Case law

CAROL LEONARD, ETC. VS. CITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK (L-4433-14, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 14, 2017

The TCA qualifies these liability-imposing principals with specific immunities, including those set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 59:4-9. … From our review, the record clearly establishes that the Raritan River caused Devine's death, thereby making it the relevant property.

In re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Housing Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan

369 N.J. Super. 2 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 28, 2004

nonprofit organizations that are community-based within a qualified census tract. … But “some impact” is not enough to establish a prima facie case. Id. at 169, 588 A.2d 1227 .

In re State

427 N.J. Super. 1 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 27, 2012

There was never, however, a corresponding move away from the traditional practice, clearly embraced by the nineteenth century courts, whereby potential jurors are not placed under oath, absent an extrinsically established … This court does not find that Rule 1:8-5 and N.J.S.A. 2B:20-4, by implication, place an absolute limit on that clearly established authority.

Panettieri v. CV Hill Refrigeration

159 N.J. Super. 472 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 10, 1978

Causal relation between a job and a heart attack must be established by expert proof, and Panettieri is clearly no expert. … Flood's opinion was not reasonably arrived at, was clearly implied.

In Re Peoples Bank of Montvale

111 N.J. Super. 141 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 14, 1970

The case before us is clearly distinguishable on several grounds. … It now argues that the October 2 hearing for the purpose of qualifying Christensen actually constituted part of the application for the bank charter. Clearly, that is not so.

Judah v. GENERAL SUPERMARKETS, INC.

99 N.J. Super. 389 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 7, 1968

The issues involved in this appeal are: (1) is an award of temporary disability benefit and medical expenses a final judgment which can be appealed to the county court, and (2) does the record before the Division establish … Clearly, it deals with the final disposition of the issues raised in a proceeding.

Hammer v. Township of Livingston

318 N.J. Super. 298 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 18, 1999

The Act was intended to re-establish the Legislature's overriding philosophy that immunity for public entities is the general rule and liability is the exception. See Pico v. … In Collins, our Supreme Court held that "an aggravating and intrusive assault" that causes a victim to sustain a permanent psychological injury may be sufficient to qualify as a "permanent loss of a bodily function" under

Levine v. Miller

272 N.J. Super. 512 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 9, 1993

The plaintiff clearly required extensive restorative dentistry as a result of the accident. … Based on these facts, this court is of the opinion that plaintiffs injuries could qualify as a category 6 injury. The plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted.

Save Camden Pub. Sch. v. Camden City Bd. of Educ.

454 N.J. Super. 478 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 24, 2018

QSAC, which was enacted in 2005 and last substantively amended in 2007, established a comprehensive statutory scheme to evaluate a school district's performance. … We will start with plaintiffs' claim under the CRA because that claim was clearly not barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Gauntt Construction Co. v. Delaware River & Bay Authority

241 N.J. Super. 310 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 6, 1990

The Commission “was established by the compact as the 'joint corporate municipal instrumentality of the States of New Jersey and New York.’ ” Id. at 345, 273 A.2d 10 . … Delaware River Port Auth., 478 Pa. 396 , 387 A.2d 41 (Pa.1978) (Pennsylvania’s immunity does not extend to this agency).

Knight v. CITY OF HOBOKEN RENT LEVELING BD.

332 N.J. Super. 547 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 13, 2000

Since this concept, so basic as to qualify as a maxim of administrative law, applies even to state administrative agency exercises, see Medical Soc'y v. … Hyland, 70 N.J. 550, 556 , 362 A. 2d 13 (1976). § 155-4 clearly establishes, without condition, a tenant's right to a refund or a credit whenever a finding has been made that rents exceeding permitted limits have been charged

State v. Cardone

146 N.J. Super. 23 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 30, 1976

He contends that the certificates were admitted without satisfying any exception to the hearsay rule (see id. ) and that, lacking competent proof of the accuracy of the radar unit, the State failed to establish defendant's … Clearly the rule contemplated the use of affidavits and other hearsay in such preliminary inquiries so long as the evidence appears to be reliable. Thus, the certificates were properly admitted in evidence.

St. Louis, LLC v. FINAL TOUCH

386 N.J. Super. 177 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 12, 2006

He's—clearly there was a great deal of effort to try and market this property over a long period of time. And . . . Mr. Boulton was involved in that process. … Kelly was a qualified expert and gave the why and the wherefore to support his conclusions.

Masel v. Paramus Borough Council

180 N.J. Super. 32 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 22, 1981

[her successor] shall have qualified” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:87—15. … or which may be established by any such county board of taxation.

Robin Newsome v. Inspira Health Network, Inc.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 24, 2024

As in Frields, the paramedics' alleged negligence will not vitiate qualified immunity under N.J.S.A. 26:2K-14, as long as they acted in good faith. … Even if plaintiff could establish a claim of negligence, that is not the standard here.

Donovan v. Bergen County Board of Chosen Freeholders

436 N.J. Super. 91 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 27, 2012

Judge Feinberg found that these statutory provisions “establish a clear and specific legislative intent to vest with the County Executive the authority to appoint the registered municipal ac *100 countant.” … Clearly, the Board’s attempts to analogize the appointment of the municipal accountant to the state auditor are misplaced.

Waldron v. Johnson

368 N.J. Super. 348 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 23, 2004

Through her expert's testimony, plaintiff established to the jury's satisfaction that the *1290 Mall's response time was slow and that, overall, its security was lax or deficient; but plaintiff's injury was no more foreseeable … The contingent fee of an attorney shall not be computed on the interest so included in the judgment." [5] That circumstance is clearly distinguishable from a situation in which no such immunity had been granted by statute

CHARLES KRAVITZ VS. PHILIP D. MURPHY (L-0774-20, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 20, 2021

A-1584-20 7  Importantly, the Governor qualified the reach of EO 106 in two ways. … In their reply brief, appellants state they do not qualify for the SLEG, because, apparently, they own less than three rental units.

State v. Farinella

150 N.J. Super. 61 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 4, 1977

with representatives of the Attorney General's office and ultimately entered into an agreement whereby his corporation, Albert Scaletti, Inc., would plead guilty to a charge against it and Scaletti would be given personal immunity … A conspiracy is presumed to have continued as to each member of it until either the object of the conspiracy has been established or there is proof of an affirmative act of withdrawal as to one or more members thereof.

Larocco v. Gardella

352 N.J. Super. 234 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 31, 2002

Nevertheless, the conclusion therein, which established venue in the Family Part, was the result of the underlying domestic arrangement of the parties, which clearly comported with the requirements necessary to establish … Unless the Plaintiff can establish cohabitation with the Defendant, he does not present a principal claim which qualifies as a “family-type” relationship.