Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

5,442 results

1.18s

  • Cooper v. Mayor

    299 N.J. Super. 174 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 13, 1997

    All plaintiffs qualify as “Department Heads.” … See N.J.S.A. 59:13-3 (providing that “[t]he State of New Jersey ... waives its sovereign immunity from liability arising out of ... a contract implied in fact”).

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Perlberg v. Geminder

    20 N.J. Super. 191 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 11, 1952

    There is nothing beyond his own claim to ten years' experience as an executive to sustain his contention that he qualified as an expert. … The qualifications of experts are left to the discretion of the court, and its decision is conclusive unless clearly *197 shown to be erroneous as a matter of law. Rempfer v.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Angelo v. Shapiro

    168 N.J. Super. 459 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 2, 1979

    Clearly, the Charter Act is not intended to modify such things as the laws of contracts or torts or civil service laws ( N.J.S.A. 40:41A-129). But it is intended to permit sweeping change in county organization. … The course of decision under N.J.S.A. 40:41A-26, already outlined, indicates that the Charter Act empowers a county to eliminate agencies with ancient and well-established organizations.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • State v. McGeary

    129 N.J. Super. 219 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 8, 1974

    Johnson, supra : It is, of course, most essential, in view of the heavy impact the result can have, that proper administration of the test be clearly established before the reading is admitted in evidence. … Johnson, supra , "it is * * * most essential * * * that proper administration of the test be clearly established before the reading is admitted in evidence," and "this includes full proof that the equipment was in proper

    Cited 26 timesPublished
  • ANTHONY PACE, SR. VS. TOWNSHIP OF NUTLEY(L-5518-13, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

    New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 12, 2017

    violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" … "The dispositive point in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether a reasonable officer in the same situation clearly would understand that his actions were unlawful."

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Novack v. CITIES SERVICE OIL COMPANY

    149 N.J. Super. 542 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 7, 1977

    Subsequent cases have established a qualified privilege for any communication "with relation to a subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, and to a person having … Clearly, the statement made by Cities Service was one in which they had an interest, and the recipient of that communication, the service station dealer, had a corresponding interest.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Essex Cty. Welfare Bd. v. NJ Bell Tel. Co.

    126 N.J. Super. 417 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 31, 1974

    Hence, qualified charities who purchased Centrex service after that year were not entitled to the traditional charitable discount. … It also insisted there was no justification for allowing the discount to qualified charities using one telephone system and not allowing the discount to qualified charities using another telephone system.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • State v. Rama

    298 N.J. Super. 339 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 4, 1997

    Moreover, when the Legislature authorized a discretionary sanction, it used language which clearly expressed that intent. … Similarly, § 2.1 establishes the period of suspension, thereby removing even that degree of discretion from the sentencing court.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Ryan v. American Honda Motor Corp.

    376 N.J. Super. 185 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 30, 2005

    Plaintiff's burden is to establish that he fits within any one of the three definitions set forth above. … Corp., 264 F.Supp.2d 616 (N.D.Ill.2003) (lessee qualified as a consumer under the third definition of the Act, and the written warranty qualified under the Act's definition because the "sale" to the leasing agency was for

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Gesner v. Roberts

    91 N.J. Super. 255 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 13, 1966

    Wiseman, 233 F. 2 d 734, 739 (10 Cir. 1956), where it was similarly deemed persuasive in a case involving a wife's claim for immunity from contribution towards estate tax that a charitable devisee gets no such relief if the … Div. 1955), was a case clearly dependent for result on an unambiguous tax clause placing the burden of payment on others than the spouse. In re Burnett's Estate, 50 N.J. Super. 482 ( Cty.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Govito v. West Jersey Health System

    332 N.J. Super. 293 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 21, 2000

    qualified privilege; or 3) the statement is excessively published." … To overcome a qualified privilege on this ground, "a plaintiff must establish that the publisher knew the statement to be false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity." Dairy Stores, Inc. v.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Ritter v. Castellini

    173 N.J. Super. 509 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 18, 1980

    Clearly, the sheriff's duty with respect to the personal property inside the store is to provide for its safekeeping. … Where a claim is for injury asserted to result from the negligent handling of property in the course of detention, there is no federal tort immunity. Id. at 850 .

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Scott v. Scott

    277 N.J. Super. 601 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 30, 1994

    Counsel states: "the crux of Simpson is `family status,' not spousal immunity, but immunity extended to all family members, who are living in the family home." Counsel for Mr. Scott cites Scheib v. Grant, 814 F. … Clearly the behavior of Mr. Scott is not analogous to the actions of the fathers in any of the aforementioned cases. It is undisputed that Mr.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Bigel v. Director of the Division of Local Government Services

    173 N.J. Super. 541 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 8, 1980

    property attributable solely to the State aid received during a tax period from the State Aid for Schools Fund established in N.J.S. 54A:9-25 as computed in section 4 of this act. … It clearly is applicable. The March 6, 1979 judgment under review is reversed.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • State in Interest of JG

    283 N.J. Super. 32 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 7, 1995

    Thus, whereas Schmerber, supra, is useful in establishing that mandatory blood tests implicate the Fourth Amendment, the test applied by the Court in that case would not be applicable here. … These statements and factual findings are clearly hearsay and cannot be considered by this court. See N.J.Evid.R. 801, 804; Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 229 N.J.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Frank Briscoe Co. v. RUTGERS, STATE UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE OF MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY

    130 N.J. Super. 493 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 3, 1974

    The comments to said law enacted by the Legislature state, * * * For purposes of establishing liability in the State of New Jersey this definition ["Public Entity"] is specifically intended to include such entities as the … In the 1956 act there are two provisions which clearly indicate there was an intent to preserve the then existing corporate powers.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Russell Forde Hornor v. Upper Freehold Regional Board of Education

    New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 8, 2024

    Thus, "[e]ven when one of the Act's provisions establishes liability, that liability is ordinarily negated if the public entity possesses a corresponding immunity. " Rochinsky v. … N.J.S.A. 59:2-1(b) "establishes the principle that even common-law and statutory immunities not contained in the Act can prevail over the Act's liability provisions." Id. at 409.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Vedutis v. Tesi

    135 N.J. Super. 337 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 3, 1975

    While this court is mindful of the fact that the Tort Claims Act represents an abrogation of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity and, therefore, ought to be strictly construed, State v. … N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.1 clearly bridges that gap, and reading the two statutes in pari materia serves to harmonize the law relating to the same subject matter.

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • State v. Kraft

    134 N.J. Super. 416 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 20, 1975

    established before the reading is admitted into evidence. … It is concluded that in a prosecution for driving while under the influence of drugs the expert who examined and tested the drug must be produced by the State to clearly establish the presence of the narcotic drug proscribed

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • SPEAKS EX REL. SPEAKS v. Jersey City Housing Auth.

    193 N.J. Super. 405 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 16, 1984

    In our view the final four of the foregoing elements of plaintiffs' cause of action were clearly established prima facie warranting submission to the jury. … See Report of the Attorney General's Task Force on Sovereign Immunity (1972).

    Cited 23 timesPublished

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