Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
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1.08s
170 N.J. 106 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 21, 2001
Trevino, 565 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 , 98 S.Ct. 1613 , 56 L.Ed.2d 63 (1978) (allowing accomplice to testify despite fact that immunity was provided and testimony was uncorroborated; because testimony … Thus, under the plain error rule, errors in the instruction should be disregarded unless “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2.
Cited 52 timesPublishedBorough of Totowa v. American Surety Co. of New York
39 N.J. 332 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 18, 1963
A. 54:5 — 18.3 that the governing body shall by resolution “designate the municipal clerk or municipal engineer as the person who shall make such certificates,” thus clearly attaching the function to such of the named existing … The surety’s obligation is not so qualified. Rather the official bond is required by statute for the further assurance of the public.
Cited 18 timesPublished34 N.J. 35 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 10, 1961
From what has been said it is apparent that the State's proofs in the instant case clearly made out the offense of extortion without proof of the corrupt agreement between Begyn and the scavenger or even if such proof were … It is true that this promise of immunity or leniency is usually denied, and may not exist; but its existence is always suspected.
Overruled in part, on other grounds by State v. Savoie, 67 N.J. 439 (1975)Cited 107 timesPublishedPub. Utility Constr., & G. Appliance Workers, Local 274 v. Pub. Serv. Elec. and Gas Co.
26 N.J. 145 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 17, 1958
An awareness of the well known legal principles controlling reinstatement at the termination of a strike (to be discussed hereafter) and an appreciation of the next paragraph of the contract, make this conclusion clearly … It contained a clause establishing grievance and arbitration procedure for use by an employee who was disciplined or discharged. The settlement agreement, in referring to that contract, said: “1.
Cited 4 timesPublishedAnthony D'agostino v. Ricardo Maldonado (068940)
216 N.J. 168 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Oct 3, 2013
Keeping in mind the deterrent and protective purposes of the CFA, it finds that Maldonado’s actions clearly qualify as “commercial practices,” and his advertised “services,” which he offered to the public for a fee, satisfy … Defendant’s actions with respect to plaintiffs and the Property clearly qualify as “commercial practice[s]” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.
Cited 307 timesPublished234 N.J. 225 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 25, 2018
that became effective in 2008, the statutory standard was expanded upon in two significant respects: first, to require that the documents, materials and information at issue be "exclusively" prepared in the setting of a qualifying … As we stressed earlier, the PSA did not abrogate existing health care law and does not immunize from discovery information that would be otherwise discoverable.
Cited 42 timesPublishedJ & M Land Co. v. First Union National Bank
166 N.J. 493 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 27, 2001
The Appellate Division rejected J & M’s claim that its use of the disputed land qualified as a prescriptive easement after twenty years. … That tension has never been clearly resolved.
Cited 23 timesPublishedHills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Tp. in Somerset Cty.
103 N.J. 1 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 20, 1986
The deadline in Bernards’ immunity order was extended from time to time to a date well after the effective date of the Act. … Clearly, however, the method adopted was simply a judicial remedy to redress a constitutional injury.
Cited 114 timesPublishedState v. Michael A. Maltese (073584)
222 N.J. 525 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 17, 2015
The State contends that defendant’s request to speak to his uncle does not qualify as an invocation of the right to remain silent. … The facts presented here clearly indicate that defendant invoked his right to remain silent.
Cited 73 timesPublished168 N.J. 448 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 7, 2001
Clearly, if you believe the prosecutor, it’s so horrible [defendant] would rather die. … That error, combined with the other identified errors, qualifies as plain error and warrants reversal of defendant’s death sentence.
Cited 133 timesPublishedZelasko v. Refrigerated Food Express
128 N.J. 329 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 24, 1992
In 1979, the Legislature codified the “going and coming” rule, and in doing so rejected many of the exceptions that had come to qualify and limit the effect of the rule. … That framework is consistent with well-established jurisprudence dealing with accidents arising from the use of employee-owned vehicles.
Cited 23 timesPublished92 N.J. 62 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 26, 1983
It must clearly exclude any possibility for the coexistence of both pieces of legislation. See State v. States, 44 N.J. at 291 . … It means simply that if a gun is “used” in the commission of a crime, separate proof of intent is not required to establish a Graves Act crime.
Cited 150 timesPublished175 N.J. 456 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 26, 2003
We therefore conclude that a juvenile term of incarceration qualifies as a term of imprisonment under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5b(2). III. … The Legislature clearly *472 knew the distinction between “parole” and “in custody” and treated them differently in the same statute. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5b.
Cited 25 timesPublishedWaste Management, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co.
138 N.J. 106 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Oct 13, 1994
Auto Owners is not authorized, licensed, or qualified to do business in New Jersey, nor has it ever issued a policy to a New Jersey domiciliary or insured any risks located in this state. … "[T]he answer," the Court declared, "clearly is that it cannot." Ibid.
Cited 82 timesPublishedDREW ASSOCIATES OF NJ, LP v. Travisano
122 N.J. 249 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 31, 1991
Any conditions on the transfer of cooperative interests must be clearly set forth in the documents recorded with the County Clerk at the time of the creation of the plan of cooperative ownership. N.J.S.A. 46:8D-6(¿). … But the second proposition is qualified by limitations which compound the difficulties of one who assails the legislative decision.
Cited 39 timesPublished74 N.J. 62 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 22, 1977
Ed. 2d 84 (1966), established the invalidity of a waiver procedure by a juvenile court conducted without providing counsel for the juvenile. … This ratio decidendi *80 is clearly applicable here, the defendant new being 29 years of age.
Cited 1 timesPublished12 N.J. 528 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 8, 1953
Both respondents are clearly guilty of violating the 27th, the 35th, and 47th Canons of Professional Ethics. III. … The facts stated in the preamble clearly disclose improper advertising of the most flagrant nature.
Cited 11 timesPublished118 N.J. 370 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 4, 1990
. *373 I The testimony established that Boone had been Kelly’s live-in companion and the father of her daughter. She had broken off her relationship with him because he physically abused her. … 840 , 489 N.E.2d 666 (1986) (rejecting defendant’s argument that reasonable apprehension of future serious bodily harm is defense to charge of per se regulation that one may lawfully carry firearm only with license or if qualified
Cited 14 timesPublishedNJ Bell Tel. Co. v. DEPT., BD. PUB. UTILITY COMM'RS
12 N.J. 568 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 15, 1953
This rate of return it found “clearly not insufficient.” On August 29, 1951 the Company filed with the Board a petition for rehearing. … The general rule with respect to allowance of rehearing is stated in the Handlon case, supra, to be qualified by the requirement for the exercise of reasonable diligence. B.
Disapproved in part by In Re Petition of Nj American Water Co., 169 N.J. 181 (2001)Cited 23 timesPublished148 N.J. 561 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 9, 1997
The-Court stated that although ERISA preemption is “clearly expansive,” to interpret the language to its furthest extent would render the reach of the provision limitless. … The Planning Act was a comprehensive statute establishing hospital rates.
Cited 14 timesPublished
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