Case law
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316 N.J. Super. 234 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 30, 1998
under the plan or design immunity provision of the Tort Claims Act. … It is not disputed that the work being done by plaintiff was for Trucking and that Trucking clearly controlled plaintiff on the job.
Cited 11 timesPublished330 N.J. Super. 231 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 20, 2000
Unless the abolition of interspousal immunity, Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535 , 388 A. 2d 951 (1978), has rendered the exclusion of Mrs. … Zacarias from coverage contrary to the State's legislatively established public policy, we are bound by the pertinent ruling of the Supreme Court in Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins.
Cited 7 timesPublishedMastice v. Interstate Industrial Corp.
270 N.J. Super. 350 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 8, 1994
Establishing tort liability is an inherently uncertain process. See Eger v. E.I. Du Pont DeNemours Co., supra, 110 N.J. at 143 , 539 A.2d 1213 . … Establishing damages in a wrongful death action of a minor is an equally uncertain process. See Simmel v. New Jersey Coop Co., 28 N.J. 1, 14 , 143 A.2d 521 (1958); Botta v.
Cited 0 timesPublished148 N.J. Super. 582 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 24, 1977
B Defendant argues that the State failed to establish that Oliveri's tape recorder was capable of taping the conversations, that the recordings were authentic and correct, and that no changes, additions or deletions had been … The trial judge, in effect, held that the immunity granted by this statute was not self-executing. We disagree. In State v.
Cited 15 timesPublished188 N.J. Super. 355 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 24, 1982
N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, which establishes a notice requirement, is part of the Tort Claims Act which, according to N.J.S.A. 59:14-4, took effect on July 1, 1972. … The subject of the liability and immunity of public employees is the exclusive province of *361 N.J.S.A. 59:3-1 through N.J.S.A. 59:3-14.
Cited 5 timesPublished361 N.J. Super. 238 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 17, 2003
immune from the imposition of rollback taxes once a change in use has occurred.”), aff'd, 5 N.J. … Therefore despite the parties' dispute over the extent of disruption caused by the Board’s excavations, the soil sampling clearly would have been disruptive to the farming operation described by Habiak.
Cited 2 timesPublished216 N.J. Super. 393 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 2, 1987
Dept., 55 N.J. 534 (1970) which all but eliminated sovereign immunity in actions brought against the State and other public entities. … Clearly, the Stewart court's holding unambiguously states that commercial property owners, not the municipality, owe a duty to pedestrians to maintain sidewalks which abut their property. See also Mirza v.
Questioned by Roman v. City of Plainfield, 388 N.J. Super. 527 (2006)Cited 16 timesPublished350 N.J. Super. 453 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 2, 2002
Once this qualified privilege has been established, the burden then shifts to the plaintiffs to overcome the privilege by demonstrating that the statements were published with actual malice, i.e., either with knowledge that … This means that a slander plaintiff may establish a cause of action not only without proving special damages but without proving any form of actual damage to reputation.
Abrogated on other grounds by Salzano v. North Jersey Media Group Inc., 201 N.J. 500 (2010)Cited 12 timesPublishedPinkowski v. Township of Montclair
299 N.J. Super. 557 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 7, 1997
Thus, the Pinkowskis argue, the judge erred in according Montclair immunity. … In addition, “not every impairment of value establishes a taking.” Washington Market Enterprises v. Trenton, supra, 68 N.J. at 116 , 343 A.2d 408 .
Cited 34 timesPublishedVacirca v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
192 N.J. Super. 412 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 7, 1983
they are clearly employees of the railroad which pays their salaries and can fire them at will. … The immunity granted by that section applies to all phases of the licensing function. Malloy v. State, 76 N.J. 515, 520 (1978).
Cited 5 timesPublishedMager v. United Hospitals of Newark
88 N.J. Super. 421 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 16, 1965
Reading it in its entirety we must conclude that it does not immunize Manufacturers from liability in the circumstances of this case. … Defendant's operation of such a clinic was clearly in its own interest.
Cited 29 timesPublished459 N.J. Super. 529 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 19, 2019
After the parties exchanged some written discovery, on August 4, 2017, defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was immunized from liability under the good-faith defense. … Because the good-faith defense provides a total bar on liability for violations of the WHL, it clearly operates as an exemption to the WHL's requirements.
Cited 17 timesPublishedCITY OF NEWARK v. Essex Cty. Bd. of Tax.
103 N.J. Super. 41 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 26, 1968
for a public use does not lose immunity because the agency incidentally derives some private business income from it." … "`Marine terminal purposes' shall mean the effectuation, establishment, acquisition, construction, rehabilitation, improvement, maintenance or operation of marine terminals."
Modified on other grounds by City of Newark v. Essex County Board of Taxation, 54 N.J. 171 (1969)Cited 8 timesPublished319 N.J. Super. 324 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 15, 1999
The doctrine of sovereign immunity "supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be sued in its own courts without its consent, but it affords no support for a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts." … "Generally speaking, to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must establish intentional and outrageous conduct by the defendant, proximate cause, and distress that is severe."
Cited 14 timesPublished273 N.J. Super. 402 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 8, 1994
The court clearly stated that its decision applied only to the facts before it and should not be taken as applying to other situations, such as large parties at which the host is too busy to personally serve alcoholic beverages … [T]he commission recommends legislation that will clearly establish the circumstances under which a social host can be held liable for injuries and damages caused by a social guest to whom the host has provided alcoholic
Cited 6 timesPublishedALLAN B. BRAGGIN v. BOROUGH OF RAMSEY (L-6101-18, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 6, 2022
The judge further addressed whether Mayor Dillon and Forbes were entitled to qualified immunity. … To determine if qualified immunity applies, we consider whether: (1) plaintiff's constitutional rights violated; and (2) "was the constitutional right being violated clearly established at the time so that any reasonable
Cited 0 timesUnpublished274 N.J. Super. 429 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 22, 1994
The burden of establishing such immunity as to any particular asset will rest upon the spouse who asserts it." [ Painter v. Painter, supra, 65 N.J. at 214 , 320 A. 2d 484 ; See also Landwehr v. … They were clearly united economically.
Cited 3 timesPublished175 N.J. Super. 263 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 18, 1980
We believe the factual situation inherent in the railroad platform qualifies for application of the exceptional rule. … The Comparative Negligence Act cannot be construed as a legislative intent to repeal N.J.S.A. 48:12-152 because earlier case law interpreting the railroad immunity statute clearly establishes that it was not based upon the
Modified by Eden v. Conrail, 87 N.J. 467 (1981)Cited 18 timesPublishedWall v. Hudson County Park Commission
80 N.J. Super. 372 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 17, 1963
Had it intended to do so, it would *379 have clearly so stated, especially where, as here, it was promulgating an “explicit legislative declaration of public policy.” Schwartz v. Stockton, supra, 32 N. J., at p. 148. … immunity, as a “body politic, with power to sue and be sued, use a common seal and adopt by-laws to regulate its proceedings” (R.
Cited 1 timesPublished432 N.J. Super. 230 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Aug 13, 2013
In 2005, the Legislature adopted The Family Health Care Coverage Act (FHCCA), N.J.S.A. 30:4J-8 to -19, which re-established, reformed, and expanded a prior program to provide subsidized health insurance coverage to qualifying … This heavy reliance on the program indicates how necessary and effective it is, and clearly demonstrates how substantially the restriction operates against the protected class.
Cited 2 timesPublished
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