Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc.

    182 N.J. 436 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 24, 2005

    They contend that because plaintiffs burden on the prima facie case is intended to be modest, so long as he can show that he was qualified to hold his job, for example, by establishing that he actually performed it for a … established his “qualifications” for the job.

    Cited 195 timesPublished
  • Post v. Anderson

    11 N.J. Misc. 1 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 19, 1932

    It is next urged that evidence received tending to establish the guilt of the officer was improperly received. … This evidence was clearly inadmissible. 22 Corp.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United Electrical, Radio & MacHine Workers of America, Local No. 410

    139 N.J. Eq. 97 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 5, 1946

    The same proofs which establish the highly coercive conduct also established that appellants otherwise violated the laws of this state (R. S. 2:29-77.1(e)). … state and are, therefore, not immune from restraint and injunctive relief.

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • State v. Feaster

    184 N.J. 235 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 14, 2005

    In contrast, on appeal, "[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2; see also State v. … "[T]he burden of proof rests on those presenting such testimony to establish that it is probably true and the trial testimony probably false."

    Cited 56 timesPublished
  • Waters v. Quimby

    27 N.J.L. 296 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 15, 1859

    If the words had been “a certificate truly stating the amount of the capital so fixed and paid in,” the legislative intent would not have been more clearly expressed. … The privileges conferred by the act are conditional immunity from debts of the association. The thirtieth section justly forfeits this immunity for the deceit of the officers.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Perrine v. Evans

    35 N.J.L. 221 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 15, 1871

    This result was clearly correct on the rule as above stated. … The situation of such a foreign corporation is merely similar to a person having an established abode in this state, whose legal domicil is elsewhere.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • City of Plainfield v. Courier News

    72 N.J. 171 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 15, 1976

    The latter distinction has been clearly expressed in Wolfe County Liquor Dispensary Association v. Ingram, 272 Ky. 38 , 113 S. W. 2d 839, 842 (1938) (“A book may be printed without being published. … established in some community.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories

    116 N.J. 155 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 31, 1989

    The products were clearly not identical because Eli Lilly’s Tri-Solgen engendered a lower risk of harm. … It clearly does not.

    Cited 61 timesPublished
  • S.L.W. v. New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits (081723) (Statewide)

    238 N.J. 385 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 24, 2019

    S.L.W. requested the matter be referred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) to establish a record. … did not properly establish dependency.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Moore v. Moore

    114 N.J. 147 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 15, 1989

    The fact that these benefits become due and owing subsequent to the divorce does not immunize them from equitable distribution. … The mere fact that a benefit is contingent and difficult to measure does not mean it is immune from equitable distribution.

    Cited 39 timesPublished
  • Strobel Steel Construction Co. v. State Highway Commission of New Jersey

    120 N.J.L. 298 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 29, 1938

    The contracts made by the commission are clearly contracts of the state — they may be made either in the name of the state or of the commission. … It enjoys this immunity as one of the essential attributes of sovereignty, it being an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations, that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • Tevis v. Tevis

    79 N.J. 422 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 5, 1979

    of wrongfully inflicted injuries, dictate that immunity, when used as a shield to defeat recovery, be established affirmatively. … An examination of the facts of this particular case shows clearly that dismissal will not further the purposes underlying the two year limitations period prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Gantes v. Kason Corp.

    145 N.J. 478 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 23, 1996

    The conflict posed in that action was whether Florida’s marital immunity law or New Jersey law abrogating interspousal immunity should be followed. … Accordingly, the Court ruled that New Jersey had no interest that would call for the application of its own policy abrogating inter-spousal immunity, and, therefore, the Florida marital-immunity doctrine should apply, notwithstanding

    Abrogated by Andrew McCarrell v. Hoffman-La Roach, Inc.(076524), 227 N.J. 569 (2017)Cited 115 timesPublished
  • US Bank, N.A. v. Hough

    210 N.J. 187 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 22, 2012

    The language of the regulation itself clearly indicates the remedy that applies when an excessive loan is secured by an affordable housing unit. … That regulation clearly states that “[a]ny loan issued in violation of [the applicable affordable housing regulations] shall be void as against public policy.”

    Cited 95 timesPublished
  • County of Morris v. Fauver

    153 N.J. 80 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 9, 1998

    Prior to 1970, the State could not be sued in actions in tort or contract as a result of its sovereign immunity. Frapaul Constr. Co. v. … Kugler, Jr., Attorney General, Report of the Attorney General’s Task Force on Sovereign Immunity 9 (May 1972).

    Cited 204 timesPublished
  • State Board of Medical Examiners v. College of Mecca of Chiropractic, Inc.

    6 N.J. Misc. 677 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 27, 1928

    Where that which is directed to be done is within the sphere of legislation, and the terms used clearly express the intent, all reasoning derived from the supposed inconvenience, or even absurdity of the result, is out of … To use the words in the attorney-general’s brief: The act of 1924, page 395, seeks to establish an educational standard for those schools or colleges proposing to train and qualify students to practice medicine and surgery

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • State v. Hill

    121 N.J. 150 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 1, 1990

    It would usurp the trial court’s discretion to establish a blanket policy restricting testimony that fully qualifies for admissibility under the fresh-complaint rule but is duplicative or prejudicial. … We cannot establish a blanket rule because in each case the weight of each of those variables will be different.

    Cited 101 timesPublished
  • O'Neill v. City of Bayonne

    99 N.J.L. 430 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 4, 1924

    or which may be established for the police force in such municipality.” … L. 678 (at p. 681). *434 Prima facie the prosecutor was a de jure officer until the contrary is established by competent proof.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • State v. Wolf

    46 N.J. 301 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 24, 1966

    Therefore, he contends the double jeopardy clauses of both Eederal and State Constitutions give him complete immunity against further exposure to any punishment greater than life imprisonment. … Although it may be argued persuasively that in principle the two cases are repugnant, still in a footnote to his opinion in Green , Justice Black said they are “clearly distinguishable.” 355 U.

    Cited 54 timesPublished
  • State ex rel. Kipnis v. Dittmar

    12 N.J. Misc. 606 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 12, 1934

    L. 1921, pp. 263, 269), which directed the governor to appoint, within thirty days after the passage of the act, an “additional member” of the board of medical examiners, established by an act to regulate the practice of … The term was fixed at three years, “and until his successor is appointed and qualified.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished

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