Case law

Gaston v. Medina County Board of Revision

133 Ohio St. 3d 18 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 28, 2012

Although he does not explicitly raise the jurisdictional issue, Gaston’s argument clearly implicates the holding of Knickerbocker. … Because she had not conducted the study, the witness was unable to explain (1) why the 2005 sale price was used instead of the 2006 one (which was closer to the lien date) and (2) how the sales would qualify as arm’s-length

State ex rel. Elliott v. Industrial Commission

26 Ohio St. 3d 76 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 20, 1986

This court has consistently required that determinations of disability be based on a claimant’s ability to return to the type of work for which he or she is qualified. * * *” Id. … The majority opinion clearly misunderstands the purpose of R.C. 4123.519 when it characterizes that statute as “expressly indicating] that this court may not act as an appellate body with respect to decisions by the commission

State v. Cowan

103 Ohio St. 3d 144 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 22, 2004

Nor does it establish any procedural framework, let alone an unconstitutional one. … Cowan’s dogs done something to qualify as a vicious dog? ^f}“A. Yes. {¶ g} “Q. And what specifically had they done? {¶ h} “A.

Vance v. Consol. Rail Corp.

73 Ohio St. 3d 222 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 16, 1995

Conrail clearly had a duty to provide plaintiff, an employee in the zone of danger, with a reasonably safe workplace. … Given that a railroad yard can present a similar rough-and-tumble atmosphere, acts of harassment in that context must be particularly egregious to qualify as unconscionable abuse.

Younker v. Nationwide Mutual Ins.

175 Ohio St. (N.S.) 1 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 5, 1963

The qualified property rights in such names and marks and the right to protection thereof arise as a matter of common law, not as a matter of statute. … Apparently plaintiff contemplates establishing an office in Arizona.

State v. Berry

80 Ohio St. 3d 371 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 3, 1997

Alcorn explained that a “mixed personality disorder” means that a patient exhibits features of more than one type of disorder, but is “not clearly in one category or another.” … Pearson is certainly qualified, her experience in forensic matters is limited. Dr. Pearson has been a self-employed clinical psychologist since 1988.

State v. Kirkland (Slip Opinion)

140 Ohio St. 3d 73 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 13, 2014

. {¶ 169} Ohio continues to employ the death penalty as part of our criminal-justice punishment scheme, and Anthony Kirkland’s predatory, brutal, and heinous crimes clearly qualify him for that ultimate penalty. … The state needed to show, pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B), that the act of soliciting Kylah established a motive for the attempted rape of Casonya or that the act of soliciting Kylah established that Kirkland’s intent was to rape

State v. Goodwin

84 Ohio St. 3d 331 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 20, 1999

In the case at bar, such evidence was clearly adduced at trial. The tenth proposition of law asserted by Goodwin has no merit. … The evidence clearly establishes that Goodwin acted with prior calculation and design in killing Mustafa. Under any reasonable view, the killing was done with purpose.

Woods v. Brown's Bakery

171 Ohio St. (N.S.) 383 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 28, 1960

The state of the record is such as to establish defendant’s negligence. … Plaintiff’s conduct, in view of the jury’s answers to th® *386 interrogatories, clearly amounted to contributory negligence as a matter of law.

State ex rel. Goldberg v. Mahoning County Probate Court

93 Ohio St. 3d 160 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 5, 2001

Goldberg must establish that (1) Judge Maloney and the probate court are about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ will cause injury … Clearly, the actions of the Probate Judge resulted in the issuance of an unconstitutional prejudgment order of attachment.” See, also, R.C. 2715.03 and 2715.044.

Tuttle v. Burgett's Admr.

53 Ohio St. (N.S.) 498 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 26, 1895

If it were the intention of the parties that performance of the obligation could be required only at a particular place, that intention could easily have been expressed, as could any other condition qualifying the rights … parties, and the surrounding-circumstances; and these may be shown by parol, to enable the court called on to interpret the instrument, the better to understand its terms, and arrive at the intention of the parties when not clearly

State ex rel. Kenton Structural & Ornamental Iron Works, Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

91 Ohio St. 3d 411 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 23, 2001

Merrell clearly indicates that there is no way the employer could have become aware of the defect before the accident. “*** “3) 4121:1-5-15(A) requires equipment such as * * * hoisting or haulage lines * * * chains … In that capacity, it chose not to attach undue weight to the qualifier “approximately.” The angle of the chains could not be determined with utter precision after the accident and will never be known.

Miller v. Hammond

156 Ohio St. (N.S.) 475 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 30, 1952

In the estate of the surviving spouse it does not qualify under section 812 (c) as property previously taxed. … The application of fundamental principles of equity in the situation here presented would be in accordance with the established legislative policy. The Y. M. C.

Ardire v. Tracy

77 Ohio St. 3d 409 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 12, 1997

Indeed, the fact that the SBT is not a tax on income is a well-established principle of Michigan law. In Trinova Corp. v. … Id. at 363-364, 111 S.Ct. at 824, 112 L.Ed.2d at 898. {¶ 8} Although the SBT is clearly not a tax on income, appellants contend that the SBT is a tax “measured by income.”

Byrd v. Smith

110 Ohio St. 3d 24 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 19, 2006

The attached photograph of the truck that I was driving at the time of the crash has a sign that clearly states that The Fred DeBra Company was available for ‘24 Hour Service’. … Thus, appellants’ argument concerning the limited purpose of depositions and the manner in which they are taken does not excuse a deponent’s cavalier treatment of facts established through deposition testimony.

Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Sinclair

105 Ohio St. 3d 65 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 29, 2004

Respondent had previously worked for years in the medical field, and he worked to establish a personal-injury practice as well. {¶ 6} Before leasing office space with DiBlasio, respondent knew Traficant only through … For the purpose of his testimony before the grand jury and trial, the prosecution granted respondent use immunity at a subsequent criminal proceeding.

State v. Carter

72 Ohio St. 3d 545 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 26, 1995

Carter argues that allowance of more than six peremptory challenges is constitutionally required in order to assure a qualified and unbiased jury. … IX Ineffective Assistance of Counsel The standard by which we review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is well established. Pursuant to Strickland v.

State v. Maurer

15 Ohio St. 3d 239 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 20, 1984

Appellant was clearly advised that the officers could not predict any outcome. … The court held that although the photographs were gruesome, their admission was not error in that they were properly identified, qualified and had probative value. Under Evid.

Havel v. Villa St. Joseph

131 Ohio St. 3d 235 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 15, 2012

Dwiggins, 9 Ohio St.3d 32, 34, 458 N.E.2d 827 (1984). {¶ 17} A right is defined as “[a] power, privilege, or immunity secured to a person by law,” as well as “[a] legally enforceable claim that another will do or … conflicts with the rule we have established, Civ.R. 42(B), which governs motions for bifurcation.

Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm.

1992 Ohio 122 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 30, 1992

The agreement between CG&E and Oxford, which established the transportation rate between them, is authorized under R.C. 4905.31. … In this program, CG&E matched, one dollar for two dollars to a maximum of $75,000 per year, its customers' contributions to a fund which paid for the utility bills of qualified applicants.