Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Charles F. Ryan & Son, Inc. v. Lancaster Homes, Inc.

    22 A.D.2d 186 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Dec 10, 1964

    In fact, the very nature of their operations, their advertising, and their conduct clearly distinguish the two types of businesses and the builders themselves. … The record does not show that the plaintiffs have established a secondary meaning for the .signature “ Homes by Ryan ” (and *191 the trial court so found), hut if, in fact, any meaning was established it would necessarily

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Ahmed v. City of New York

    129 A.D.3d 435 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jun 4, 2015

    to establish certain rates, standards of service, standards of insurance and minimum coverage; standards for driver safety.” … of qualifying standards required for such licensees” (New York City Charter § 2303 [b] [5]).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • People v. Robertson

    61 A.D.2d 600 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Mar 27, 1978

    To hold otherwise would permit two or more persons to gain immunity from prosecution on a charge of unlawful possession of narcotics by proving joint possession of the drugs. … The circumstantial evidence, viewed in its entirety, with reason and common sense employed under the guidance of established legal principles governing appellate review, clearly warrants an affirmance herein.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • LaBarbera v. New York Eye & Ear Infirmary

    230 A.D.2d 303 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · May 15, 1997

    It is in this critical aspect that a stent is clearly a fixation device and not a foreign object. … In dismissing the case for failure to present expert medical testimony, the Court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the gauze was a foreign object and that therefore the failure to remove it alone established negligence,

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Sobol v. New York State Ass'n of Realtors, Inc.

    235 A.D.2d 966 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jan 30, 1997

    New York law attributes a dual meaning to the term "malice” in the libel context, recognizing that either the common-law meaning or the constitutional standard are sufficient to defeat a qualified privilege (see, Liberman … The Panel members stated that prior to the hearing they did not know plaintiff and were unfamiliar with his reputation; clearly, the record supports the conclusion that none of the Panel members were harboring any spite or

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Jacob v. Columbia Storage Warehouses

    125 A.D. 556 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Apr 24, 1908

    The contract under consideration was held to be clearly a conditional sale, and the title remained in plaintiff until the full amount called for by the contract was paid. … Of course, the entire statute is to be read and reconciled, and any general expression therein must be regarded as limited and qualified by the particular provisions of the statute,” The' appellant seeks to distinguish this

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • National Life Ass'n of Hartford, Connecticut v. Thompson

    56 N.Y.S. 401 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Mar 7, 1899

    This ruling was clearly erroneous. … It was admitted that Freeman was an officer of the plaintiff corporation, and the defendant was not only entitled to contradict or qualify his testimony as to the particular conversations which Freeman had mentioned, but

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • People v. Abney

    57 A.D.3d 35 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Oct 14, 2008

    When he was about two feet away from her, and she could clearly see his face, he asked her for some change. … While LeGrand establishes that, in an appropriate case, all of these factors may be proper subjects of expert testimony, it is far from clear that defendant established that this is such an appropriate case as to each factor

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • GRIMES, JAKIM, PEOPLE v

    Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Nov 13, 2015

    Defendant further contends that the search and seizure were illegal because the police officers tailored their testimony to establish probable cause to stop the vehicle. … The credibility determinations of the hearing court are entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record, which is not the case here (see People v Ponzo, 111 AD3d 1347, 1347).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • In re the Dissolution of T. J. Ronan Paint Corp.

    98 A.D.2d 413 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jan 31, 1984

    The court held the corporate impasse to mandate dissolution, finding the two factions hopelessly deadlocked so as to be harmful to the continued success of the corporation, such clearly established by four years of “corporate … Clearly, the statutory scheme requires that fees and commissions for such a receiver be determined in accordance with the schedule provided by section 1217.

    Cited 39 timesPublished
  • Bartlett v. State

    52 A.D.2d 318 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · May 28, 1976

    Such conduct removes the protection of governmental immunity (see Zophy v State of New York, supra). … The foregoing principles define the standard to be applied in this case and clearly establish claimant’s cause of action.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Horton v. Erie Railroad

    86 A.D. 379 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jul 1, 1903

    The case was submitted to the jury under instructions to find in the plaintiff’s favor only upon an adoption by them of this story of the severance ■of the journey as having been established in absolute good faith. … Such contention was clearly expressed on the trial in the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint at the close of the plaintiff’s case, the counsel then saying: “We say this clearly was a trip which he intended to take

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Matter of Thompson v. Wood

    156 A.D.3d 1279 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Dec 28, 2017

    the father “shall solicit and reasonably consider” the mother’s input regarding any major decisions involving the child is unworkable and vague, as it provides no guidance as to what constitutes a major decision and what qualifies … The child was clearly upset about the father’s discovery of her text messages with the boy and the photographs.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • In re the Estate of Walton

    56 A.D.2d 436 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Mar 24, 1977

    Provision was made for a trust fund A in order to qualify for the marital deduction, and for a trust fund B for the maximum charitable deduction. … Clearly, the 1971 amendment was more than a mere formal change.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • People v. Adrian

    2019 NY Slip Op 4454 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jun 6, 2019

    The evidence showed that defendant was a profiteer under Penal Law § 220.00(20)(b), because he was clearly part of a large international "controlled substance organization" (Penal Law § 220.00[18]) with many members, and … The evidence also showed that defendant was a profiteer under Penal Law § 220.20(20)(c), because he "arranged" or "planned" the execution of at least one transaction, and did not qualify for any of the exceptions set forth

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Mann v. Cooper Tire Co.

    33 A.D.3d 24 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jun 1, 2006

    Campbell “appears to be qualified to make such an assessment.” We are not persuaded by Mr. … Now, on appeal, Cooper Tire argues thus: “information regarding specific ingredients of the compound formula (halobutyl, antioxidants and antiozonants) is clearly part and parcel of the trade secrets protection granted by

    Cited 26 timesPublished
  • People v. American Loan & Trust Co.

    2 A.D. 193 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Mar 15, 1896

    Moore subsequently died, and the respondent was appointed in his place as receiver, and qualified on the 9th of January, 1894. … aCtion- • wherein Moore was plaintiff and the trust company defendant, by which it was agreed that the said Moore, as receiver, “ shall exchange with said trust company cash to the amount of the claim of said-defendant, as established

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • People v. Harper

    132 A.D.3d 1230 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Oct 2, 2015

    “[I]t should be obvious that the more the defendant shoots . . . the victim, the more clearly intentional is the homicide” (People v Payne, 3 NY3d 266, 272 [2004], rearg denied 3 NY3d 767 [2004]). … Here, the evidence established that there were multiple shots fired at the victim.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Foley v. City of New York

    95 A.D. 374 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Jul 1, 1904

    The plaintiff testified that at the time she fell she was proceeding carefully, and whether or not she was guilty of contributory negligence, upon the evidence at the close of the case, was clearly a question for the jury … The obligation resting upon a municipal corporation to remove accumulations of snow and ice from its sidewalks is not an absolute but a qualified one.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • In re the Estate of Brown

    41 A.D.2d 275 · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · Apr 9, 1973

    The inter vivas trust established by the testator was created by a transfer of assets totaling $75,000 to a bank trustee and two named individuals and provided that the income therefrom be paid to the testator in equal monthly … To look at the matter from another viewpoint, the objectant here clearly qualifies as a creditor-third-party-beneficiary under the 1944 agreement betweeen the testator and his mother and her second husband, his adoptive father

    Reversed in part by In re the Estate of Brown, 33 N.Y.2d 211 (1973)Cited 4 timesPublished

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