Case law

Scholz v. Scholz

177 N.J. Super. 647 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 2, 1980

Tevis is clearly applicable to the allegation of assault and battery alleged and the court will grant plaintiff's motion. … Although Tevis recognized the abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity, it made mention of exceptions to which the immunity may still apply.

Paternoster v. NJ Transp. Dept.

190 N.J. Super. 11 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 20, 1983

Super. 67, 73 (App.Div. 1978), certif. den. 77 N.J. 480 (1978), that the Tort Claims Act had not abolished "the immunity established in the area of discretionary activities typified by Miehl v. … Subsection d is clearly brought into play and there is no "broad blanket immunity" for the public entities' snow removal activities. Brown v. Brown, supra, 86 N.J. at 578 .

Morey v. Palmer

232 N.J. Super. 144 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 12, 1989

Properly applied, N.J.S.A. 59:2-2 qualifies the general immunity of N.J.S.A. 59:2-1 by focusing on the type of conduct enjoying the immunity. … "We have held that the plain meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:2-1 firmly establishes that `immunity is the dominant consideration of the Act.' (Citations omitted).

Jobes v. Evangelista

369 N.J. Super. 384 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 28, 2004

immunity issue. … Simply put, good faith as a condition of the qualified immunity afforded by N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 and actual malice in the New York Times sense are mutually exclusive.

James B. Hurwitz, M.D. v. Ahs Hospital Corp.

438 N.J. Super. 269 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 24, 2014

Like the federal law, the New Jersey statute provides broad immunity for damages to qualified persons for actions taken as part of a hospital's peer review process. … As Judge Grispin correctly found, defendants are clearly within the presumptive scope of the federal immunity under the HCQIA.

Dlugosz v. Fred S. James & Co.

212 N.J. Super. 175 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 24, 1986

Historically, public entities within the State of New Jersey enjoyed complete sovereign immunity in tort actions. Ibid. That long established immunity was abrogated by the Supreme Court in Willis v. … They further noted that the qualified immunity of a public body under federal law is concordant with the New Jersey legislative policy as expressed in N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(a) and -3(b) or our Tort Claims Act. Id. at 168.

Binkewitz v. Allstate Ins. Co.

222 N.J. Super. 501 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 4, 1988

In balancing those significant interests, absolute immunity best fits some settings and qualified immunity is appropriate to others. See Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Pub. Co., 104 N.J. 125, 136 (1986). … Just as in a defamation action, the qualified privilege is a defense which must be raised by defendant. The cause of action is not, however, established solely by defeating the defense of privilege.

Hilton Acres v. Klein

64 N.J. Super. 281 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 30, 1960

To this qualified extent the statutory policy is for a period of enforced immobility of the local regulatory power relative to the particular subdivision development. … The record does not clearly indicate whether such tests were ever made or submitted or what they showed.

State v. Carminati

170 N.J. Super. 1 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 26, 1979

Clearly, trial of the perjury charges necessitated disclosure of Badelamenti's immune grand jury testimony because it was portions of that testimony which were alleged to have been false. … Clearly, the joint trial held in this case, necessitating the disclosure of testimony coerced under a promise of immunity, directly contrary to the commitment of immunity made, raises problems of constitutional magnitude

Laracuente v. Laracuente

252 N.J. Super. 384 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 13, 1991

Federal authority clearly and unequivocally supports Macy's contention. In Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Services, Inc., 451 F. … We need not pass on whether Macy's, as a provider of information has a qualified or conditional privilege insofar as plaintiff has not overcome the burden of establishing malice.

Eastern Seaboard, Etc. v. Nj Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guaranty Ass'n

175 N.J. Super. 589 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 9, 1980

Defendant offers as "a general rule of statutory construction" that statutes which grant privileges, powers, rights or immunities to "residents" will be limited to domestic corporations, absent qualifying words which plainly … is clearly expressed in the terms of the statute.

Roberts v. TBAA

371 N.J. Super. 189 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 15, 2004

That does not automatically qualify it to invoke the defense of charitable immunity, however. … That is why we require plaintiff to establish that she falls within the DeVries volunteer category.

Pemberton Tp. v. State

178 N.J. Super. 346 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 13, 1981

which may qualify the immunity if one is otherwise deemed to exist. … The question, then, is whether the immunity thereby established was arbitrarily exercised here.

Simmons v. Loose

418 N.J. Super. 206 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 31, 2011

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages under Section 1983 "`insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable … In analyzing a qualified immunity claim, courts consider whether the law enforcement officer's conduct violated a constitutional right and whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v.

In Re Doe

416 N.J. Super. 233 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Aug 5, 2010

The law should not cut off its promise of anonymity and legal immunity at the maternity ward door. … in a hospital maternity ward, then clearly and unambiguously states her desire to surrender that infant anonymously and the other Safe Haven statutory requirements are met.

Rubin v. Glaser

166 N.J. Super. 258 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 1, 1979

Clearly, under this provision appellants, as residents of Pennsylvania whose New Jersey home is used only for a few weeks of each year for vacation purposes, do not qualify for the rebate. They do not contend otherwise. … This purpose was clearly evidenced by use of the term "homestead," a word particularly associated with an owner's principal residence.

Loder v. St. Thomas Greek Orthodox Church

295 N.J. Super. 297 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 25, 1996

Consequently, the judge awarded summary judgment against plaintiffs on the ground that the church qualified for immunity from personal injury liability under the Act. … In analyzing whether an entity qualifies for charitable immunity, the Act directs that [t]his act shall be deemed to be remedial and shall be liberally construed so as to afford immunity to the said corporations, societies

DeVivo v. Ascher

228 N.J. Super. 453 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 25, 1988

In explaining the distinction between absolute privilege and qualified privilege, our Supreme Court stated in Rainier's Dairies v. … Trow, 105 N.J. at 338 , that a qualified privilege may be lost "unless the information is provided to one with a `corresponding interest' in the information."

F.A. v. W.J.F.

280 N.J. Super. 570 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 7, 1995

To qualify for federal aid, states must provide for the reporting of child abuse and furnish immunity to the reporters. Id. at 790, 794; 42 U.S.C.A. § 5103 . … Some jurisdictions provide a qualified immunity to reporters of suspected child abuse.

Hehre v. DeMarco

421 N.J. Super. 501 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Aug 18, 2011

"A qualifying organization does not lose its statutory immunity merely because it charges money for its services, unless it makes a profit or collects fees for services totally unrelated to its organizational pursuits." … Having established the applicability of immunity conferred by N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a), we must determine whether N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(c)(2) in any way erodes or vitiates this immunity.