Case law

Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc.

19 N.J. 552 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Oct 31, 1955

In these situations the courts recognize a privilege or immunity which may be absolute or qualified; the difference is that the absolute privilege affords complete protection whereas the qualified privilege affords protection … Notwithstanding the foregoing, the plaintiff urges that the privilege in the instant matter should be qualified rather than absolute and it relies heavily on Finkelstein v. Geismar, 91 N. J. L. 46 (Sup.

Nicoletta v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission

77 N.J. 145 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 6, 1978

As the Supreme Court has held, executive officers are entitled to immunity where they act in good faith, as defined by the Court: *168 “[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch … We note that such qualified immunity of a public body is concordant with New Jersey legislative policy as expressed in our Tort Claims Act: 59 :2-3.

Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.

29 N.J. 357 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 9, 1959

But it is requisite that there be malice in fact if a qualified privilege is to be overcome. … Ed. 2d 179 (1957), distinguishing between absolute and qualified privilege immunizing defamation uttered by an officer of the Government in the form of a press release relating to matters committed to his control or supervision

Kemp Ex Rel. Wright v. State

174 N.J. 412 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 20, 2002

Reported women were classified into one of three categories of immune status: 1) susceptible — seronegativity (negative reaction to serological test) for rubella antibody documented within one year of vaccination; 2) immune … Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (1984), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated: [A] cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can

Wilson v. City of Jersey City

209 N.J. 558 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 8, 2012

The immunity provision of subsection (b) clearly immunized 9-1-1 operators for any negligence “in rendering PSAP services” to users of the 9-1-1 systems. … The amended statute clearly expanded immunity to telecommunications carriers.

Jackson v. Florence Thread Co.

115 N.J.L. 175 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 17, 1935

L., p. 708), the respondent clearly could not have invoked the limitation. … The point is made here, though the Supreme Court does not allude to it, that the act of 1924 does not express in its title any intent to modify or qualify the limitation imposed in the Workmen’s Compensation act.

Basil v. Wolf

193 N.J. 38 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 11, 2007

Here, Wolf clearly was not a co-employee of Basil. Tellingly, the defendant insurer did not contest that before this Court. Dr. Wolf was not entitled to claim co-employee immunity from suit by Basil’s Estate. … It simply has a duty to provide a qualified physician to diagnose and treat.

Coyne v. State, Department of Transportation

182 N.J. 481 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 2, 2005

As a result, the dissent concluded that “[t]he terms of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2a, generally establishing the parameters of liability, and the well-established idea that even the question of whether conduct was ‘palpably unreason … To construe [N.J.S.A. 59:2-3a] that broadly, however, would in effect eliminate most of the liability which the Legislature clearly intended to permit when it enacted the statute. [Costa v.

Polzo v. County of Essex

196 N.J. 569 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 3, 2008

Summarizing the case succinctly, the motion court explained that “this is a case clearly in which [plaintiff is] alleging that the County of Essex allowed a dangerous condition that [it] had constructive notice of to exist … Any application of the Tort Claims Act must start from its “guiding principle,” that is, “that ‘immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception.’ ” Coyne v.

Russell Forde Hornor v. Upper Freehold Regional Board of Education

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 11, 2026

See Margolis & Novack, Title 59: Claims Against Public Entities, cmt. 1 on N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 (2025) (“This section establishes a basis for employer immunity once a ground is established for the employer’s vicarious liability … Supreme Court was established.

Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co.

117 N.J. 539 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 5, 1990

A qualified privilege, on the other hand, enjoys a lesser degree of immunity and is overcome on a showing of actual malice. Specifically, in Coleman v. … We have also declared that proof of malice in the context of a qualified privilege must be established by clear and convincing evidence. See Burke v. Deiner, 97 N.J. 465, 481 (1984) (quoting New York Times v.

In Re Application of Martin

90 N.J. 295 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 30, 1982

It further provides that “[a]ny liability of a public entity established by this act is subject to any immunity of the public entity... ” N.J.S.A. 59:2-1(b) (emphasis added). … N.J.S.A. 5:12-80(b). 17 Since the Tort Claims Act states that any immunity of a public entity prevails over any liability, N.J.S.A. 59:2-1(b), the *336 immunity granted by the Casino Control Act is dispositive.

Swede v. Passaic Daily News

30 N.J. 320 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 2, 1959

In such situations, the courts recognize a privilege or immunity. … The nature of the “conference room” meeting is clearly established by the testimony of plaintiffs’ witnesses. The conclusion is inescapable that it was not only an official but also a public meeting.

State v. Froland

193 N.J. 186 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 12, 2007

At trial, the facts outlined above were established. … The Legislature could have qualified the word “parent” in the consent prong of the kidnapping statute based upon judicially decreed custodial status. It did not do so.

Jackson v. Hankinson and Bd. of Ed. of New Shrewsbury

51 N.J. 230 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 19, 1968

But we hold the view that on the retrial the plaintiffs will not have the burden of establishing “active wrongdoing” as the Appellate Division asserted but will be entitled to prevail if they establish, in addition to causal … The school district immunity statute is under its terms clearly inapplicable (Titus v. Lindberg, supra, 49 N.

Children's Seashore House for Invalid Children v. Atlantic City

68 N.J.L. 385 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 17, 1902

shall not *388 claim stieli immunity by virtue of that act. … The use of the word in the statute under consideration is clearly within the rule here suggested.

In Re Application of Waterfront Com'n of Ny Harbor

39 N.J. 436 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 4, 1963

Moreover, at its hearing on October 27, 1961, the Commission clearly recognized the defendants’ right to assert the privilege when it granted them immunity against prosecution. … : “It [the statute] does give ample protection against the use of such testimony in our own tribunals, and it is perfectly well established that this is a sufficient immunity; that all that the state is required to or can

Fanelli v. City of Trenton

135 N.J. 582 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 7, 1994

The court determined that the ordinance had been authorized under the State’s police power and established pursuant to the authority delegated to municipalities by the statutes authorizing the establishment of SIDs. … That authorization clearly meets the Hattie requirement that the anticompetitive action be a foreseeable result of the state authorization.

Andris Arias v. County of Bergen

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 22, 2026

Van Saun Park was established in 1960. It is located within the suburban confines of Paramus, New Jersey, and is owned and operated by Bergen County. … As the parties’ arguments reflect, the question of immunity in this case turns on the effect of statutory amendments on factors established in pre- amendment case law.

Pico v. State

116 N.J. 55 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 25, 1989

Any liability of a public entity established by this act is subject to any immunity of the public entity and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were a private person. … In the present case, we need not consider the application of common-law immunity because the statutory weather immunity provided by N.J.S.A. 59:4-7 so clearly applies.