Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
2,879 results
1.49s
Thorp v. Board of Trustees of Schools for Industrial Education
6 N.J. 498 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 12, 1951
And a state statute requiring students at the state university to take a course in military science and tactics was held valid as against the contention that its enforcement would abridge the privileges and immunities and … Here, also, the teacher becomes qualified by taking the oath. The judgment of the State Board of Education is affirmed.
Vacated by Thorp v. Board of Trustees, 342 U.S. 803 (1951)Cited 17 timesPublishedPhillips v. State, Dept. of Defense
98 N.J. 235 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 21, 1985
N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. 4 Moreover, there are other provisions in article 2 of the Workers’ Compensation Act that are clearly inapplicable to the military situation. … If the action against the Department establishes that there was no causal relationship between the incident and the injury, plaintiff may be barred from proceeding against defendants in the civil action.
Cited 15 timesPublishedBunk v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
144 N.J. 176 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 22, 1996
At that time, the doctrine of sovereign immunity immunized public bodies from many forms of liability. … If the language is plain and clearly reveals the statute’s meaning, the court’s sole function is to enforce the statute in accordance with the language. In Phillips v.
Disagreed with by Delaware River Port Authority v. Fraternal Order of Police, 290 F.3d 567 (2002)Cited 52 timesPublished66 N.J. 69 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 20, 1974
Clearly it is the latter, as the trial judge here held. … I do not, at this point in this interlocutory proceeding, intimate any view on the underlying policy *72 considerations affecting the doctrine of intra-family immunity as expressed in Koplik v. C.P.
Cited 6 timesPublishedNew Jersey State Board of Optometrists v. S. S. Kresge Co.
113 N.J.L. 287 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 17, 1934
And a statute prohibiting the sale at retail, in any store or established place of business, of “any spectacles, eyeglasses, or lenses for the correction of vision, unless a duly licensed physician or duly qualified optometrist … But this clearly does not constitute the practice of optometry.
Modified by State Board of Optometrists v. S. S. Kresge Co., 115 N.J.L. 495 (1935)Cited 25 timesPublishedO'Neill v. State Highway Department
50 N.J. 307 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 6, 1967
across the river from the property here involved), the tidal boundary may be established by elevations taken on the land. … We note that on the record as it now stands, certain portions of the tract are clearly owned by the State and some apparently by plaintiff.
Cited 64 timesPublished135 N.J.L. 478 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 24, 1947
and established newspaper was barred by the terms of an unrelated statute.” … Clearly, the intention of the legislature was to limit legal advertising only to those newspapers having stability and continuous existence in the municipalities where their publication offices are maintained, and,- to qualify
Cited 1 timesPublishedInterstate Wrecking Co. v. Palisades Interstate Park Commission
57 N.J. 342 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 25, 1971
In that year the Palisades Interstate Park Commission was established by the compact as the “joint corporate municipal instrumentality of the States of New Jersey and New York” with appropriate provision for the transfer … While these provisions clearly support the administrative separations between the states in the Commission’s operations they hardly serve to narrow the breadth of the sue and be sued clause. Cf. 109 N. J.
Cited 12 timesPublishedRusso v. BD. OF TRUSTEES, POLICE.
206 N.J. 14 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 17, 2011
Both Russo and the Board agreed that the matter could be decided on the record previously established, in addition to supplemental *25 briefing following Patterson . … Applying Richardson and Patterson , the ALJ concluded that the Board misapplied the reasonable person standard established in Patterson .
Cited 459 timesPublished84 N.J. 289 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 16, 1980
We conclude that N.J.S.A. 37:2-5 does not establish a substantive rule of law on the capacity of spouses to contract with one another. Our analysis must therefore focus on the common law rule. … demise * * While acknowledging the obligation of a lower court “to anticipate the winds of change as well as probable future expression of a higher court,” the court properly refused to deviate from the “clearly pronounced
Cited 4 timesPublishedCommercial Trust Co. v. Hudson County Board of Taxation
87 N.J.L. 179 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 9, 1914
It may he well to say, by way of parenthesis, that the expression that such classification was “forced upon the state’'’ by federal legislation, ought not to be misleading in view of the context which clearly shows that what … of the statute, we have nothing to add to the opinion excepting to say that statutes for the performance of governmental -functions, which will not be invalidated by the courts upon an agreed state of facts, are equally immune
Cited 12 timesPublished76 N.J.L. 464 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 8, 1908
In England this rule is ■established and liberalized by an act of parliament. 28 Viet., e. 18. … If such copies were offered as substantive proof of the original document they would be clearly inadmissible.
Cited 5 timesPublishedWoodland Private Study Group v. State
109 N.J. 62 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 16, 1987
The objective, then, is to distinguish those internal statements that should remain immune from the notice and hearing requirements. … The “substantial impact” test alone may not be sufficient to isolate those internal agency statements that remain immune from the notice and hearing requirements.
Cited 55 timesPublishedMcDevitt v. Bill Good Builders, Inc.
175 N.J. 519 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 5, 2003
Clearly, if both these questions are answered affirmatively, the summary judgment dismissing the complaint was improvidently granted. The difficulty is that neither question can be answered on this record. … As the proponent of the adoptive admission, plaintiff must establish both prerequisites for admissibility to the trial court’s satisfaction.
Cited 25 timesPublished73 N.J. 484 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 30, 1977
Ed. 819 (1896), the Court clearly indicated that transactional immunity was constitutionally required. … Brown and Hale, however, involved statutes that were clearly sufficient to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination, as they provided full immunity from prosecution ‘for or on account of any transaction, matter or
Cited 32 timesPublished182 N.J. 436 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 24, 2005
They contend that because plaintiffs burden on the prima facie case is intended to be modest, so long as he can show that he was qualified to hold his job, for example, by establishing that he actually performed it for a … established his “qualifications” for the job.
Cited 195 timesPublished11 N.J. Misc. 1 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 19, 1932
It is next urged that evidence received tending to establish the guilt of the officer was improperly received. … This evidence was clearly inadmissible. 22 Corp.
Cited 1 timesPublishedD.D. v. University of Medicine & Dentistry
213 N.J. 130 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 12, 2013
And it is for this reason that we have often described the Tort Claims Act as the means through which the Legislature “re-establishe[d]” sovereign immunity. Id. at 289 , 850 A.2d 1238 ; see also Ogborne v. … The Legislature’s waiver of sovereign immunity remains a limited one and we are not free to expand that waiver beyond its statutorily-established boundaries.
Cited 131 timesPublishedWilliams v. Department of Human Services
116 N.J. 102 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 1, 1989
This assistance continues for as long as the recipient remains qualified. Normally, an individual remains qualified so long as he or she is financially in need. … Under that argument, its “choice of a five-month limitation on homeless aid, given the limits on State funding, is clearly a rational one.”
Limited by LT v. Dept. of Human Services, 264 N.J. Super. 334 (1993)Cited 44 timesPublishedGannon v. American Home Products, Inc.
211 N.J. 454 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 15, 2012
so that he may know of past immunizations.” … They must not regard those considerations to be a license to substitute generalized concerns about the imposition of collateral estoppel when the clearly established elements have been met.
Cited 18 timesPublished
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