Case law

Johnson v. BP Chemicals, Inc.

85 Ohio St. 3d 298 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 14, 1999

The fact patterns in Jones and Van Fossen clearly fall under Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution as part of the workers’ compensation trade-off. … The General Assembly’s ability to legislate under the police power “is plenary, except as it may be specifically and clearly limited in the constitution.” Champaign Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v.

Columbus City School District Board of Education v. Testa

130 Ohio St. 3d 344 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 1, 2011

These two establishments occupied 12 percent of the property and paid rent that was directed into the university’s general fund. … But that does not mean, as the appellees assert here, that the use of income, by itself, suffices to qualify the property for exemption.

State ex rel. Sylvester v. Neal (Slip Opinion)

140 Ohio St. 3d 47 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 8, 2014

Procedures for establishing the amount and conditions of bail shall be established pursuant to Article TV, Section 5(B) of the Constitution of the state of Ohio. … Respondents have political-subdivision immunity.

State ex rel. Shannon v. Ogg

2026 Ohio 1599 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 3, 2026

‘last preceding regular municipal election.’ ” {¶ 30} However, the series-qualifier canon does not apply. … CONCLUSION {¶ 33} Ogg abused her discretion and disregarded clearly applicable law when she certified that the petitions contained a sufficient number of signatures.

Arcanum National Bank v. Hessler

69 Ohio St. 2d 549 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 3, 1982

All five of these requirements must be met to qualify as a holder in due course. … The facts of this case clearly indicate such close connectedness between appellee bank and John Smith Grain Company as to impute knowledge by appellee bank of infirmities in the underlying transaction.

Kaplysh v. Takieddine

35 Ohio St. 3d 170 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 17, 1988

It is well-established that language in a contract of insurance reasonably open to different interpretations will be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Faruque v. … “When the meaning of the contract can be fully and clearly ascertained from its own words, we are at liberty to go no further in search of aid in its interpretation.” Rose v. New York Life Ins.

Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Thatcher

140 Ohio St. 38 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 3, 1942

E., 560 : “Intent to confer immunity from taxation must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt, for, as in case of-a claim of grant, nothing can be taken against the state by presumption or inference.” … I think there were 30 out of the 60 that made application who could qualify, but some of them, for some reason or other, after they were ■notified, didn’t want to— * * *” “Q.

Andersen v. Highland House Co.

93 Ohio St. 3d 547 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 20, 2001

As the final authority on Ohio law, we must take the opportunity to prevent an absurd and unreasonable result—one that was never clearly intended by Highland House or RMI and one that was never clearly communicated by Indiana … If carbon monoxide exposure were not covered, then why would this information be “important in the determination if a risk qualifies for [insurance]”?

General Motors Corp. v. Lindley

67 Ohio St. 2d 331 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 22, 1981

It is not a tax ‘laid directly on persons or property.’ * * * It is a tax assessed for some special privilege or immunity.***” (Citations omitted.) Howell Air, Inc., v. Porterfield (1970), 22 Ohio St. 2d 32, 34 . … Moreover, the property here clearly left the flow of interstate commerce.

City of Hilliard v. Elfrink

77 Ohio St. 3d 155 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 11, 1996

Myers thus clearly set out this court’s position on this issue. … Appellant in essence argues that the existence of the per se offenses means there is now no defense available to a defendant who tests above the legal limit who is unable to establish that the test administered to him or

Clawson v. Hts. Chiropractic Physicians, L.L.C.

170 Ohio St. 3d 451 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 23, 2022

We concluded that the employee’s potential immunity as a state employee was “immaterial” to his private employer’s vicarious liability, id. at ¶ 21, because “[a]n employee’s immunity from liability is no shield to the employer … Wuerth, 122 Ohio St.3d 594, 2009-Ohio-3601, 913 N.E.2d 939, in which we clearly stated that a plaintiff may choose to proceed against only an employer/principal: As we explained in Clark v.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter

106 Ohio St. 3d 418 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 26, 2005

Their testimony clearly establishes the presence of each of the factors set forth in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g). {¶ 50} Jeffrey C. Hutzler, M.D., a psychiatrist, testified regarding respondent’s mental health. … Should respondent seek reinstatement from an indefinite suspension after the expiration of the two-year period established by Gov.Bar R.

State v. Said

71 Ohio St. 3d 473 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 30, 1994

Crim.R. 22 clearly provides: “In serious offense cases all proceedings shall be recorded.” (Emphasis added.) … As a result, even though a statement falls within a hearsay exception, two elements of the declarant’s competency remain at issue • and must still be established.

State ex rel. Balas-Bratton v. Husted

138 Ohio St. 3d 527 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 2, 2014

If Maier can now qualify as a candidate for sheriff, he may run for the office, even though he did not qualify last year. … Rather, Wolfe held that the candidate’s experience did not qualify because some of it was clearly not served at the rank of corporal or above. Id. at 185. In the second case, State ex rel. Watson v. Hamilton Cty.

State Ex Rel. Miller v. Waid

145 Ohio St. 373 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 13, 1945

engineer’ as used in this act shall mean a person who, by reason of his knowledge of mathematics, the physical sciences, and the principles of engineering, acquired by professional education and practical experience, is qualified … life, public health or property is concerned or involved, when such professional service requires the application of engineering principles and data.” *377 Concerning the second basis or ground for registration, the act clearly

State ex rel. Citizens for Responsible Taxation v. Scioto County Board of Elections

65 Ohio St. 3d 167 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 14, 1992

R.C. 3501.38(C) does not permit substantial compliance, and the pertinent 172 signatures clearly did not strictly comply. … Stillman (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 13 , 41 O.O.2d 151 , 231 N.E.2d 61 , establishes that respondents have discretion to overlook such deficiencies.

Hack v. City of Salem

174 Ohio St. (N.S.) 383 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 17, 1963

John’s Hospital, 165 Ohio St., 467 , this court nevertheless found in the Gibbon case that considerations of public policy also required that the established doctrine of immunity from liability should continue to be applied … The following list of reported Ohio eases, which is fairly complete, clearly demonstrates the morass of inconsistencies and changes of mind which have occurred as the result of attempts to apply the “simple rule” for determining

State v. Moore

90 Ohio St. 3d 47 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 20, 2000

Criminal law—Search and seizure—Drugs—Smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to conduct a search. … The smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to conduct a search.

State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitehead

70 Ohio St. 2d 37 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 5, 1982

Clearly, none of the allegations in this case, either individually or collectively, satisfies the degree of interference or injury required by Ohio law to establish a taking. … Furthermore, appellants’ claim of damage caused by the trucks to the public road and bridge and private fences does not qualify as a taking of private property rights.

MacDonald v. Cleveland Income Tax Bd. of Rev. (Slip Opinion)

2017 Ohio 7798 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 26, 2017

The canon rests on the rationale that “ ‘[t]he particular provision is established upon a nearer and more exact view of the subject than the general, of which it may be regarded as a correction.’ ” Scalia & Garner, Reading … And because it is clearly not a pension, it would not be excluded under Cleveland Codified Ordinance 191.0901(d).