Case law

Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc.

155 N.J. 245 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 22, 1998

The dealer dealt a hand that qualified for a *252 “double down,” which entitled plaintiff to double his bet. N.J. AC. 19:47-2.10. Plaintiff then placed another $350 in the betting circle and won. … To abrogate a common-law right, the Legislature must speak plainly and clearly. DeFazio, supra, 22 N.J. at 519 , 126 A.2d 639 ; State n Cruz Constr. Co., Inc., 279 N.J.Super. 241, 245 , 652 A.2d 741 (App.Div.1995).

US Trust Co. of New York v. State

69 N.J. 253 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 28, 1976

A. 32 :l-35.55a, was immune from constitutional challenge as an impairment of contractual obligation, a right which is protected by U. S. Const., Art. I, § X and N. J. Const. (1947), Art. IV, § VII, ¶ 3. … Not surprisingly both of these measures presented plans for the establishment of an independent agency to handle matters relating to mass transportation.

Carey v. Lovett

132 N.J. 44 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 6, 1993

From the record, "it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law," R. 4:49-1, which compels a new trial. … Costarino carefully qualified his testimony by stating that the baby likely experienced "some pain."

State v. J.G.

201 N.J. 369 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 7, 2010

The Pastor also believed that he was not qualified to offer the psychological help he thought J.G. needed. Instead, the Pastor offered to find an organization that *375 could counsel J.G. … A trial court’s findings may only be disturbed “if they are so clearly mistaken ‘that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.’ ” Id. at 244 , 927 A.2d 1250 (quoting State v.

Tahir Zaman v. Barbara Felton (072128)

219 N.J. 199 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Sep 9, 2014

Because of the deficiencies in the record, it is unclear what arguments were made by Felton in support of either motion. 16 trial “unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of … the seller and not the buyer, that the title company represented neither party, that it is in the broker’s financial interest that the house be sold and the closing completed, that the broker is neither permitted nor qualified

State v. Savage

120 N.J. 594 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 19, 1990

In response to these circumstances the ABA recommends that no less than two highly-qualified attorneys be appointed to represent each capital defendant. Commentary to Guideline 2.1. … Davis, supra, 116 N.J. at 395-400 , 561 A.2d 1082 (Handler, J. dissenting) (some nexus between homicidal act and mutilation must be established).

Alfred Vail Mutual Ass'n v. Borough of New Shrewsbury

58 N.J. 40 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 8, 1971

Clearly, a classification based merely on the historical temporal order of regionalization and the chance that the school district is comprised of exactly two municipalities rather than two or more governmental units has … IV, § VII, ¶ 8, in accordance with procedures established by the implementing statutes, N. J. S. A. 1:6 — 1 et seq.

State v. Driver

38 N.J. 255 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 19, 1962

established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. … declared to be involuntary and thus inadmissible, a presumption arises that any subsequent confession was the product of the same influence, and such presumption must be overcome by the State before the later confession can qualify

The New Brunswick Steamboat v. Tiers

24 N.J.L. 697 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 15, 1853

I am clearly of opinion it was not. The immediate or proximate cause of the loss was the projecting timber. … Garrett — “ That no wrong doer can be allowed to apportion or qualify his own wrong.”

Camden Board of Education v. Alexander

181 N.J. 187 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 12, 2004

To be given effect [in that setting], any such waiver must be clearly and unmistakably established, and contractual language alleged to constitute a waiver will not be read expansively"). [6] Thus, the question is whether … Here the language is qualified only by the fact that there must be "a personal loss, injury or inconvenience" to the grievant.

Newburgh v. Arrigo

88 N.J. 529 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 23, 1982

In general, financially capable parents should contribute to the higher education of children who are qualified students. … Moreover, as previously noted, the forced recognition of dead and mummified marriages is clearly contrary to public policy.

State in Interest of TLO

94 N.J. 331 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 8, 1983

also revealed an index card reading "People who owe me money," followed by a list of names and amounts of $1.50 and $1.00, and two letters, one from T.L.O. to another student and a return letter, both containing language clearly … Such officials have immunity from damages for claims resulting from their good faith judgments. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed. 2d 214 (1975).

State v. Maxey

42 N.J. 62 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 16, 1964

Such aggregation shall be for the purpose of establishing the date upon which such prisoner shall be eligible for consideration for release on parole. … Although I have stressed the lack of authority in the court to qualify or supplement the jury's recommendation, the case ought not to be decided on that narrow ground.

Hunter v. Greenwood Trust Co.

143 N.J. 97 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 28, 1995

E.g., Greenwood Trust, supra, 971 F. 2d at 827 ("historical record clearly requires a court to read the parallel provisions of DIDA and the Bank Act in pari materia "); see also Morales v. … "At best, Cipollone *114 supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not establish a rule." Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1488, 131 L.Ed. 2d at 393 .

State v. Adams

127 N.J. 438 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 11, 1992

Whatever reason Adams had for choosing to invoke his right to silence with respect only to written statements clearly did not include ignorance of those rights. … IV In this case, the officer's testimony established that he attempted to clarify defendant's apparent invocation of the right to remain silent.

Welter v. Seton Hall University

128 N.J. 279 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 1, 1992

We hasten to add that religious institutions are free to bargain away the right to unimpeded discretion in deciding which persons are most qualified to minister the religion or to train those who will eventually minister … To address plaintiffs’ punitive-damage claims, Seton Hall called an expert in canon law to establish a religious, and *300 therefore non-malicious, motive for breach of the employment contract.

State v. Manley

54 N.J. 259 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 27, 1969

Ed. 2d 577 (1958); such qualifying language approved in Sellers v. United States, 106 U. S. *286 App. D. C. 209, 271 F. 2d 475 (D. C. … The Illinois Supreme Court speaking of this subject said that such statements are usually slanted, argumentative and often clearly erroneous.

State v. Lyle

73 N.J. 403 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 10, 1977

As we have said, the probative value of the recounted incident in tending to establish motive and state of mind is clear. … Thus the defendant at bar clearly waived his privilege in relation to this episode once he voluntarily told the police he had shot the decedent.

State v. Williams

29 N.J. 27 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 20, 1959

The alleged attack upon defendant clearly was a disorderly persons offense for which defendant was empowered to arrest, and defendant did then, for the first time, determine to take deceased into custody. … But thus to qualify the officer’s right is to require him to retreat in the face of resistance.

Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.

185 N.J. 40 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 26, 2005

In the summer of 1996, however, Atlantis established a private beach club known at the time as Club Atlantis Enterprises. … Matthews clearly articulates the concept already implicit in our case law that reasonable access to the sea is integral to the public trust doctrine.