Case law

Gibilterra v. Rosemawr Homes, Inc.

19 N.J. 166 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 20, 1955

liability might rest upon a jury finding of a failure by United and Bayley, assuming the trench was dug by Bayley in the continuance of the general hire, to employ standard methods in digging it, provided expert opinion establishes … R. 4:16-2 expressly immunizes from production or inspection “the conclusions of an expert” (except the report of a physician as limited by R.

Shreve v. Shreve

17 N.J. Eq. 487 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 15, 1864

If this is the correct theory, the disposition which has been made of the interest in question is clearly erroneous. As simple personalty, it cannot rank with the specific gifts to legatees and devisees. … The specialty creditor can look to the land as well as the personal assets, and there seems to be no reason why, in regard to this class of debts, the one kind of property should have an immunity which the other does not

Crespo v. Stapf

128 N.J. 351 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 25, 1992

Requiring a person to establish residency, which subjects him or her to the general jurisdiction of state courts, Jack H. … may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.

Rosa v. Dunkin' Donuts of Passaic

122 N.J. 66 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 15, 1991

The fireman's rule still allows recovery in situations of willful or intentional misconduct traditionally outside of the cloak of the rule's immunity. As we stated clearly in Mahoney v. … Freda that the rule does not apply when a defendant's clearly "subsequent act of negligence" injures the police officer or firefighter. 93 N.J. at 91 , 459 A. 2d 663 .

State v. Pinkston

233 N.J. 495 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 14, 2018

The first noted that when the police tried to conduct the motor vehicle stop, defendant's car "began to slowly travel," and the police "were unable to clearly identify the make and model of the" car because of low visibility … The State and the Attorney General contend that defendants possess only a qualified right in light of the history of the CJRA.

Lehrer v. Board of Adjustment of Newark

137 N.J.L. 100 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 9, 1948

A qualified real estate expert testified. “Question: Mr. Gill, does this property lend itself to a gasoline service station? … True, the decision of the Board of Adjustment is presumably correct, but its decision will not stand where, as here, it is clearly against the weight of the evidence.

Standard Underground Cable Co. v. Attorney-General

46 N.J. Eq. 270 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 15, 1889

The proviso, I think, is clearly an ambiguous sentence. … These qualifying words relate to and qualify some antecedent substantive.

Terry v. MERCER CTY. BD. OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDER

86 N.J. 141 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 26, 1981

The breadth of the statutory language and the strong remedial thrust of the statutory purpose therefore clearly accommodate the remedy that was fashioned by the Director. … The Division’s order in the context of the case clearly constitutes individual remedial action.

Sanzari v. Rosenfeld

34 N.J. 128 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 23, 1961

he in fact did establish a standard of care, and (3) it was unnecessary to establish a standard of care in this case. … judge’s determination of whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert may he reviewed, and, if clearly erroneous, may be set aside.

Den ex dem. Wortendyk v. Wortendyk

7 N.J.L. 363 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 15, 1800

Further, if the testator did design to establish that equality, at least in favor of his daughters, can it be .presumed that he would have left his intention veiled with so much apparent caution ? … The conclusion flowing from these circumstances is strongly corroborative of the idea, that the qualifying clause was not designed by tho testator to apply to the whole will.

State v. City of Perth Amboy

38 N.J.L. 425 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 15, 1876

Such is the established policy of the courts. State, Wilkinson, v. Trenton, 7 Vroom 499 . … Clearly, if after a new assessment and sale thereon, the parties might obtain a certiorari, and set aside the proceedings because of irregularities before the public moneys were expended, the caution of the court in limiting

Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler

157 N.J. 188 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 24, 1999

A prima facie cause of action under the LAD is established when [t]he plaintiff [ ] demonstrate^] by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she (1) belongs to a protected class, (2) applied and was qualified for a position … An employee can demonstrate “background circumstances” sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination by establishing either that the plaintiff was better qualified for the position than the minority candidate selected

State v. Mingo

77 N.J. 576 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 26, 1978

We believe that right to be clearly subverted if an expert report obtained for defense purposes by defendant’s counsel is to be made discoverable to the State and utilizable by it, directly or indirectly, at trial, unless … As indicated above, the immunity from discovery by the State of defense experts reports is subject to waiver in the event the defense intends to use the substance of those reports at the trial.

White v. Violent Crimes Compensation Board

76 N.J. 368 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 25, 1978

In its order of denial, the Board observed that had plaintiff’s claim been *373 filed in timely fashion she would have qualified for compensation. … Unlike claims under the Tort Claims Act, applications for compensation from the Board do not implicate the well-established principle that conditions attached to a limited waiver of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed

Superior Life, Health & Accident Insurance v. Board of Review of Unemployment Compensation Commission

127 N.J.L. 537 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 21, 1942

We think this is so despite the fact that he was obliged to obtain a license from the state to qualify him to sell insurance. … That fact alone does not establish his status as one engaged in an independently established business, &c., any more than one employed as a driver of an automobile with & license to drive would be.

Grodjesk v. Faghani

104 N.J. 89 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Oct 2, 1986

Without the informer’s privilege to bolster the state’s interest in confidentiality, the Appellate Division held that the balance clearly weighs in favor of disclosure. Id. at 458-59 . … Thus, the privilege, although well established, is no longer absolute, but qualified. State v. Milligan, supra, 71 N.J. at 383 .

In Re Shain

92 N.J. 524 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 16, 1983

Here, the Committee, in properly exercising its legislative purpose, clearly did not usurp the Mayor’s executive power. … The Mayor moved to vacate and quash the subpoena alleging that he was immune therefrom under the doctrine of separation of powers.

Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.

109 N.J. 189 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 27, 1988

They perceived plaintiffs complaint as stating only that she was terminated for asking to see her records; such a discharge, they reasoned, offended no clearly mandated public policy. … Plaintiff alleges that she was passed over for promotion in favor of less-qualified male candidates and that she was fired because she sought to examine her personnel records to establish a gender discrimination claim.

State v. Haskins

131 N.J. 643 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 15, 1993

In Romano , we explained that the reliability of a measuring device need not be established “beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. at 89 , 474 A.2d 1 ; conditions of admissibility need only be “clearly established.” … If jurors are qualified to make a comparison of handwriting with which they are not familiar, they would be qualified to make a comparison of tape measures with which they are most likely familiar.

State v. R.B.

183 N.J. 308 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 23, 2005

It may not be considered by you as establishing that the child was a victim of sexual abuse or that the defendant committed an act of sexual abuse on the child. … We again reinforce the overarching principle that CSAAS expert testimony cannot be *329 allowed as substantive proof to establish guilt or innocence. State v. J.Q., supra, 130 N.J. at 579 , 617 A.2d 1196 .