Case law

DRONEY v. VIVINT SOLAR

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 23, 2020

Judge Schneider determined that “Hendricks is qualified to testify about the general areas of credit reporting and credit data privacy. … However, Hendricks is not qualified to testify about plaintiffs’ damages, emotional or physical, or damages expected to flow from FCRA violations.

NAQVI v. PATEL

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jul 29, 2025

“It is not enough to establish that a party is acutely upset by reason of the incident. … plaintiff must assert the following: (1) “a conspiracy”; (2) “for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities

<font color="red">DO NOT FILE IN THIS CASE</font> - TRANSFERRED TO CAMDEN - NEW CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-1460

District Court, D. New Jersey · Dec 30, 2020

Because the laboratory is not a listed entity, the Court must use the tests previously employed by New Jersey courts in determining whether a non-listed entity qualifies as a public accommodation under the NJLAD. … Ann. § 59:2-10 provides public entities with immunity for intentional misconduct. (ECF No. 9-5 at 10–11.)

United States v. Leon

2 F. Supp. 2d 592 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Apr 7, 1998

Application Note 1(c) includes as an appropriate consideration in determining whether a defendant qualifies for this adjustment, the “voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt.” … Brock, 108 F.3d 31 (4th Cir.1997) and noting that “[c]olleetively, these decisions clearly establish that when an offender demonstrates an exceptional or extraordinary degree of responsibility, a court may depart downward

BASS v. JABER

District Court, D. New Jersey · Nov 18, 2019

“In order to establish a basis for subject matter jurisdiction in federal court, a plaintiff's claims must establish either federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. … To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege a federal claim of odometer fraud, Plaintiff fails to allege such a claim clearly or in any detail.

United States v. Delaney

8 F. Supp. 224 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 8, 1934

Bail or qualified freedom was devised to meet these conflicting interests of society and the individual. … To eliminate too much of the personal equation, general rules for the conduct of such trials have been established. Because of that, their outcome becomes to a certain extent a matter of predictability.

Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department

933 F. Supp. 396 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jul 12, 1996

The scope of individual liability under the NJLAD has not yet been clearly established. No New Jersey court has resolved the issue. In Tyson v. … The ACPD’s liability is established on different grounds from Mad-amba’s.

TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY LIMITED v. ZYDUS PHARMACEUTICALS (USA) INC.

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jul 26, 2021

Proof of a sham merely deprives the defendant of immunity; it does not relieve the plaintiff of the obligation to establish all other elements of his claim.” PRE, 508 U.S. at 61. … Zydus responds that “merely identifying a possible, albeit nebulous, DOE argument” is not enough to establish Noerr immunity. Def. Br., at 22. But that is more or less the standard for objective reasonableness.

Olsen v. Communications Workers of America (CWA)

559 F. Supp. 754 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Mar 16, 1983

Your name and work number are clearly printed on the leaflet with an invitation to call you. Such information would be considered “first hand.” … Use of a State phone for business other than that of the State’s is clearly inappropriate.

C.K. v. Shalala

883 F. Supp. 991 · District Court, D. New Jersey · May 4, 1995

Rather, in this ease the Court is confronted with an AFDC program circumscribed by comprehensive regulations with no intimation from Congress that the Secretary’s discretion is immune from judicial scrutiny. … These interests are clearly legitimate.

MACALL

District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 23, 2025

“[T]o qualify as a defamatory statement, the statement must be able to be proven true or false.” Id. at 205 (citation omitted). … The evidence will show that First Montgomery’s amount of claimed “rent” is clearly wrong.

Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.—Conn.

801 F. Supp. 1334 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 5, 1992

In finding that the letters did not constitute claims, the court stated: clearly none of the September 1982 communications qualifies as a ‘demand for money or property.’ … In support of this argument, they document evidence in the record that establishes clearly that Grace was aware in the 1960s that its waste disposal practices caused extensive surface water pollution of nearby brooks and

HABER v. NEW JERSEY TRANSIT

District Court, D. New Jersey · Feb 21, 2020

The first and third requirements are clearly met in this case. … NJT is an “arm of the state” such that it may invoke New Jersey’s sovereign immunity, immunizing it from Section 1983 lawsuits in federal court. Karns v.

Johnson & Johnson v. Herold

161 F. 593 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jul 31, 1907

Ed. 160 , the same principle is enunciated, and is clearly indicated in the earlier case of Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 619 , 19 L. Ed. 205 , where, upon page 622 of 7 Wall. ( 19 L. … The word necessarily implies absolute or qualified ownership. Johnson’s plasters are Johnson’s, and nobody’s else, and they cannot be anybody’s else. It is not equivalent to saying “belladonna plasters made by Johnson.”

Waterloov Gutter Protection System Co. v. Absolute Gutter Protection, L.L.C.

64 F. Supp. 2d 398 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Sep 28, 1999

The litigation privilege is firmly established in New Jersey case law. The privilege protects, as absolutely immune from liability, statements by attorneys made in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. … On the one side are eáses involving underlying transactions clearly within the ambit of the CFA. In these cases, New Jersey courts have been willing to extend liability to professionals.

MOYA v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

District Court, D. New Jersey · Aug 12, 2020

Thus, “[i]f a proposed amendment is not clearly futile, then denial of leave to amend is improper.” … Plaintiff argues that United’s claim would be futile because he had access to the information and documents to carry out his 4 Plaintiff claims to be immune under 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1) governing immunity from liability

JACKMON v. NJ DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

District Court, D. New Jersey · Sep 12, 2022

Second, Defendants assert that they lack sufficient personal involvement, personal capacity claims are not subject to suit under RLUIPA and are entitled to qualified immunity. … Plaintiff’s sworn deposition testimony is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

GAVIRIA v. LINCOLN EDUCATIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jul 8, 2021

Immunity Lincoln Tech argues that it is immune from this suit under the New Jersey Emergency Health Powers Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:13-1 et seq. … The complaint does not establish what portion of these fees were “used.”

ACADEMY HILL, INC. v. CITY OF LAMBERTVILLE

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jul 6, 2020

The New Jersey legislature, however, enacted the New Jersey Tort Claims Act “to establish immunity for government action as the rule and liability as the exception.” Lee v. … Because the City of Lambertville is a municipality, it is not entitled to sovereign immunity; instead, a New Jersey municipality’s governmental immunity derives from the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“NJTCA”), which states

PHANG

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jan 14, 2026

As such, this Court will not hypothesize potential causes of action that have not been clearly alleged. Therefore, Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to satisfy the applicable pleading standard and is dismissed. … To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the plaintiff is at least forty years old; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision; (3) the plaintiff was qualified for