Case law

Electric Park Amusement Co. v. Psichos

83 N.J.L. 262 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 6, 1912

the parties that qualifies him to give an opinion. … But it is an equally well established rule of law that the question whether a witness is duly qualified to give expert testimony is a preliminary question for the court to decide.

Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania Railroad

25 N.J. 541 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 20, 1958

This view was clearly stated in Payne v. Pullman Co., 13 Ill. App. 2d 105 , 141 N. E. 2d 83, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957). … “Where the case is clearly or admittedly one of qualified privilege, and there is no evidence, or not more than a scintilla of evidence, of malice, it is the duty of the trial judge to withdraw that issue from the consideration

State v. Hancock

35 N.J.L. 537 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 15, 1871

This, apparently, would have afforded the most definite and practical measure by which to ascertain the extent of the immunity of these companies. … But this, I think, is clearly a mistake; and it is a mistake which has introduced confusion.

Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co.

88 N.J. Eq. 450 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 24, 1917

It accordingly seems impossible to construe an immunity clause as intended to exempt a trustee from liability for transcending his powers as clearly defined by the trust agreement; his engagement is to exercise the powers … , and only the powers conferred upon him, and the appropriate office and purpose of an immunity clause forming a part of a trust agreement which specifically and clearly defines the trustee's powers appears to be to limit

St. John the Baptist Greek Catholic Church v. Gengor

121 N.J. Eq. 349 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 5, 1937

While paragraph 6 conditions the validity of its proceedings and secular transactions upon the approval “of a majority of all the members of such corporation,” the trustees, qualified as in the act prescribed, constitute, … strict, literal interpretation, it is radically deficient, at least in so far as it is applicable to the existing corporation, in that it fails to condition the surrender of the society’s ancient rights, privileges and immunities

State v. Boiardo

34 N.J. 599 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 8, 1961

This proviso does not mean that a naked claim must be sustained unless the interrogator establishes affirmatively the wholly *606 negative proposition that no conceivable hazard can exist. … , unless it clearly appears that the basis for apprehension which was affirmatively revealed is nullified by such other circumstances.

Allen v. Wyckoff

48 N.J.L. 90 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 15, 1886

It was there argued that a state law, which authorized a corporation to establish stock-yards and slaughter-houses in and near New Orleans, and prohibited all other persons from slaughtering cattle or keeping stock-yards … It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case Avould be necessary for its application to any other.” The same general view was again expressed by the court in Strauder v.

Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co.

11 N.J. 526 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 2, 1953

The present inquiry is directed to the scope of the immunity. … This statute grants but a limited immunity from the ban of the Sherman Act.

Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hospital v. Estate of Baum

84 N.J. 137 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 2, 1980

There is no doubt that the cost of hospital and medical care qualifies as a necessary expense. Capodanno v. Capodanno, supra. See generally 10 NJ.Practice §§ 335 et seq. … The hospital argues that, although a wife is immune from liability for the debts of her husband under N.J.S.A. 37:2-15, the immunity does not extend to debts of the husband’s estate.

Reed v. Bojarski

166 N.J. 89 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 23, 2001

Although the pre-employment physical clearly does not establish a traditional physician-patient relationship, that is of no moment. … Furthermore, when appropriate, the physician should suggest that the patient seek care from a qualified physician and, if requested, provide reasonable assistance in securing follow-up care.

Zacarias v. Allstate Insurance

168 N.J. 590 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 3, 2001

Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 549 , 461 A.2d 1145 (1983) (concluding that doctrine of parental immunity will no longer insulate parent from liability for willful or wanton failure to supervise children). … And we are also convinced that reasonable expectations of coverage raised by the declaration page cannot be contradicted by the policy’s boilerplate unless the declaration page itself clearly so warns the insured. [ Lehrhoff

Gallo Asphalt Co. v. Sagner

71 N.J. 405 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 8, 1976

The D.O.T. hearing was clearly a "civil proceeding" within the meaning of R. 3:9-2 and Judge Ackerman's orders, and therefore no reliance whatsoever should have been placed upon the pleas. … A perusal of the record establishes beyond cavil that there was no such understanding.

State v. State Supervisory Employees Association

78 N.J. 54 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 2, 1978

J. 17, 31 ,(1973), we held that the Legislature’s use of this strong qualifying language “clearly precluded any expansive approach” to the *62 negotiability of the terms and conditions of public employment. … We agree with PERC’s view that since all three pesons who are certified are clearly qualified, this proposal is procedural in nature and does not bear on criteria for promotion.

In Re the Petition Filed by the Freeholders of Hudson County

105 N.J.L. 57 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Oct 25, 1928

While in this day the right of the legislative branch of government to regulate the exercise of the franchise must be accepted as an established constitutional truism, and beyond the realm of reasonable criticism, still the … The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society.”

Price v. Edwards

88 N.J.L. 582 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 4, 1916

The question as to the immunity of charitable institutions not organized under the laws of this state, from the imposition of a transfer tax, was presented in the case of Rothschild. 71 N. J. Eq. 210. … Thus we have it established by the settled law of this state that the exemption clause in the act of 1894 refers exclusively to domestic charitable corporations and that the Exemption act of 1898 refers to religious institutions

Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance v. Monmouth County Municipal Joint Insurance Fund

141 N.J. 235 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 25, 1995

The Legislature enacted the Tort Claims Act to establish qualified governmental immunity for the negligent acts of governmental entities and their employees. See N.J.S.A 59:1-2. … “declared [it] to be the public policy of this State that public entities shall only be liable for their negligence within the limitations of [the Tort Claims Act] and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established

Eureka Printing Co. v. Div., Etc., Dept. of Labor & Industry

21 N.J. 383 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 23, 1956

Although specific limitations had been established earlier in Roman and English Law, the first general limitation applicable to personal actions in the common law was enacted in 1623. … See Note, Immunity from Statutes of Limitations and Other Doctrines Favoring the United States as Plaintiff, 55 Col L. Rev. 1177 (1955).

Williams v. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.

132 N.J. 109 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 3, 1993

Although, as the Appellate Division pointed out, we said in Erickson that we had previously declared that “malice in the context of a qualified privilege must be established by clear and convincing evidence,” 117 N.J. at … The incorrect jury charge was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. See Rule 2:10-2. *124 III The judgment of the Appellate Division on plaintiffs remaining claims of error is affirmed.

Shamberg v. New Jersey Shore Line Railroad

73 N.J.L. 572 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 18, 1906

In this connection it is to be noted that, under our General Eailroad law, to the agent itself is committed, not only the right to locate its road, but also the duty of qualifying itself by such location to perform the condition … That the property rights of the state in the located road arc private rights is established law. That they cannot be granted or condemned has already been pointed out.

Seals v. County of Morris

210 N.J. 157 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 14, 2012

The panel deduced from the language of Contey one controlling principle—that “governmental entities [have] the duty to establish standards for the initial placement and continued existence of utility poles along the roadways … Plaintiff was clearly mistaken when he advised the trial court that N.J.SA 59:4-2 was inapplicable because the County did not own the pole or because it was not on the County’s property.