Case law

State v. B.H.

290 N.J. Super. 588 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 15, 1996

clearly intended. … It might even be motivated by an attempt to cause annoyance or alarm, but I think it would be immune from prosecution, but the utilization of a ripped up order clearly indicates to me that this was a communication likely

Linek v. Korbeil

333 N.J. Super. 464 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Aug 3, 2000

In 1987, after qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs) were authorized by federal statute, a consent order was entered to satisfy the requirements of the pension administrator. … Clearly, the intent of Judge O'Donnell was to apply Kikkert . There's no doubt what Kikkert requires and plaintiff should receive the full share she's entitled to under the law.

State v. Kittrell

279 N.J. Super. 225 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 31, 1995

In adopting the tests of reliability established by the Supreme Court in State v. … Because enough evidence was presented to qualify Detective Mordaga as an expert in this area, the trial court's error in failing to specifically qualify him as an expert was harmless.

Heinl v. Heinl

287 N.J. Super. 337 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 14, 1996

The wife's interest in the pension shall be subject to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. … Clearly, the written provision in the judgment contradicts the express language of the judge's written opinion.

WT Grant Co. v. Walsh

100 N.J. Super. 60 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 8, 1968

Plaintiff sues on a contract for the establishment of a retail installment sales account. Defendant Janet P. … These statements were clearly untrue and were relied upon by Mrs. Walsh. Mrs.

In Re Gutkowski

135 N.J. Eq. 93 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 27, 1943

Justice Blatchford said in Re Devoe Manufacturing Co., 108 U.S. 401 , 413 ; 2 S.Ct. 894 , 902 ; 27 L.Ed. 764 : "* * * The jurisdiction thus conceded to New York [in article IV] is, clearly, a limited one, and cannot, in any … . * * *" He concludes the opinion in the following language: "* * * and that the sovereignty of the State of New Jersey is co-extensive with the territorial limits thus established, subject only to such extra-territorial

Jarrett v. Duncan Thecker Associates

175 N.J. Super. 109 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 29, 1980

West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee, 68 Wis. 2d 42 , 227 N.W. 2d 660 (1975), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that it is immaterial that an entity which may be partly responsible is not a party or is immune from further … [Emphasis supplied] The statute clearly limits the jury's deliberations to parties to the suit, rather than parties to the transaction.

S.S. v. E.S.

243 N.J. Super. 1 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 17, 1990

The tests shall be performed by a qualified expert appointed by the court. b. The court, upon reasonable request by a party, shall order that independent tests be performed by other qualified experts. c. … It is clearly within the power of the State to provide for the enforcement of the parental duty to support one’s children.

State v. Cunningham

186 N.J. Super. 502 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 21, 1982

Clearly, the statutory design is to prevent firearms from coming into the hands of persons likely to pose a danger to the public. … It expressly provides that no one shall "purchase" or "receive ... or otherwise acquire" a gun unless qualified under law.

Columbro v. Lebanon Tp. Zoning Bd.

424 N.J. Super. 501 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 23, 2012

The primary use of the premises by the occupant must be residential and the "home occupation" engaged in must be clearly incidental thereto. … They argue that the welding business is not "incidental" to the principal use of the property as a residence, and they suggest that the Edwards' use must qualify as "light occupation."

LP Marron & Co. v. River Vale Tp.

54 N.J. Super. 64 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 2, 1959

Super. at page 44) it is made clear that the substantial reliance that will immunize the landowner from subsequent legislation must be a "justifiable expenditure in good faith." In the Crecca case, supra ( 52 N.J. … Moreover, our examination of the record does not convince us that the claimed factual effect is clearly established.

State v. Jones

57 N.J. Super. 260 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 2, 1959

The prosecution clearly established a strong prima facie case, including the positive identification of Jones as the leader of the holdup party on each of the two occasions for which he was convicted — the Brakefield robbery … Significantly, there was no attempt to establish an alibi through him.

Bower v. Board of Educ. of City of East Orange

287 N.J. Super. 15 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 30, 1996

to consider whether criminal conduct ascribed to Paul Norman Bower, a tenured kindergarten teacher employed by the East Orange Board of Education, arose "out of and in the course of the performance of his duties," thus qualifying … The court noted, "The fact ... that the alleged criminal acts were obviously beyond the prescribed duties of a board member does not in itself immunize the board from the statutory liability; for such a construction would

Kisselbach v. County of Camden

271 N.J. Super. 558 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 31, 1994

Kisselbach's deteriorating condition, pain, suffering and subsequent death," the judge correctly concluded that Nellis, not being a medical doctor, was not qualified to establish a causative link. … DiPiero and I don't think that that is sufficient to establish negligence on behalf of the defendants in this case.

Mabee v. Borden, Inc.

316 N.J. Super. 409 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 23, 1997

“The fellow worker’s employment need not be simultaneous for purposes of the immunity.” Id. at 262, 266 . … outside of the standards established in Millison .

Berkery v. ESTATE OF STUART

412 N.J. Super. 76 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 19, 2010

Plaintiff goes on to argue that none of defendants qualify under New Jersey law as "media defendants." … The book's assertion that the charges were dropped because the legal establishment "had had enough" is clearly an opinion of the author on a matter of public interest and thus not subject to a defamation claim.

State v. Maddox

153 N.J. Super. 201 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 26, 1977

R. 2:10-2 requires an appellate court to disregard errors unless "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." … The denial of the motion for a new trial was clearly mandated by the proofs and reasonable inferences therefrom.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DIEGO ARROYO-NUNEZ (19-04-0265, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 18, 2022

"[t]he need to ensure sentencing uniformity for defendants convicted of qualifying Chapter 35 offenses." … If nothing else, however, our prior discussion demonstrates the unfettered exercise of prosecutorial discretion in sentencing, even when acquiesced to by a defendant, is not immune from judicial review.

Forsyth v. Township of Lacey

167 N.J. Super. 198 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 30, 1978

He also indicated that there may be a title problem in re *201 gard to the land, i. e., if it is established that it is tidal land, ownership would be in the State. … He explained: Sacrifice sale means you’re hard up and can’t keen your taxes uj), or something like that; so, I qualified. Yes, it’s a sacrifice due to the high tax bill.

Matter of Sussex County Mun. Utilities Authority

198 N.J. Super. 214 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 18, 1985

We are convinced that the words used by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 40:14B-18 clearly manifest an intent that, other than with respect to those specifically excepted thereby, appointees and employees of utilities authorities … Without particular regard for the honored maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius we note with respect the established proposition that "legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative