Case law

Doyle v. Rondout Valley Central School District

3 A.D.3d 669 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jan 15, 2004

“A government official performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity provided his or her conduct does *671 not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person … To be entitled to qualified immunity, Seals was required to establish that it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his conduct was appropriate under the circumstances, or that officers of reasonable competence

Lucas v. Otsego County Sheriff Richard J. Devlin Jr.

139 A.D.3d 1196 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · May 12, 2016

Supreme Court determined that, among other things, defendants were shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity and granted their motion. Plaintiff now appeals. We affirm. … Defendants nevertheless have qualified immunity for their conduct if they did "not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" (Mullenix v Luna, US

Liu v. New York City Police Department

216 A.D.2d 67 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jun 13, 1995

However, we find that the individual defendants should be granted qualified immunity from plaintiffs civil rights claims. … A government official performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity provided his or her conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

Colao v. Mills

39 A.D.3d 1048 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Apr 19, 2007

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity, thereby shielding them from civil liability, as long as their actions did not violate the plaintiffs clearly established legal rights … qualified immunity test and determine whether reasonable officers would know that the conduct here was unlawful at the time (see Cowan ex rel.

Rankel v. County of Westchester

135 A.D.3d 731 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jan 13, 2016

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 USC § 1983 for discretionary functions if either (1) their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights, or (2) it was objectively reasonable … for them to believe that their acts did not violate clearly established rights (see Doe ex rel.

Kravitz v. Police Department of the Hudson

285 A.D.2d 716 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jul 5, 2001

“A government official performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity provided his or her conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person … “The defendant must establish that he [or she] had an objectively reasonable belief that his [or her] act violated no clearly established rights [citation omitted]” (Young v Selsky, 41 F3d 47, 54 , cert denied 514 US 1102

Alex LL. v. Department of Social Services

60 A.D.3d 199 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jan 22, 2009

Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for damages when performing discretionary duties “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a … “The qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.

Davila v. City of New York

139 A.D.3d 890 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · May 18, 2016

Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the officers’ actions would be entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. … “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” (Mullenix

Mahoney v. City of Albany

2022 NY Slip Op 07288 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Dec 22, 2022

In the federal context, public officials may invoke qualified immunity under 42 USC § 1983 "unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established … Given this framework, we begin with Tierney's claim of qualified immunity.

Owens v. City of New York

183 A.D.3d 903 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · May 27, 2020

If the officer's actions did not violate a clearly established right or law, or if it was objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that his actions did not violate a clearly established right or law, his or her actions … event, he is entitled to qualified immunity for any such alleged failure ( see Boyd v City of New York , 149 AD3d at 686 ).

Parker v. St. Lawrence County Public Health Department

102 A.D.3d 140 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Nov 21, 2012

In response, then Governor Paterson issued an executive order declaring a disaster emergency with respect to the influenza outbreak, which authorized state and local health departments to establish immunization programs in … We are unpersuaded by plaintiffs assertion that immunity pursuant to the PREP Act does not extend to qualified persons who administer a covered countermeasure to an individual without consent.

3502 Partners LLC v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth.

2026 NY Slip Op 01118 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Feb 26, 2026

Plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated that the proposed amendment was not palpably insufficient or clearly devoid of merit ( see MBIA Ins. Corp. v Greystone & Co., Inc. , 74 AD3d 499, 499-500 [1st Dept 2010]). … In any event, defendants have failed to make a sufficient showing that all of them would be immune from punitive damages, and there is no dispute that one of them — Tutor Perini Corporation — does not qualify as a public

24 Franklin Ave. R.E. Corp. v. Cannella

139 A.D.3d 717 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · May 4, 2016

The complaint does not allege that Fitzsimmons undertook any actions that violated “clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have been aware” (Zalaski v City of Hartford, 723 F3d 382, 388 … Therefore, the defendants are entitled to dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against Fitzsimmons, based on the principle of qualified immunity (see Vincent v Yelich, 718 F3d 157, 170 [2d Cir 2013]; Scott v Fischer

Martinez v. New York City Tr. Auth.

2022 NY Slip Op 00252 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jan 13, 2022

At the same time, we find that the TA was not entitled to pretrial dismissal of the complaint on the basis of qualified immunity. … In that case, the Court of Appeals emphasized that a governmental body claiming qualified immunity based on its having studied a particular condition alleged to have caused injury must establish that the study was indeed

Martinez v. New York City Tr. Auth.

2022 NY Slip Op 00252 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jan 13, 2022

At the same time, we find that the TA was not entitled to pretrial dismissal of the complaint on the basis of qualified immunity. … In that case, the Court of Appeals emphasized that a governmental body claiming qualified immunity based on its having studied a particular condition alleged to have caused injury must establish that the study was indeed

Moore v. Dormin

252 A.D.2d 421 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jul 16, 1998

As for qualified privilege, the plaintiff clearly did not raise a triable issue as to the defendant’s motivation, under either the constitutional or the common-law definition of malice. … Defendant raised the bar of absolute and qualified immunity based on his capacity as a prosecutor and the official context of the statements, arguing that the communication was made by one law-enforcement official to another

Firth v. State

12 A.D.3d 907 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Nov 18, 2004

The Court of Claims denied claimant’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion premised on OSIG’s absolute privilege rendering it immune from liability, or alternatively, that OSIG was entitled to a qualified immunity … As the governor would clearly be entitled to absolute immunity, so are employees or agents specifically delegated the authority to carry out his duties (see Ward Telecom. & Computer Servs. v State of New York, supra at 291

Salter v. Meta Platforms, Inc.

2025 NY Slip Op 04384 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jul 25, 2025

We reject MEAN's contention that the phrase "manufacturer or seller of a qualified product" in section 7903 (5) (A) should be read to divorce "manufacturer" from "qualified product" and grant immunity to any manufacturer … As a result, we conclude that MEAN established that it is "engaged in the business" of manufacturing a qualified product under the PLCAA by establishing that it "devotes time, attention, and labor to manufacturing [its qualified

Delgado v. City of New York

86 A.D.3d 502 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jul 28, 2011

“A government official performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity provided his or her conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person … To be entitled to qualified immunity, it must be established that it was objectively reasonable for the police officer involved to believe that his or her conduct was appropriate under the circumstances, or that officers

La Belle v. County of St. Lawrence

85 A.D.2d 759 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Dec 3, 1981

In addition, the case of Doe v County of Suffolk ( 494 F Supp 179, 182 ) states that the immunity under section 419 of the Social Services *761 Law is a qualified good faith immunity only. … Furthermore, it should be noted that contrary to defendants’ assertion, since the immunities are at best qualified immunities, plaintiffs did not have the burden to plead bad faith (Gomez v Toledo, 446 US 635 ).