Case law

Weinberg v. Sprint Corp.

173 N.J. 233 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 22, 2002

Rowley, Note, Immunity from Regulatory Price Squeeze Claims: From Keogh, Parker, and Noerr to Town of Concord and Beyond, 70 Tex. L.Rev. 399, 413 (1991). … The filed rate doctrine clearly was applicable to long-distance telecommunication carriers throughout the period covered by plaintiffs complaint. 2 The doctrine has been described as central to the regulatory scheme for interstate

Buck v. Henry

207 N.J. 377 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 22, 2011

Kirstein was "not qualified to offer an Affidavit of Merit against [Dr. … The appellate panel noted that, in medical malpractice cases, the Affidavit of Merit statute clearly requires an affidavit "from a physician who `specialized at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for the action

In Re Parole Application of Trantino

89 N.J. 347 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 20, 1982

This is a valuable tool established by the Legislature for the Board’s use. … A new sentencing structure has been imposed in which the discretionary aspects of the sentence for most offenses are more clearly drawn.

Breen v. Peck

28 N.J. 351 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 1, 1958

If B or C pays A's claim in full then A clearly has no further recourse against B or C for he has received full satisfaction and may not justly claim any more. … It has full effect, as far as its language goes, for it does not, in terms, purport to extend to, or to give immunity to, anyone but the releasee.

In Re the Estate of Santelli

28 N.J. 331 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 1, 1958

And further, it was pointed out that in the event of intestacy, the wife did not qualify as an heir to her husband’s realty. Shepherd v. Shepherd, supra; Brush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. Rep. 506, 518 (Ch. N. … And clearly the policy was to limit the common-law doctrine of revocation to an afterborn child or children regardless of when the will was executed in relation to the marriage.

Olivit Bros. v. Pennsylvania Railroad

88 N.J.L. 241 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 28, 1916

S. 602 , establishes a different rule. … Clearly it could not have been intended 'in the case last cited to adjudge that a common earner could make unlawful contracts by discriminating between shippers and be forbidden to waive it as to those not favored, for in

Graham v. Gielchinsky

126 N.J. 361 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 11, 1991

Primich was an impartial, unbiased witness, defendant grossly distorted the truth and that such a distortion was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. … Defense counsel established through Dr. Primieh that Graham had brought hospital records with him at the time of the examination and that Dr.

Newark Superior Officers Ass'n v. City of Newark

98 N.J. 212 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 14, 1985

Byrne, 72 N.J. 292 (1977), we established a three part test to determine whether a statute passes as general legislation. … The final inquiry is whether the Act clearly rests on a rational basis justifying the classification.'

New Jersey Transit Corporation v. Sandra Sanchez and Chad Smith (082292) (Bergen County & Statewide)

Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 12, 2020

New Jersey Transit clearly appealed the trial court’s rulings on both cross-motions for summary judgment to the Appellate Division. … [The employee] was clearly entitled to receive PIP benefits for his economic loss. Whether he received them is immaterial.” Id. at 190.

In Re Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act Rules

180 N.J. 478 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 26, 2004

The legislative history of the Act demonstrates that the establishment of transition areas was the result of a “delicate compromise” between environmentalists and developers. … Thus, the statute clearly sets forth the dimensions for transition areas adjacent to freshwater wetlands of exceptional and intermediate resource value.

Watson v. City of East Orange

175 N.J. 442 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 24, 2003

The contract clearly provided that Watson had to "enroll" in a rehabilitation program during his 90-day suspension and that he could not return to work until he had successfully completed it. … In reaching a contrary conclusion as to the meaning of the contract, the Court has substituted the word "complete" for the word "enroll," in contravention of our well-established contract law jurisprudence.

David Goyco v. Progressive Insurance Company

Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 14, 2024

In opposition, Progressive argued that an LSES is not an “automobile” under the No-Fault Act and Goyco does not qualify as a “pedestrian” because the LSES is motorized. … Subtitle 1, labeled “Motor Vehicles Generally; Traffic Laws,” establishes the rules of the road and provides for their enforcement, whereas Subtitle 2, “Additional Motor Vehicle Regulations,” establishes rules for processes

Dionicio Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Spring, LLC

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 12, 2024

Workers’ compensation is thus the exclusive remedy for injured employees who qualify under the Act. … In sum, none of Rodriguez’s claims -- whether for negligent, grossly negligent, or recklessly indifferent conduct or for intentional wrongdoing -- fall within the coverage established in either Part One or Part Two of the

State v. Michael Olenowski

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 15, 2023

In that second report, the Special Master concluded that the State “clearly established that the DECP and the twelve-step DRE protocol satisfy the reliability standard of N.J.R.E. 702 when analyzed under the methodology … Here, because the State is the party seeking to admit DRE evidence, it must carry the burden to “clearly establish” that the testimony is sufficiently reliable under N.J.R.E. 702. See State v.

Velasquez v. Franz

123 N.J. 498 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 25, 1991

The federal cases have clearly established that Rule 17(b) should not be applied in diversity cases, supra at 518, 589 A.2d at 153, but the language of the Rule does not acknowledge that limitation. … This is clearly a case in which this Court should apply state principles of res judicata.

Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello

97 N.J. 37 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 2, 1984

These are obviously penal purposes and should cause us to focus clearly on precisely what it is that we wish to punish or deter. … Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 , 101 S.Ct. 2748 , 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (municipalities immune from punitive damages under § 1983).

In Re the Suspension or Revocation of the License of DeMarco

83 N.J. 25 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 2, 1980

The conclusory paragraph in Count V charged that the respondent was guilty of gross malpractice and neglect and was not qualified to remain a licensed physician. … The majority concedes that “[n]o one shall be punished for a crime unless both that crime and its punishment are clearly set forth in positive law.” 83 N.J. at 36. (emphasis added).

State v. Engerud

94 N.J. 331 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 8, 1983

also revealed an index card reading “People who owe me money,” followed by a list of names and amounts of $1.50 and $1.00, and two letters, one from T.L.O. to another student and a return letter, both containing language clearly … Such officials have immunity from damages for claims resulting from their good faith judgments. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975).

Kalogeras v. 239 Broad Avenue, L.L.C.

202 N.J. 349 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 16, 2010

Furthermore, the governing statute, N.J.S.A. 33:1-26, clearly and unequivocally establishes a legal duty: it requires that any transfer of a liquor license requires governmental approval. … On the whole, then, we perceive no reason to immunize a liquor license transfer from the application of the foregoing principles.

Hazelton v. Murray

21 N.J. 115 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 5, 1956

We found from testimony by qualified and decent labor leaders that the International Longshoremen’s Association is not a union in the accepted sense of its designation. * * * The control of a Local of the International Longshoremen … It is clear that the control and regulation permitted by the Compact over the waterfront in New York Harbor clearly concerns such public interests.