Case law

Swanson v. Swanson

8 N.J. 169 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 19, 1951

the *179 ends of justice in the very cause for the protection of which the immunity is invoked. … Clearly this case holds the immunity rule does not apply to the service of process on non-residents in contempt proceedings, but the case does not go so far as to intimate that the process in criminal contempt proceedings

First Charter National Bank v. Ericson

74 N.J. 300 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 3, 1977

Ericson was clearly moved by such an impulse. He bequeathed to his wife all of his tangible personalty. He made her the life beneficiary of the inter vivos trust of March 7, 196?. … Article II séeks to immunize the marital share from the payment of all death duties.

Salorio v. Glaser

82 N.J. 482 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 26, 1980

Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the burden of demonstrating that non-residents are the “peculiar source” clearly lies with the State. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. at 526 , 98 S.Ct. at 2488 , 57 *504 L.Ed.2d at 405. … Noting that property taxes are paid by any non-resident who owns property in New Jersey, plaintiffs argue that such taxes do not qualify as “taxes imposed upon residents alone” under Austin .

Nesbitt v. Board of Managers

10 N.J. Misc. 19 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 10, 1931

It enjoys this immunity as one of the essential attributes of sovereignty, it being an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent … After stating that an interpretation which would make a statute operative to affect a state is not to be given unless the legislature’s purpose to do so is clearly indicated, the vice-chancellor adds, “it is, I take it, essentially

McAndrew v. Mularchuk

33 N.J. 172 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 28, 1960

City of Hoboken, supra, clearly supports that conclusion. … It must be pointed out that in the Florida and Illinois cases not only was the basic immunity rule abandoned but the principle of vicarious liability for both passive and active negligence was established as well.

C.A.L. v. State of New Jersey

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 28, 2026

immunity, or that plaintiffs did not comply with the TCA’s notice requirements. … Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116 (2015) (describing the CRA as “New Jersey’s analogue to a Section 1983 action” and noting that 25 “[f]or purposes of analyzing” qualified immunity “the

Lowe v. Zarghami

158 N.J. 606 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 7, 1999

In 1994 the Act was amended to extend immunity from liability to public employees to the same degree that public entities are immune from suit. … The opinion found that the Board of Trustees of the College of Medicine and Dentistry [soon to be reorganized as part of the University of Medicine and Dentistry] was “clearly authorized” to establish faculty practice programs

State v. Klapprott

127 N.J.L. 395 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 5, 1941

“It does not appear that the statute in question is so clearly in contravention of our constitutional law that there can be no reasonable doubt about it. Eor the reasons stated the demurrers are overruled.” … Unbridled license in the matter of speech has no absolute immunity either in the federal courts or the courts of the states generally. (Cf. Gitlow v.

State v. Marshall

148 N.J. 89 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 5, 1997

Second, under any standard, the PCR court’s finding was clearly erroneous. … Defense counsel asserted that it must have lasted more than ten minutes, although he could not recall clearly.

Seals v. County of Morris

210 N.J. 157 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 14, 2012

The panel deduced from the language of Contey one controlling principle—that “governmental entities [have] the duty to establish standards for the initial placement and continued existence of utility poles along the roadways … Plaintiff was clearly mistaken when he advised the trial court that N.J.SA 59:4-2 was inapplicable because the County did not own the pole or because it was not on the County’s property.

Antonio Chaparro Nieves v. Office of the Public Defender (082262)(Union County & Statewide)

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 15, 2020

It is well recognized that, through the TCA, the Legislature established that generally, immunity for public entities is the rule and liability is the exception. “Public entity” is a defined term in the TCA. … It is well recognized that, through the TCA, the Legislature established that “[g]enerally, immunity for public entities is the rule and liability is the exception.” Fluehr v.

State in the Interest of K.O., a Minor (070406)

217 N.J. 83 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 24, 2014

At a hearing conducted on July 20, 2009, the Family Part court, after finding the State had failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the robbery had been committed with intent to kill or inflict serious bodily injury … language that clearly and unambiguously captures the instant offenses with which the disposition court is dealing.

Fuchilla v. Layman

109 N.J. 319 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 8, 1988

With respect to the fifth Urbano factor, the 1981 amendments to the enabling statute for the first time established UMDNJ as “a body corporate and politic.” … The difference between the substantive standard for negligence, which was clearly a legislative concern in the Act, and the Law’s implicit emphasis on motive or intent suggests that the Legislature did not intend that the

Precipio v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania

103 N.J.L. 589 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 24, 1927

It was for the purpose of having contracts of insurance read clearly and intelligibly to the ordinary understanding of men, that the legislature, in 1886, provided for a uniform, or standard, policy of insurance. … But it is an equally well-established rule of law that the question whether a witness is. duly qualified to give expert testimony is a preliminary question for the court to decide.”

Harris v. State

61 N.J. 585 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 4, 1972

At the time of the attack the State was clearly immune from any ensuing tort claim by him. See Willis v. Dept. of Conservation and Economic Development, 55 N. J. 534, 541 (1970). … The mere fact without more that Brown, in violation of prison regulations, had retained possession of a reamer, had entered the plaintiff’s cell with it and had assaulted the plaintiff, did not establish any right on the

Gilhooley v. County of Union

164 N.J. 533 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 11, 2000

In 1972, in response to the judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity in Willis v. Department of Cons. & Econ. … A total permanent loss of use would qualify. We doubt, however, that the Legislature intended that a claimant could recover only for losses that were total.

Patton v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission

93 N.J. 180 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 19, 1983

Hunt, 69 N.J.Super. 447, 451 (Ch.Div.1961) (holding payment of taxes “would hardly satisfy the elements necessary to qualify one as an adverse possessor .... ”). … Being a subdivision of the State and engaged in a governmental function of transmitting water through pipelines located in the canal, the defendant was immune from adverse possession by the railroad.

Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer Cty.

169 N.J. 135 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 23, 2001

The Mercer and Morris agreements clearly, however, do not qualify for the forty-year duration limit. … The Mercer agreement clearly does not qualify for the McEnroe Act procurement process.

Green v. Jersey City Board of Education

177 N.J. 434 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 11, 2003

When another statute clearly establishes a remedy and does not limit the application of that remedy, as in the case of CEPA, the general immunity of the TCA must fall. … We believe that sovereign immunity is the baseline, as did the dissent in Abbamont.

Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold

42 N.J. 541 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 24, 1964

S. 40:9-2 (a law concerning municipal immunity from liability in certain situations), represents a narrow construction of the statute. … The borough not only denied negligence but asserted immunity from liability under B.