Case law

Brown v. State

62 N.J.L. 666 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 6, 1899

By our statute the judge is required to select the names of such persons qualified as jurors “as he shall think most impartial and indifferent between the parties, and best qualified as to talents, knowledge, integrity, firmness … The trial judge instructed the jury that the killing being established the presumption was that it was murder of the second degree, and that “ if the defendant desired to reduce it to a lower degree of homicide he must establish

Francis v. United Jersey Bank

87 N.J. 15 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 1, 1981

Generally directors are accorded broad immunity and are not insurers of corporate activities. … If one “feels that he has not had sufficient business experience to qualify him to perform the duties of a director, he should either acquire the knowledge by inquiry, or refuse to act.” Ibid.

In the Matter of Samay

166 N.J. 25 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 12, 2001

Neither by your age, by your occupation, by your life experiences or by your education are you qualified to do so. Lastly, and most importantly, I intensely resent the tone of your letter. … Clearly respondent, as required by Canon 3C, should have disqualified himself from sitting in any phase of the Jakubovic and Grassie matters.

Salvatore Puglia v. Elk Pipeline, Inc.(075171)

226 N.J. 258 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 16, 2016

The Supreme Court has held that individual invocation of a right guaranteed in the CBA could qualify as concerted activity. … Elk says that Puglia’s conduct qualifies as concerted activity and is therefore preempted.

Goerke Kirch Co. v. Goerke Kirch Holding Co.

118 N.J. Eq. 1 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 4, 1935

Its jurisdiction rests upon and is limited by well established principles; otherwise, there could be no certainty or fixity of right and remedy — its functioning would be attended with uncertainty and consequent confusion … The arbitration provision was clearly of the essence and substance of the contract.

C. B. Snyder Realty Co. v. National Newark & Essex Banking Co.

14 N.J. 146 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 21, 1953

Society for Establishing Useful Mfrs., 2 N. J. 136, 150-152 (1949). The affidavit of Mr. Alfred .Q. … There is clearly evidence in his depositions an effort to qualify the extent of his exact authority, but there is adequate recitation of facts to determine that it was demonstrated “palpably” that there was a genuine issue

In Re the Guardianship of K.H.O.

161 N.J. 337 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 3, 1999

Prenatal drug use does not, without more, establish parental unfitness or an inability to parent. … We conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that terminating the parental rights of B.A.S. will not do more harm than good to K.H.O.

New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. Board of Chosen Freeholders

76 N.J.L. 664 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 14, 1909

Glair County case,. if the court had understood that former cases had defínitéty established the proposition that interstate transportation of all kinds, whether known as ferries' or otherwise, was immune from any state requirement … Calvert, on page 207 of his book upon that subject/remarks: “The extent of the power of states to authorize and regulate ferries has not been clearly determined.

Besler v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF W. WINDSOR

201 N.J. 544 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 17, 2010

Clearly, Dr. Bynum and other Board members were the final policymakers for the Board of Education. … Clearly, Besler was not a cheerleader of the Board; he was a critic of its policies and actions. Dr.

DiProspero v. Penn

183 N.J. 477 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 14, 2005

Only a displaced fracture could possibly qualify as a non-permanent injury, provided the fracture could heal well enough for the bone to function normally. … Nor can we conclude that the Legislature established clearly defined statutory categories of injuries to be proven by *506 objective clinical evidence, and then expected this Court to impose on accident victims a higher burden

Sears Mortgage Corp. v. Rose

134 N.J. 326 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 29, 1993

Clearly, as earlier noted, supra at 346, 634 A.2d at 84 , Commonwealth was acutely aware of the peril. … Those concerns therefore clearly call for further and more extensive consideration.

State v. Savage

172 N.J. 374 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 20, 2002

The trial court refused to *396 do so, finding that criminal restraint was “precluded” because there was “clearly a death here.” … As defined by N.J.S.A 2C:l-8d, an offense is “included” if: (1) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (2) It consists of an attempt

State v. Hotel Bar Foods, Inc.

18 N.J. 115 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 21, 1955

That was entitled “An Act to establish a uniform standard of weights and measures in this State, to establish a department of weights and measures, and to provide penalties for the use of other than standard or legal weights … The license and bond requirements governing warehousemen qualifying under the Federal Warehouse Act have *127 been adopted by a considerable group of states.

Wallace, Muller & Co. v. Leber

69 N.J.L. 312 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 20, 1903

The question in the present case was whether the defendants’ contract with the plaintiffs was an absolute agreement of indemnity, or whether it was a qualified undertaking conditioned upon the performance by Bunge & Company … This ruling of the learned justice was clearly right. The contract of sale covered three general subjects—(1) the sale by Bunge.& Company of four thousand bags of sugar, described as “Dutch Granulated Sugar, W. S.

State v. Gerald

113 N.J. 40 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Oct 25, 1988

Jason, the Medical Examiner, provided testimony directed at establishing aggravating factor (4)(c), and Investigator Bolis testified to the robbery and confession to establish the felony-murder factor. … The trial court held that “clearly he had not * * * requested an attorney.

Southern New Jersey Newspapers, Inc. v. Township of Mt. Laurel

141 N.J. 56 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 19, 1995

Under the common law, as a threshold condition for access to public records, a citizen must establish an interest in the subject matter of the material that he or she is seeking. … Unquestionably, the proper issuance of firearm licenses only to persons qualified to receive them is a matter of fundamental public concern.

State v. James J. Revie (072600)

220 N.J. 126 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 17, 2014

Given the passage of only two years between his second and third convictions, the Burroughs defendant was clearly ineligible for a second “step-down” when he was convicted of a third DWI. Ibid. In State v. … The Court observed, however, that apart from an “increase [in] a defendant’s loss of liberty, there is no constitutional impediment to the use of the prior uncounseled DWI conviction to establish repeat-offender status

Candace A. Moschella v. Hackensack Meridian Jersey Shore University Medical Center

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 11, 2024

doctor who had been named in the complaint, but it concluded that the plaintiff had nevertheless substantially complied with the AOM statute because the doctor “was timely served with an affidavit and . . . report that clearly … To establish vicarious liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate an employment relationship and that the alleged tort occurred in the scope of that employment. Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 408-09 (2003).

Monaco v. Hartz Mountain Corp.

178 N.J. 401 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 9, 2004

that the critical element should not be the question of the proprietor’s control over the area to be traversed but rather the expectation of the invitee that safe passage will be afforded from the parking facility to the establishment … Certainly, no immunity could attach if he had that knowledge and made no effort, consistent with municipal allocation of responsibility, to effect a repair. [ Learn, supra, 245 N.J.Super. at 584 , 586 A.2d 327 ; see also,

DiOrio v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance

63 N.J. 597 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 4, 1973

This Court specifically held that the automobile was furnished for the regular use of Tomiko Lynch and that therefore it did not qualify for coverage under the “non-owned automobile” clause, and that therefore Tomiko’s father … It having been clearly established to my satisfaction that the DeSoto was furnished for the regular use of the father, Generoso DiOrio, I would not reach the question as to whether it was also furnished for the regular use