Case law

Komninos v. BANCROFT NEUROHEALTH

417 N.J. Super. 309 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 13, 2010

The Charitable Immunity Act encourages private philanthropic activity by affording statutory immunity to qualifying non-profit organizations. … Moreover, for the reasons we have already expressed, Bancroft's immunized status is established by its core educational purposes.

Graber v. Richard Stockton College

313 N.J. Super. 476 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 24, 1998

A qualifying organization does not lose its statutory immunity merely because it charges money for its services, Rupp v. … Cramer, 133 N.J. 347 , 627 A. 2d 1090 (1993)(stating that public entities are entitled to immunity both under the Tort Claims Act and as established at common law).

State in Interest of AL

271 N.J. Super. 192 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 28, 1994

A state legislature is free to restrict or qualify that right, so long as it does not create an arbitrary or discriminatory classification scheme. Woodard v. … Clearly, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-29 does not mention "derivative use" immunity.

Bayer v. Township of Union

414 N.J. Super. 238 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 7, 2010

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages under section 1983 unless his conduct violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person … Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a defense to liability; the benefit of the immunity is effectively lost if the case is allowed to go to trial. Mitchell v.

Kirk v. City of Newark

212 N.J. Super. 201 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Aug 4, 1986

Leon, 468 U.S. [897], 82 L.Ed.2d 677 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984)] defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest. … The test the jury was instructed to apply lacked substantial definition and clearly could have prejudiced defendant’s right to have the benefit of the qualified immunity to which she was *209 entitled.

Brown v. City of Bordentown

348 N.J. Super. 143 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 16, 2002

The Law Division judge denied this motion on the ground that Lynch was entitled only to "qualified immunity subject to good faith." As noted, we affirm this denial of summary judgment as to Lynch with modification. … Lynch headed the Department of Public Safety under the distribution of powers scheme established in the City's government. N.J.S.A. 40:72-4.

Felicioni v. Admin. Office of Courts

404 N.J. Super. 382 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 15, 2008

substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, or [2] whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted … Clearly, defendants' contrary interpretation renders the terms "deprive" and "interfere" indistinguishable, yet they are clearly different in meaning.

Mick v. American Dental Assn.

49 N.J. Super. 262 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 13, 1958

Unlike absolute privilege, which affords complete protection, qualified privilege affords immunity only if there is no ill motive or malice in fact, and can be lost by abuse on the part of the defendant. … Fluoridation of drinking water, which affects the health of citizens in a community, is clearly a subject of wide public interest.

Reaves v. State

303 N.J. Super. 115 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 8, 1997

Such an allegation also may implicate the enforcement priorities established by the agency’s supervisory staff, which would be covered by the qualified *121 immunity provided by N.J.S.A. 59:2-3(d) and N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(d). … Therefore, the Tort Claims Act’s clearly expressed policy judgment that such legislative and executive decisions should not generally provide a basis for the imposition of tort liability provides further support for our conclusion

Martha C. Ptaszynski, Etc. v. Atlantic Health Systems, Inc., D/B/A Mt. Kemble Rehabilitation at Morristown Memorial Hospital

440 N.J. Super. 24 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 20, 2015

Charitable Immunity Defendant argues that the judge erred by refusing to consider its pre-trial motion for immunity under the CIA. … To qualify for immunity under this statute, defendant must establish that it was organized "exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes." Ibid. (Emphasis added). B.

Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell

152 N.J. Super. 133 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 18, 1977

The court concluded that, under the circumstances before it, wherein allegations, if proven, "would most convincingly establish clearly, specifically and definitely that it was the intent of the parties to enter into long-term … privilege affords immunity only if there is no ill motive or malice in fact, and can be lost by abuse on the part of the defendant.

Smith v. ALZA CORPORATION

400 N.J. Super. 529 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 9, 2008

The motion judge summarily dismissed plaintiff's complaint finding that defendant qualified for "seller" immunity under N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-9. … As such, we conclude that defendant does not qualify as a "product seller" entitled to immunity from liability under N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-9.

Tumpson v. Farina

431 N.J. Super. 164 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 29, 2013

Defendants raised the issue of qualified immunity. Given our decision we need not reach that issue. … We do note, however, that qualified immunity is an *183 affirmative defense under the NJCRA, and the defense of qualified immunity applies only to claims for money damages and not to claims for injunctive relief.

Petrocelli v. Sayreville Shade Tree Commission

297 N.J. Super. 544 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 21, 1997

Unlike the grant of a qualified good faith immunity in N.J.S.A. 26:11-12, which the Court found to be inconsistent with the TCA’s grant of absolute immunity to public entities for “ ‘the exercise of judgment or discretion … ,’ ” 147 N.J. at 306-08 , 687 A.2d at 721 , the absolute immunity of N.J.S.A 40:64-14 is not a qualified immunity.

Town of Morristown v. TP. OF HANOVER

168 N.J. Super. 292 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 16, 1979

The legislation as construed by the Supreme Court in Aviation Services and Shell Oil Co., supra, establishes an island of immunity from zoning regulations for property operated and used for the primary purpose of a municipal … The statutory immunity mandates the reverse process.

Heffelfinger v. Town of Morristown

209 N.J. Super. 380 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 24, 1985

The terms "society" and "association" are not clearly defined by New Jersey statutory or decisional law. … In this case, defendants clearly were fulfilling their obligations as trustees of the Morristown green when Mrs. Heffelfinger allegedly was injured. Mrs.

Wuethrich v. Delia

134 N.J. Super. 400 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 27, 1975

the liability established by the act may be subject to one of the claimed express statutory immunities of the public entity ( N.J.S.A. 59:2-1(b); 59:5-4; and 59:5-5). … This court construes N.J.S.A. 59:2-2 to hold the public entity clearly liable for acts or omissions of a low-level discretionary or ministerial nature.

Brian Royster v. New Jersey State Police

439 N.J. Super. 554 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 10, 2015

Only the sovereign's own consent could qualify the absolute character of that immunity" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). … Here, defendants are clearly an arm of the State under the Fitchik test.

Tallaksen v. Ross

167 N.J. Super. 1 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 7, 1979

Defendant's 70-acre undeveloped tract qualifies for immunity under the act when used for the statutorily defined recreational purposes, despite its zoning classification as residential lands and its proximity to developed … Clearly, plaintiff's recreational activities on defendant's undeveloped land represented the fulfillment of the legislative objective and, consistent *5 with the act's promise of immunity with respect to such use, defendant's

Whitney v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light

240 N.J. Super. 420 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 1, 1990

The Act, in our view, would clearly go beyond these goals were it construed to grant a blanket *424 immunity to all property owners, particularly to those owning lands in densely populated urban or suburban areas, without … The Supreme Court made this statement in concluding that a reservoir, which probably would qualify for the immunity provided by the Act if located in an undeveloped area, does not enjoy that immunity if it is located in the