Case law

Community Hospital Group, Inc. v. More

183 N.J. 36 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 5, 2005

the public’s access to other qualified neurosurgeons within that area. … JFK contends that the reference in those provisions to "one” year is clearly a typographical error. Dr. More does not concede that these covenants have a two-year duration.

State ex rel. Beckett v. Collector of Bordentown

32 N.J.L. 192 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 15, 1867

Exemption of the alien from compulsory military service, might, obviously, be often just, and many times politic; while the immunity of the property of such alien from taxation to contribute to the support of the same military … By the establishment of his domicil here, the prosecutor became invested with most of the rights, and subject to most of the duties, of a native born citizen. “Such domiciled citizen,” says Mr.

Hill v. Hill

95 N.J. Eq. 233 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 19, 1923

The executors duly qualified. The personal estate of the testator is more than sufficient to pay all the debts, including the principal and interest due on the bonds and mortgages mentioned. … This rule of law found early expression in our reports being very clearly and succinctly stated by Chancellor Green in the case of Keene et al. v. Munn et al., 16 N. J.

State v. Barone

96 N.J.L. 417 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 20, 1921

. *419 AYe think the proof was clearly competent in the aspect in which it was introduced. … The state was clearly entitled to resort to this circumstantial evidence for the purpose of establishing how and under what circumstances Benevento was killed.

Halsted v. State

41 N.J.L. 552 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 15, 1879

Judge Story, in one of his decisions, recognizes this as an established principle of the common law, and applies it to the issue before him. … This is manifestly a clear case in which the court held that the culprit must have had a guilty mind, although such ruling had the effect of qualifying the general statutory language.

Todd v. Jackson

26 N.J.L. 525 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 15, 1857

They offered no evidence to qualify the possession of the plaintiffs. … The merits are clearly against the defendant.” See also Graham v. Peat, 1 East 244; Harper v. Charlesworth, 4 B.&C. 574.

Bauer v. Nesbitt

198 N.J. 600 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 7, 2009

fourth count alleges that the C View Inn committed common-law negligence and violated the Dram Shop Act by either serving the underage Nesbitt alcohol when he was visibly intoxicated or allowing him to consume alcohol in his clearly … with immunity from liability for negligence — except as defined in the Act.

Lullo v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 1066

55 N.J. 409 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 9, 1970

Ereedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. … Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community." N. L. R. B v. Tidewater Exp. Lines, supra, 90 F. 2d at 303 .

State v. Jamerson

153 N.J. 318 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 25, 1998

Speth was qualified only as an expert in forensic pathology. … Speth was qualified only as an expert in forensic pathology and not qualified as an accident reconstruction expert.

Robert A. Verry v. Franklin Fire District No. 1 (Somerset) (077495) (Statewide)

230 N.J. 285 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 7, 2017

The District moved for reconsideration, arguing that the GRC had misapplied the “creation test” established in Fair Share Housing Center, Inc. v. … For OPRA disclosure-requirement purposes, as an instrumentality of a political subdivision, a fire district clearly meets the definition of public agency under the second sentence of OPRA’s definition.

Swetland v. Swetland

102 N.J. Eq. 294 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 6, 1928

This was a trust fund established on July 14th, 1917, by the testator for the benefit of the wife and children of his only son, Maurice J. Swetland. … That case clearly held that a gift to an executor is a complete testamentary disposition.

Matter of Musick

143 N.J. 206 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 1, 1996

establishing that the disorder would not have occurred but for the performance of specific work duties.” … The effect of adopting Option 2 was to eliminate clearly the necessity of establishing a one-time occurring accident or traumatic event as the cause of an injury or illness for which SLI benefits are available.

Danek v. Hommer

9 N.J. 56 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 10, 1952

The relevant provisions of the act are as follows: L. 1911, chapter 95, page 134: "An Act prescribing the liability of an employer to make compensation for injuries received by an employee in the course of employment, establishing … This seems to be the rational consequence of the changed relationship by consent of the parties affected under the act, whereby the employer becomes immune from liability for tort in consideration of the payment of compensation

Sisters of Charity v. Cory

73 N.J.L. 699 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 2, 1907

In our opinion in the earlier case, after reciting’ the exempting provision of the statute (which remains unchanged except in its phraseology), we proceeded as follows: “No reason is perceived why this statutory immunity … If anything remains after the necessities of the sisters are supplied, it must be' applied, according to their rules, either to extend their establishments for the public good or appropriated to the use of the poor.

Smith v. Atlantic City Railroad

66 N.J.L. 307 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 17, 1901

To sustain an exception to such a refusal to nonsuit it must be clearly established, from the facts and circumstances 'developed in the plaintiff’s case, that her failure to exercise ordinary or reasonable care proximately … If so, does this inference so clearly appear as not to be a subject for fair debate? We think not.

In Re Petitions for Rulemaking, N.J.A.C. 10:82-1.2 & 10:85-4.1

117 N.J. 311 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 11, 1989

The difference in programs (aside from funding sources) is that the AFDC program serves only families with children in need while the GA program is the program of “last resort” for many needy citizens not qualifying for categorical … For example, social security benefits increased by 10% in 1971, by 20% in 1972, and by 7% in 1973, and were indexed, effective 1975, by a formula that “immunized them from the runaway inflation of the late 1970s.”

Mueller v. Seaboard Commercial Corp.

5 N.J. 28 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 12, 1950

S. 2:42-88 in that they fail to establish that the plaintiff has a cause of action. … The foregoing facts which were set forth in the plaintiff’s affidavits clearly establish prima facie the proposition that Technical and Boberts in refusing to deliver up the property were acting as agents for and under instructions

In re the Trenton Water Power Co.

20 N.J.L. 659 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 15, 1846

It is objected that the privilege of cutting through highways, is clearly given by the charter; and, as no obligation is expressly imposed of building the bridges, that might thus become necessary, it is to be presumed that … inquiring at this time, whether the legislature had a constitutional right to grant a charter with express provisions of that sort, it seems clear to *663 my mind, that in the absence of such express provisions, a grant of such immunities

Montclair Military Academy v. North Jersey Street Railway Co.

65 N.J.L. 328 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 12, 1900

Such a transaction was clearly violative of public poliejr. Slocum v. Wooley, 16 Stew. Eq. 451, 454, rests upon the sanre principle. In Gulick v. … The burden of establishing fraud which shall enable the defendant to repudiate its obligation to pay, while it retains the consideration, is upon the defendant.

State v. Oglesby

122 N.J. 522 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 23, 1991

A defect on so critical a point clearly had the capacity of producing an unjust result. See R. 2:10-2. … NOTES [1] The motion produced this exchange: [COUNSEL]: I feel that the [death qualifying] system is defective in that the juror should be death-qualified in terms of their views on the death penalty prior to even coming