Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • In Re Bond Printing Co., Inc.

    135 N.J.L. 478 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 24, 1947

    and established newspaper was barred by the terms of an unrelated statute.” … Clearly, the intention of the legislature was to limit legal advertising only to those newspapers having stability and continuous existence in the municipalities where their publication offices are maintained, and,- to qualify

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • O'Neill v. State Highway Department

    50 N.J. 307 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 6, 1967

    across the river from the property here involved), the tidal boundary may be established by elevations taken on the land. … We note that on the record as it now stands, certain portions of the tract are clearly owned by the State and some apparently by plaintiff.

    Cited 64 timesPublished
  • New Jersey State Board of Optometrists v. S. S. Kresge Co.

    113 N.J.L. 287 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 17, 1934

    And a statute prohibiting the sale at retail, in any store or established place of business, of “any spectacles, eyeglasses, or lenses for the correction of vision, unless a duly licensed physician or duly qualified optometrist … But this clearly does not constitute the practice of optometry.

    Modified by State Board of Optometrists v. S. S. Kresge Co., 115 N.J.L. 495 (1935)Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Interstate Wrecking Co. v. Palisades Interstate Park Commission

    57 N.J. 342 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 25, 1971

    In that year the Palisades Interstate Park Commission was established by the compact as the “joint corporate municipal instrumentality of the States of New Jersey and New York” with appropriate provision for the transfer … While these provisions clearly support the administrative separations between the states in the Commission’s operations they hardly serve to narrow the breadth of the sue and be sued clause. Cf. 109 N. J.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Thorp v. Board of Trustees of Schools for Industrial Education

    6 N.J. 498 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 12, 1951

    And a state statute requiring students at the state university to take a course in military science and tactics was held valid as against the contention that its enforcement would abridge the privileges and immunities and … Here, also, the teacher becomes qualified by taking the oath. The judgment of the State Board of Education is affirmed.

    Vacated by Thorp v. Board of Trustees, 342 U.S. 803 (1951)Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Pasqua v. Council

    186 N.J. 127 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 8, 2006

    It is the purpose of the child support hearing to establish that very point. … Those who draft and promulgate such rules, or omit to do so, are protected by legislative immunity.

    Abrogated on other grounds by Turner v. Rogers, 180 L. Ed. 2d 452 (2011)Cited 75 timesPublished
  • Romeo v. Romeo

    84 N.J. 289 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 16, 1980

    We conclude that N.J.S.A. 37:2-5 does not establish a substantive rule of law on the capacity of spouses to contract with one another. Our analysis must therefore focus on the common law rule. … demise * * While acknowledging the obligation of a lower court “to anticipate the winds of change as well as probable future expression of a higher court,” the court properly refused to deviate from the “clearly pronounced

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Russo v. BD. OF TRUSTEES, POLICE.

    206 N.J. 14 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 17, 2011

    Both Russo and the Board agreed that the matter could be decided on the record previously established, in addition to supplemental *25 briefing following Patterson . … Applying Richardson and Patterson , the ALJ concluded that the Board misapplied the reasonable person standard established in Patterson .

    Cited 459 timesPublished
  • Bunk v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey

    144 N.J. 176 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 22, 1996

    At that time, the doctrine of sovereign immunity immunized public bodies from many forms of liability. … If the language is plain and clearly reveals the statute’s meaning, the court’s sole function is to enforce the statute in accordance with the language. In Phillips v.

    Disagreed with by Delaware River Port Authority v. Fraternal Order of Police, 290 F.3d 567 (2002)Cited 52 timesPublished
  • Guterman v. Guterman

    66 N.J. 69 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 20, 1974

    Clearly it is the latter, as the trial judge here held. … I do not, at this point in this interlocutory proceeding, intimate any view on the underlying policy *72 considerations affecting the doctrine of intra-family immunity as expressed in Koplik v. C.P.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Woodland Private Study Group v. State

    109 N.J. 62 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 16, 1987

    The objective, then, is to distinguish those internal statements that should remain immune from the notice and hearing requirements. … The “substantial impact” test alone may not be sufficient to isolate those internal agency statements that remain immune from the notice and hearing requirements.

    Cited 55 timesPublished
  • State v. Vinegra

    73 N.J. 484 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 30, 1977

    Ed. 819 (1896), the Court clearly indicated that transactional immunity was constitutionally required. … Brown and Hale, however, involved statutes that were clearly sufficient to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination, as they provided full immunity from prosecution ‘for or on account of any transaction, matter or

    Cited 32 timesPublished
  • State v. Skillman

    76 N.J.L. 464 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 8, 1908

    In England this rule is ■established and liberalized by an act of parliament. 28 Viet., e. 18. … If such copies were offered as substantive proof of the original document they would be clearly inadmissible.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Commercial Trust Co. v. Hudson County Board of Taxation

    87 N.J.L. 179 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 9, 1914

    It may he well to say, by way of parenthesis, that the expression that such classification was “forced upon the state’'’ by federal legislation, ought not to be misleading in view of the context which clearly shows that what … of the statute, we have nothing to add to the opinion excepting to say that statutes for the performance of governmental -functions, which will not be invalidated by the courts upon an agreed state of facts, are equally immune

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • D.D. v. University of Medicine & Dentistry

    213 N.J. 130 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 12, 2013

    And it is for this reason that we have often described the Tort Claims Act as the means through which the Legislature “re-establishe[d]” sovereign immunity. Id. at 289 , 850 A.2d 1238 ; see also Ogborne v. … The Legislature’s waiver of sovereign immunity remains a limited one and we are not free to expand that waiver beyond its statutorily-established boundaries.

    Cited 131 timesPublished
  • Williams v. Department of Human Services

    116 N.J. 102 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 1, 1989

    This assistance continues for as long as the recipient remains qualified. Normally, an individual remains qualified so long as he or she is financially in need. … Under that argument, its “choice of a five-month limitation on homeless aid, given the limits on State funding, is clearly a rational one.”

    Limited by LT v. Dept. of Human Services, 264 N.J. Super. 334 (1993)Cited 44 timesPublished
  • Gannon v. American Home Products, Inc.

    211 N.J. 454 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 15, 2012

    so that he may know of past immunizations.” … They must not regard those considerations to be a license to substitute generalized concerns about the imposition of collateral estoppel when the clearly established elements have been met.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Center

    203 N.J. 184 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 28, 2010

    It was accompanied by a Sponsor’s Statement explaining that its purpose was “to establish by statute the responsibilities and liabilities of those individuals who engage in equine activities.” … Other factual circumstances, however, are not so clearly within this exception.

    Cited 30 timesPublished
  • McDevitt v. Bill Good Builders, Inc.

    175 N.J. 519 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 5, 2003

    Clearly, if both these questions are answered affirmatively, the summary judgment dismissing the complaint was improvidently granted. The difficulty is that neither question can be answered on this record. … As the proponent of the adoptive admission, plaintiff must establish both prerequisites for admissibility to the trial court’s satisfaction.

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Hull v. Plume

    131 N.J.L. 511 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 20, 1944

    “But like all general rules it has its exceptions and one of the most generally recognized •exceptions is the one applicable here, to wit, that where the acts of the defendant plrysicians are so manifestly and clearly negligent … to other members of his profession, and that mere proof of error or mistake is not sufficient to establish negligence.

    Cited 28 timesPublished

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