Case law

Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen

61 N.J. 190 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 19, 1972

The trend against the “completed and accepted” rule was already clearly established well before our Legislature acted. … Immunity is accorded the surety by the mere passage of time. Potential liability is then at an end whether or not a cause of action exists or, but for the statute, might thereafter arise.

Green v. Jersey City Board of Education

177 N.J. 434 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 11, 2003

When another statute clearly establishes a remedy and does not limit the application of that remedy, as in the case of CEPA, the general immunity of the TCA must fall. … We believe that sovereign immunity is the baseline, as did the dissent in Abbamont.

Vincent Hager v. M & K Construction (084045) (Statewide)

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 13, 2021

The "claimant bears the burden . . . to establish his claim." Id. at 599 (citing Kahle v. Plochman, 85 N.J. 539, 548 (1981)). … The compensation judge considered both treatment methods and concluded that medical marijuana was the "clearly indicated option."

Benequit v. Borough of Monmouth Beach

125 N.J.L. 65 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 17, 1940

The prosecutrix without making any structural change or alterations in the building established it as a hotel and has conducted it as such since. … On the contrary the proofs clearly sustain the conviction. As stated above the charge was for violation of sections 12 and 17 of the ordinance.

Cammarata v. Essex County Park Commission

26 N.J. 404 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 3, 1958

Each of these letters stated: “Your appointment to this Department is subject to your clearly understanding and accepting the provisions shown on the sheet attached hereto.” … Costa, those Probationary Patrolmen failing to qualify for appointment, be terminated. * * *” B.

State v. Odom

116 N.J. 65 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 26, 1989

In the past he had been qualified 1,000 times as an expert in trials involving narcotics distribution. The trial court found Detective Tierney qualified to testify as an expert. … The court held the police officer was clearly qualified to testify as an expert witness concerning the identification of narcotics, the way in which narcotics are packaged when they are for sale as opposed to when they are

Harris v. State

61 N.J. 585 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 4, 1972

At the time of the attack the State was clearly immune from any ensuing tort claim by him. See Willis v. Dept. of Conservation and Economic Development, 55 N. J. 534, 541 (1970). … The mere fact without more that Brown, in violation of prison regulations, had retained possession of a reamer, had entered the plaintiff’s cell with it and had assaulted the plaintiff, did not establish any right on the

Garrett v. State

49 N.J.L. 94 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 15, 1886

The judge had, in a former part of the charge, clearly defined a public nuisance. … It is a mistake to ascribe to this legislation a design to grant immunity from the ordinary legal consequences of creating or continuing a public nuisance.

Delaware River & Bay Authority v. International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots

45 N.J. 138 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 28, 1965

Article 1, par. 19 of the Constitution clearly recognizes the distinction between public and private employees. … The Authority here is an agency of the State and its activities clearly involve a proper exercise of governmental functions.

Hunt v. Hospital Service Plan of NJ

33 N.J. 98 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 28, 1960

Such cases do not qualify for payment of compensation benefits by reason of failure to meet the conditions imposed by the act. … A. 34:15-15.1, which was obviously designed to establish a means for reimbursing the Plans where they have paid the bills for treatment and subsequently a workmen’s compensation award is made against the employer.

Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp.

210 N.J. 449 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 26, 2012

Nor can the context prong, which is a legal determination, be satisfied because plaintiff knew or should have known that the propellers were operating when he inserted his hand into the chute; the labels on the machine clearly … Notwithstanding that the employer’s deception did not rise to the level presented in Laid-low, it clearly affected the Court’s totality of the circumstances analysis on the conduct prong. See ibid.

In re the Petition to Compel Testimony of Tuso

73 N.J. 575 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 30, 1977

Yet clearly any such interaction would have violated Tuso’s privilege. … But while federal precedents indicate that a court has no discretion to determine whether a grant of immunity would be in the public interest, they also establish that courts have ample authority to check prosecutorial abuses

Bruder v. Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund

27 N.J. 266 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 2, 1958

Where the duty of a public treasury official is delineated and ‘charged by statute,’ the writ will clearly lie.” (133 N. J. L. at page 440) The statute, N. J. S. … The fact that someone contends for a meaning different from that clearly expressed does not make the construction of a law unsettled.

Hake v. Manchester Township

98 N.J. 302 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 22, 1985

sufficient knowledge to qualify as an expert. … Immunity is the dominant consideration of the act. See N.J.S.A. 59:2-1 comment. Plaintiffs rely on Estelle v.

Eden v. Conrail

87 N.J. 467 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Sep 28, 1981

Consistent with the notion that this railroad immunity statute, like all immunity enactments, must be strictly construed, Potter v. … Because Eden was clearly an invitee in terms of his presence in the train station and on the platform, the defendant railroad was required "to use reasonable care to make the premises safe." E.g., Handleman v.

Zoller v. State Board of Tax Appeals

124 N.J.L. 376 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 20, 1940

Zoller qualified as the executrix therein named. A decree barring creditors, effective January 7th, 1938 (B. 8. 3:25-3), was entered. … That bare circumstance falls far short of establishing a valid transfer of the stocks as required by our “Uniform Stock Transfer law.” R. S. 14:8-27 (a) and (b).

Matter of Skevin

104 N.J. 476 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 14, 1986

In re Fleischer, 102 N.J. 440, 447 (1986) (while poor accounting does not establish a *486 knowing misappropriation, poor accounting is not a Wilson defense if evidence indicates knowing misappropriation). … R. 1:20 — 11(b); In re Hearing on Immunity For Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669 (1984).

In Re the Estate of Jackson

79 N.J. 517 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 11, 1979

However, section 4(a) on its face clearly would subject an infant’s tort recovery to its repayment provisions as it has been so construed administratively and judicially. … To the extent that any such expenses are identified and established, an appropriate portion of Lisa’s funds should be segregated for that purpose and rendered immune from the Welfare Board’s claim.

Delaware River and Bay Auth. v. INTERNATIONAL ORG. ETC.

45 N.J. 138 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 28, 1965

Article 1, par. 19 of the Constitution clearly recognizes the distinction between public and private employees. … The Authority here is an agency of the State and its activities clearly involve a proper exercise of governmental functions.

State v. LaBrutto

114 N.J. 187 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 16, 1989

Clearly, there was more than sufficient evidence to warrant defendant’s conviction. … A conviction will not be reversed unless the jury verdict clearly and convincingly constitutes a miscarriage of justice. See R. 2:10-1, 3:20-1. Evidence in this case establishes that there was no miscarriage of justice.