Case law

State v. Jule Hannah

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 16, 2026

The State initially sought to qualify Detective Leyman as an expert in historical cell site analysis. The prosecutor noted, “I have to qualify him as an expert in order for this testimony to come in.” … The trial judge responded that, while cell phone tower data alone does not establish location, it may do so in conjunction with other evidence.

Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

237 N.J. 36 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 4, 2019

The exact nature and etiology of this is not clearly known." … While not qualified as an expert in CRPS, 8 Dr.

Atlantic City Racing Ass'n v. Attorney General

98 N.J. 535 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 27, 1985

Any law authorizing the establishment and operation of such gambling establishments shall provide for the State revenues derived therefrom to be applied solely for the purpose of providing funding for reductions in property … The type and number of such casinos or gambling houses and of the gambling games which may be conducted in any such establishment shall be determined by or pursuant to the terms of the law authorizing the establishment and

State v. Ivonne Saavedra (073793)

222 N.J. 39 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 23, 2015

Curtiss-Wright Corp., 204 N.J. 239 , 8 A.3d 209 (2010), immunized her conduct as a matter of public policy and prohibited the State from prosecuting her. … Consequently, “it is only when the facts known to the prosecutor clearly indicate or clearly establish the appropriateness of an instruction that the duty of the prosecution arises.”

State v. George

108 N.J.L. 508 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 1, 1932

Mental irresponsibility, because proper judgment was not exercised, is not only not the test of legal insanity approved by our courts, but seems to us to include immunity for nearly all criminal acts of omission and commission … The verdict was clearly not against the weight of the evidence.

1530 Owners Corp. v. Borough of Fort Lee

135 N.J. 394 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 11, 1994

In contesting the use of the respective sales, taxpayer presented the testimony of an expert qualified as a real-estate appraiser (but not qualified as an expert on the Director’s sales-ratio studies) who testified concerning … Clearly a taxpayer has to do more than demonstrate a procedural irregularity to challenge an assessment successfully.

Mary Richter v. Oakland Board of Education (083273)

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 8, 2021

We stated in Royster that [t]o establish a failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she (1) “qualifies as an individual with a disability, or … Clearly absent from that recitation is mention of an adverse employment action as an element. Two years later, in Caraballo v.

Cetofonte v. Camden Coke Co.

78 N.J.L. 662 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 28, 1910

There was no showing nor offer to show, either in the court below or here, that the remaining answers were material to the issue or that they tended to explain, qualify or limit the answer admitted. … Clearly, in the absence of such showing, the action of the trial judge cannot be said to be erroneous. What the result might have been in a dif *668 ferent situation we are not called upon to determine.

State v. Cameron

104 N.J. 42 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Sep 25, 1986

The exceptional immunity extended to the drunkard is limited to those instances where the crime involves a specific, actual intent. … In order to satisfy the statutory condition that to qualify as a defense intoxication must negative an element of the offense, the intoxication must be of an extremely high level.

Gerber v. BD. OF REV., ETC, NJ DEPT. OF LABOR & INDUS.

20 N.J. 561 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 13, 1956

Specific conditions under which unemployment compensation can or should be paid where there is a work stoppage as a result of a labor dispute is clearly within the legislative province. … Some states appear to qualify the intent of the statute and make disqualification from benefits operative only if unemployment “is directly due” to a labor dispute.

Univ. Cottage v. Env. Protection

191 N.J. 38 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 30, 2007

First, you should recognize that being "non-profit" does not automatically qualify an organization for property tax exemption. … (They are off-campus clubs and clearly not part of the University.) Secondly, your criteria says that: "The property must be open to the public on a regular basis." This is clearly not the case.

Paul Kimball Hospital, Inc. v. Brick Township Hospital, Inc.

86 N.J. 429 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 24, 1981

Initially the Department ruled Brick did not qualify for the exemption. Subsequently, the Department decided to reconsider this decision and held a hearing for that purpose. … [g]ranting to any corporation, association or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.

State v. Carlone

109 N.J.L. 208 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 17, 1932

One who is otherwise qualified and who has been in such position that he would probably have heard comment had there been such, may testify to the reputation of another in the neighborhood where the *214 latter resides, even … The testimony in the record does not establish reputation. Therefore, also for the reason last assigned, we think there was error.

Dawson v. Hatfield Wire & Cable Co.

59 N.J. 190 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 26, 1971

Such is clearly the law of this State. Booker v. James Spence Iron Foundry, 80 N. J. Super. 68, 73 (App. Div. 1963). … Where such facts coalesce, we think that the petitioner qualifies as a “wife” under the statute.

Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad v. Salmon

39 N.J.L. 299 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 15, 1877

Keeping in view that proximate, as here used, means closeness of causal connection, and not nearness in time or distance, and that its office is to qualify the generality of the idea expressed by natural, this definition, … That a servitude of this character is not imposed upon the owner of lands contiguous to a railroad, is clearly shown by the opinion of the Supreme Court in sustaining the demurrer to the plea.

Melick v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

84 N.J.L. 437 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 8, 1913

The meaning of a written contract is determined by the application of established canons to the language employed by the contracting parties. … is void in case of its violation as in the ease of a person previously rejected, or in the case of certain diseases, &c., but in the case of a previous policy in the same company the restriction is not absolute but only qualified

State v. Reynolds

65 N.J.L. 424 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 12, 1900

This principle is stated very clearly by the Court of Errors and Appeals in Halsted v. State, 12 Vroom 552 . … By his own agreement he recognizes the company, and his agency of it, and he will not be permitted to claim immunity by sirnpty asserting that it does not exist.

McCran v. Borough of Ocean Grove

96 N.J.L. 158 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 12, 1921

it may deem needful and to appoint such peace officers as may be deemed requisite for the purpose of keeping order within the territory of the association, such officers being clothed with the same power, authority and immunities … to a, given statute, is this: does it clearly appear that the unconstitutional feature'of the statute did1 not constitute an essential motive to its enactment? Hann v. Bedell, 67 N. J. L. 148; Riccio v.

Kennedy v. City of Newark

29 N.J. 178 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 16, 1959

The court can intervene only when unreasonableness is clearly established. Plaintiffs have not met that burden. *186 II. … The legislative history quite clearly indicates that with respect to the local service, N. J. S.

Bergen Point Iron Works v. Board of Review of Unemployment Compensation Commission

136 N.J.L. 645 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 18, 1948

Eor the unemployment resulting therefrom, he was clearly disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits by reason of the provision of R. … S. 43:21-5 (d), which provides for disqualification “for any week with respect to which it is found that his total unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment