion, tlxe court stated in the opinion as follows: “We hold that govenxmeixt-owned property, to the full extent of the government’s interest therein, is immune

Stephenson v. State

119 Ohio St. 349 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 28, 1928

R., 1243, that any objection to the trial court or magistrate touching his qualification to hear and determine the cause, if specifically urged at the beginning of the trial, and facts shown to establish such disqualification … Ct., 345 ), we quote: “It was not a denial of a right protected by the Constitution of the United States to refuse a jury *354 trial, even though it were clearly erroneous to construe the laws of the State as justifying the

Loftus v. Pennsylvania Rd.

107 Ohio St. (N.S.) 352 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 27, 1923

The remedy is provided by establishing courts and declaring their jurisdiction. … The first thing to be determined is the character of the “privileges and immunities” referred to in that section.

Carroll v. Washington Township Zoning Commission

63 Ohio St. 2d 249 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 30, 1980

we have indicated as pertinent to the inquiry, at least, the reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying as it must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly … Foster children may or may not qualify as members of such a single family, depending upon the degree of their integration within the family.

State ex rel. Craig v. Scioto County Board of Elections

117 Ohio St. 3d 158 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 21, 2008

X(2) (“The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure shall supplement these rules unless clearly inapplicable”); see also State ex rel. Howard v. … name should not be on the ballot because he is not qualified under R.C. 311.01(B)(9) to be a candidate for county sheriff.

State ex rel. Attorney General v. Taylor

15 Ohio St. (N.S.) 137 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1864

of the sheriff to give notice by proclamation of the election of a probate judge, at the October election of 1863, may -be competent, and perhaps important evidence, in connection with other circumstances, as tending to establish … Whether Poster was duly elected to the office as he claims, or whether there is a vacancy by reason of the failure of the people to elect any one in 1863, Taylor is clearly not entitled to it.

State ex rel. Smith v. City of Columbus

28 Ohio St. 3d 94 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 24, 1986

The preamble to this ordinance states that it is “[t]o establish a new Authorized Strength Ordinance for various Divisions or Departments of the City * * *.” … However, that argument by relator is contrary to a basic tenet of statutory construction as to determination of legislative intent: “* * * [I]f such intent is clearly expressed therein, the statute may not be restricted,

State Ex Rel. Coughlin v. Summit County Board of Elections

136 Ohio St. 3d 371 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 9, 2013

Because the board disregarded clearly established law by refusing to place Coughlin’s name on the ballot, we grant the writ. … The parties agree that Coughlin is a qualified elector and satisfies the statutory requirements to run for the Stow Municipal Court clerkship. {¶ 3} On July 11, 2013, an elector named Donald Nelsch filed a protest

McCrone v. Bank One Corp.

107 Ohio St. 3d 272 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 28, 2005

A statute will not be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause, and this court will not invalidate a plan of classification adopted by the General Assembly, unless it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. … In mental injury claims, the problem arises of establishing the existence of the injury itself.

State ex rel. Grumbles v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (Slip Opinion)

165 Ohio St. 3d 552 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 13, 2021

Accordingly, our inquiry is whether the board abused its discretion or failed to follow clearly established law in refusing to certify Grumbles’s candidacy for the November ballot. A. … There is no dispute that Grumbles is a qualified elector of Orange Township and that his nominating petition and statement of candidacy contained enough valid signatures to qualify him for the ballot.

Huber v. United Protestant Evangelical German Congregation

16 Ohio St. (N.S.) 371 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1865

The defendant in error is a corporation, and derives all its powers from an act of the general assembly, passed January 3,1843, which provides that it “ shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities granted … The facts alleged in the answer clearly show that the defendant in error was engaged in the very business prohibited by the stat *345 ute; for it had established a savings bank, and was engaged in the business of banking

ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio (Slip Opinion)

139 Ohio St. 3d 520 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 10, 2014

An appropriation from the Department of Development initially funded and established JobsOhio. 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, Section 5. … Consequently, they are admittedly unable to meet the requirements to establish traditional standing.