Case law

Durig v. Youngstown

2025 Ohio 4719 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 16, 2025

Under the statutory scheme, a political subdivision initially carries the burden to establish general immunity under R.C. … Regardless of how clearly the allegations of a complaint point to R.C.

Pelletier v. Campbell (Slip Opinion)

153 Ohio St. 3d 611 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 5, 2018

See R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(e) and (j). {¶ 17} R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) establishes an exception to political-subdivision immunity: “[P]olitical subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused … Every driver in Ohio is concerned with the practical question whether a stop sign can be seen clearly from the road.

Combs v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Div. of Parks & Recreation (Slip Opinion)

146 Ohio St. 3d 271 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 19, 2016

In lieu of the common law distinctions, id., the duty owed depends on “whether the person using the property qualifies as a recreational user,” Pauley v. … . {¶ 18} The recreational user statute does not expressly abrogate a landowner’s common law duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid negligently injuring those on the premises, and “ ‘in the absence of language clearly showing

Proctor v. Ford Motor Co.

36 Ohio St. 2d 3 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 10, 1973

The fellow employees’ immunity statute, R. … corporation # # * but not including any person whose employment is casual and not in the usual course of trade, business, profession, or occupation of his employer * * *5 It thus appears that a person “in the service of” a qualifying

Kendall v. U.S. Dismantling Co.

20 Ohio St. 3d 61 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 27, 1985

R.C. 2305.31 clearly announces that agreements such as the one at bar are void as against public policy. … specific waiver of that immunity.

Bibler v. Stevenson (Slip Opinion)

150 Ohio St. 3d 144 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 29, 2016

In ruling on Findlay’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Findlay was entitled to statutory political-subdivision immunity and that the Biblers had not established that an exception to immunity applies … Clearly it was. R.C. 4511.65(A).

Community Ins. Co. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.

92 Ohio St. 3d 376 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 25, 2001

This statement clearly spells out the majority’s confusion 8  January Term, 2001 on the subject of immunity. … Judge Holmes, writing a separate concurrence in Lumbermens, stated, “If it be the legislative intent to establish the state policy that, under the limited waiver of governmental immunity of this chapter, a subrogated insurer

Jacobs v. Frank

60 Ohio St. 3d 111 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 5, 1991

QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE R.C. 2305.25 provides qualified immunity from suit to, among others, members or employees of utilization review, tissue, and peer review committees for actions taken within the scope of their functions … However, in the Hahn opinion, the majority says: “The correct rule as to the type of malice required to be established by plaintiff in connection with qualified privilege cases is simply and clearly stated in the Ohio Court

Estate of Cook v. Montville Twp.

178 Ohio St. 3d 170 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 6, 2024

Montville filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it was entitled to immunity as a political subdivision of the State. The estate countered that an exception to immunity applied. … (“The burden of proof is initially on the political subdivision to establish general immunity, and when established, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that one of the exceptions to immunity applies.”)

Crawford v. State, Division of Parole & Community Services

57 Ohio St. 3d 184 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 20, 1991

Upon considering the above facts, we agree with appellant that the decision to send Maynard to A.A. is not entitled to immunity. … Before attendance by a furloughee at an A.A. meeting may be considered statutorily authorized, the Director of Rehabilitation and Correction would be required to designate A.A. as an “other progra[m]” in order to qualify

Stevens v. Ackman

91 Ohio St. 3d 182 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 28, 2001

Chapter 2125 establishes the necessary requirements. … If an action has the characteristics of an ordinary action it does not qualify as a special proceeding.

Ayers v. Cleveland (Slip Opinion)

160 Ohio St. 3d 288 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 25, 2020

(Emphasis added.) {¶ 20} Ayers clearly does not qualify as an employee under the statute. … The Ohio General Assembly clearly knows how to establish such procedures.

Iddings v. Board of Education of Jefferson County

155 Ohio St. 287 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 25, 1951

The statute provides that to be effective the remonstrance must be by a majority of the qualified electors residing in the territory and then goes further and specifies the additional qualification, that they must be qualified … It has uniform operation throughout the state, it does not abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen or deprive any one of due process or equal protection of the law, it deprives no citizen of his con *292 stitutional

State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann

21 Ohio St. (N.S.) 198 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1871

that includes all legislative power which the object and purposes of the State government may require ; and we must look to other provisions of the constitution to see how far, and to what extent, legislative discretion is qualified … At all events, the legislative action *211 is conclusive, unless it clearly infringes the provisions of the constitution.

Estate of Cook v. Montville Twp.

2024 Ohio 5690 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 6, 2024

(“The burden of proof is initially on the political subdivision to establish general immunity, and when established, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that one of the exceptions to immunity applies.”) … Cook’s estate has failed to come forth with any evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the tree was on the grounds of any building.

Williams v. City of Columbus

33 Ohio St. 2d 75 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 4, 1973

procedures for bringing suits against the state, and that such procedures have been established by this court in the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure; and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity violates the due process and … Salem [1963], 174 Ohio St. 383 , 391), this court has clearly stated, in paragraph one of the syllabus in Bell v.

Snyder v. American Family Insurance

114 Ohio St. 3d 239 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 22, 2007

Snyder’s third proposition is that because the tortfeasors herein qualify as “uninsured motorists” under the statutory definition of R.C. 3937.18(B)(5), Snyder is entitled to recover uninsured-motorist benefits under the … may be asserted to establish nonliability: {Hc}“* * * {¶ d} “(6) [T]he employee is immune from liability unless one of the following applies: *242 {V e} “(a) The employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope

Piazza v. Cuyahoga Cty. (Slip Opinion)

2019 Ohio 2499 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 26, 2019

to immunity for intentional torts. … the General Assembly established.

Colbert v. City of Cleveland

99 Ohio St. 3d 215 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 9, 2003

Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that Cleveland was immune from liability under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a), which establishes a defense to political-subdivision tort liability when a police officer … However, that immunity is not absolute. R.C. 2744.02(B); Cater v.

Baker v. Wayne Cty. (Slip Opinion)

147 Ohio St. 3d 51 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 19, 2016

qualified as a governmental function. … The Twelfth District concluded that “[t]he edge drop between the paved shoulder and the unpaved berm is clearly part of either the *56 shoulder or the berm.” Id. at ¶ 45. In Bonace v.