Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filtersohio

2,076 results

0.83s

  • Balyint v. Arkansas Best Freight System, Inc.

    18 Ohio St. 3d 126 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 10, 1985

    This is apparent from the opinion in Blankenship, supra, at 612-613 as follows: “* * * Qeneraj Assembly, however, in enacting R.C. 4123.95, established a rule of construction which is clearly of assistance in determining … the scope of employer immunity.

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Gerijo, Inc. v. City of Fairfield

    70 Ohio St. 3d 223 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 14, 1994

    The authority vested in municipalities to enact zoning ordinances is clearly defined in this state. … Based upon the foregoing, Gerijo clearly failed to satisfy one of the requisite elements for invalidating Fairfield’s zoning enactment.

    Cited 257 timesPublished
  • State v. Davis

    62 Ohio St. 3d 326 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1991

    Cooper, during voir dire, conditioned and qualified her remarks when asked if she could follow the law and not place her personal feelings above her duties. … This is clearly a question of discretion on the part of the trial court. No abuse of discretion has been shown.

    Cited 241 timesPublished
  • Kelleys Island Caddy Shack v. Zaino

    96 Ohio St. 3d 375 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 2, 2002

    Lewis (1906), 74 Ohio St. 403, 78 N.E. 523 (“That taxation as the subject of legislation is of a general nature is established by a uniform course of decisions”). … other municipal corporations or townships from qualifying in the future.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • State v. Jester

    32 Ohio St. 3d 147 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 26, 1987

    The jury at the second trial was informed that Buckner was to be granted immunity from prosecution for his testimony. … If we adopted appellant’s proposition, it would not be possible to death-qualify a jury.

    Cited 112 timesPublished
  • Ranells v. City of Cleveland

    41 Ohio St. 2d 1 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 8, 1975

    Ohio law is well established that a municipal corporation, while acting in a governmental capacity, is immune from liability for tortious conduct. … The petition herein clearly asserts acts of negligence in the handling of a hazardous gas, with some foreknowledge that serious conse- *5 quenees might ensue.

    Cited 53 timesPublished
  • Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic (Slip Opinion)

    2016 Ohio 8000 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 7, 2016

    In his response, Chen merely repeated the appellate court’s observation regarding qualified privileges. 2013-Ohio-4931, at ¶ 11. … As it relates to discovery, privilege provides “qualified immunity of an attorney’s work product from discovery or other compelled disclosure.” Id. at 1844.

    Cited 40 timesPublished
  • State ex rel. Wolfe v. Delaware County Board of Elections

    88 Ohio St. 3d 182 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 18, 2000

    Therefore, Wolfe needed three more months of qualifying supervisory experience to satisfy R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a). … Based on the foregoing, the board neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded R.C. 311.01(B)(9) by granting the protest and invalidating Wolfe’s candidacy for sheriff.

    Cited 50 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. Milburn v. Pethtel

    153 Ohio St. 1 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 15, 1950

    of the Secretary of State, to serve for the term of four years and until their successors have been appointed and have qualified. … To establish, define, provide, rearrange and combine election precincts. “b. To fix and provide the places for registration, when required, and for holding primaries and elections. “d.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Skelly v. Jefferson Branch of the State Bank

    9 Ohio St. (N.S.) 606 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1859

    Cas. 616-624, Chelmsford, C. *493 It thus appears that while the rule is now clearly established in England, and it equally prevails in this country, that the principle upon' which it rests, is one of decorum and respect, … The subjects of the grant are not only privileges and immunities, but property, or, which is the same thing, a capacity to acquire and to hold property in perpetuity.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • State v. Fork

    174 Ohio St. 3d 224 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 21, 2024

    Criminal law—Definition of “motor vehicle” in R.C. 4501.01(B) is used for penal laws and applies to offense of aggravated vehicular assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a)—R.C. 4501.01(VV)’s qualifying language … Muenchenbach and its “use standard” is therefore inapplicable to this case. {¶ 25} In Muenchenbach, we determined whether, for purposes of establishing immunity for public-entity defendants under R.C. 2744.02(B), a

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Johnson v. Abdullah (Slip Opinion)

    166 Ohio St. 3d 427 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 22, 2021

    Moreover, Abdullah had ample time after the complaint was refiled to find a witness who was qualified under the rule. … Clearly absent from this definition is any indication that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies when a court is making a determination of law.

    Cited 706 timesPublished
  • Rowe-Reilly Corp. v. Tracy

    85 Ohio St. 3d 625 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 16, 1999

    Moreover, appellant’s sales catalogues clearly indicate that the inventory items in question were intended to be used in the construction, operation, and repair of greenhouses. {¶ 19} A majority of the BTA apparently … In fact, the BTA indicated that some of appellant’s inventory, specifically heating, ventilation, and shading equipment, may qualify as “equipment” if the evidence established that it was designed and built for agriculture

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Products Co.

    125 Ohio St. 3d 250 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 23, 2010

    This court wrote in Johnson: {¶ 110} “Notwithstanding, the General Assembly has enacted R.C. 2745.01, and, again, seeks to cloak employers with immunity. … {¶ 111} Déjá vu. {¶ 112} The court noted in Johnson that although certain aspects of former R.C. 4121.80 were different from the version of R.C. 2745.01 at issue in Johnson , the purposes of both were the same: {¶ 113} “Clearly

    Cited 99 timesPublished
  • Taylor v. Taylor

    44 Ohio St. 3d 61 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 5, 1989

    We hold that R.C. 3113.21 (D)(4) (now renumbered [4][a]) authorizes a domestic relations court to issue a “qualified domestic relations order” (“QDRO”) attaching pension plans qualifying under ERISA. … Appellee’s pension benefits, like all benefits provided under ERISA-governed pension plans, are clearly a “form of income” within the language of this statute.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • State ex rel. Ferarra v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections (Slip Opinion)

    166 Ohio St. 3d 64 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 14, 2021

    Chapter 3501] * * * or any other requirements established by law.” R.C. 3501.39(A). … Ferrara has failed to clearly and convincingly demonstrate any right to relief.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • State ex rel. One Person One Vote v. Ohio Ballot Bd.

    173 Ohio St. 3d 15 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 12, 2023

    The ballot language {¶ 5} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus against the ballot board, relators must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the board … it onerously oppressive for citizens to amend the Ohio Constitution through the initiative process, but it would leave unaffected the General Assembly’s ability to propose amendments that serve its interests at elections established

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Johnson v. BP Chemicals, Inc.

    85 Ohio St. 3d 298 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 14, 1999

    The fact patterns in Jones and Van Fossen clearly fall under Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution as part of the workers’ compensation trade-off. … The General Assembly’s ability to legislate under the police power “is plenary, except as it may be specifically and clearly limited in the constitution.” Champaign Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • State ex rel. Gil-Llamas v. Hardin (Slip Opinion)

    164 Ohio St. 3d 364 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 29, 2021

    In this case, Civ.R. 12(A)(2)(a) is clearly inapplicable. … The forwarding address does not necessarily mean that Gonzaga was no longer a qualified elector of Columbus at that time, much less that she was no longer a qualified elector during the time that the initiative petition was

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. Levy v. Savord

    143 Ohio St. 451 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 14, 1944

    Relator contends that the Court of Common Pleas can. acquire jurisdiction of a proceeding in disbarment only if and when the preliminary steps prescribed by statute have been taken, and since the allegations of the petition clearly … It is noteworthy that the relator’s petition does not allege that the proceeding was not caused to be instituted by a qualified judge; neither does the petition suggest that relator was not served with a certified copy of

    Cited 10 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.