Case law

Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Thomas J. Trautner

Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 7, 2025

Although the Eleventh Amendment pertains to state sovereign immunity in federal court, it is well-established that states enjoy sovereign immunity from suit in their own courts and may define the scope of that immunity. … in federal court, it is well-established that states enjoy sovereign immunity from suit in their own courts and may define the scope of that immunity.”

Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Morris County Board of Taxation

41 N.J. 405 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 20, 1964

Yet that must be in a case where a lease was clearly intended. … But since purchases by independent contractors of supplies for Government construction or other activities do not have federal immunity from taxation, the form of contracts, when governmental immunity is not waived by Congress

Cali v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation

63 N.J. 310 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 5, 1973

Leshowitz was later granted immunity by the Commission (N. J. S. A. 52:9M-17) and as a result any suggestion of confidentiality grounded on the writing clearly has no substance. Mr. … Immunity was forthcoming and any confidentiality by virtue of the agreements was clearly removed. There were oral statements by Mr.

Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank and Trust Co. of Freehold

97 N.J. 1 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 20, 1984

Consequently, the bank cannot *10 qualify for the immunity provided for § 3-419(3) since it has not achieved representative or agent status. … That immunity may be lost, however, under certain circumstances.

Kelly v. Gwinnell

96 N.J. 538 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 27, 1984

The usual elements of a cause of action for negligence are clearly present: an action by defendant creating an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff, a risk that was clearly foreseeable, and a risk that resulted in an injury … Y.M.C.A., 27 N.J. 67 (1958) (abolishing charitable immunity), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7, L. 1959, c. 90 (reestablishing charitable immunity); cf. Immer v.

Washington National Insurance v. Board of Review of New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Commission

1 N.J. 545 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 7, 1949

A constitution is to be given a prospective operation only, unless an intention to make it retrospective is clearly revealed in the legislative expression. San Antonio v. San Antonio Public Service Co., 255 U. … Appellant contends that if the vitiating clause “exclusive of life insurance agents” be exscinded, the subsection of the statute will be free of legal infirmity and should be effectuated as so qualified. *556 But the excision

Small v. Rockfeld

66 N.J. 231 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 17, 1974

Rev. 1030 , 1074-76 (1930); Comment, “Intra-family Immunity — The Doctrine and Its Present Status,” 20 Baylor L. Rev. 37 , 57 (1967); Chopin, “Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Rule in Need of Change,” 37 U. Miami L. … Punitive damages are clearly not allowable under this wrongful death action, Kern v. Kogan, 93 N. J. Super. 459 (Law Div. 1967), even under the majority’s view of the case.

Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Construction Co.

176 N.J. 366 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 22, 2003

Millison, thus, established a two-prong test for determining an intentional wrong: conduct and context, both of which must be met by plaintiff. … It stated: [I]n order for an employer’s act to lose the cloak of immunity of N.J.S.

Wymbs v. Township of Wayne

163 N.J. 523 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 11, 2000

A public entity does not automatically receive the benefit of that immunity. “It is well established that the burden is on the public entity both to plead and prove its immunity under our Act.” … In the present ease, defendants did not establish their entitlement to immunity under the TCA.

Dr. Dominick A. Lembo v. Arlene Marchese (082930) (Passaic County and Statewide)

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 17, 2020

If the statutory language clearly reveals the Legislature’s intent, then our interpretive mission comes to an end. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 480 (2013). … alleges that TD Bank accepted checks payable to Lembo with forged 2 Given our resolution of this issue, we do not address Lembo’s claims that Marchese and Wright were acting in the role of “constructive trustees” to qualify

State v. Strong

110 N.J. 583 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 16, 1988

The trial court must recognize that the burden of proof to establish the absence of taint is on the State. … The Murphy decision involved considerations of federalism not present in situations where a single state jurisdiction both questioned and prosecuted the same defendant; thus where federal concerns and standards were clearly

M.A. v. J.H.M.

Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 27, 2025

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” … United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), and to require him to answer if “it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.” Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 899 (1881).

D'Annunzio v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America

192 N.J. 110 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 25, 2007

When, as here, the language is plain and clearly reveals the meaning of the statute, the court’s sole function is to enforce the statute in accordance with those terms. … This matter was presented to the trial court on Prudential’s motion for summary judgment on the sole issue of whether D’Annunzio qualified as an "employee" under CEPA.

Milstrey v. City of Hackensack

6 N.J. 400 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 26, 1951

"Once establish that the local authority did something to the road, and the case is removed from the category of nonfeasance. … The misfeasance established by the verdict and judgment here is imputable to the municipality, or so the jury might well find.

Eger v. E.I. Du Pont DeNemours Co.

110 N.J. 133 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 20, 1988

The courts clearly consider that this system of mutual give and take would be upset if the employee could sue for negligence in another jurisdiction. [Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Mather, 210 F.2d 868, 873-74 (D.C.Cir.) … His or her right to compensation does not depend on the inherently uncertain process of establishing tort liability.

Nl Industries, Inc. v. State(076550)

Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 27, 2017

A legislative waiver of sovereign immunity must be expressed clearly and unambiguously, and a retroactive waiver of sovereign immunity requires the clearest of expression. (pp. 20-23) 5. … In other words, a legislative waiver of sovereign immunity must be expressed clearly and unambiguously, Allen v.

State v. Dasean Harper (077427) (Salem and Statewide)

229 N.J. 228 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 5, 2017

That is not a declaration of blanket immunity. (pp. 10-11) 2. … That is not a declaration of blanket immunity.

Millison v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.

101 N.J. 161 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 10, 1985

II Under Rule 4:46-2 the court shall grant summary judgment if a discriminating search of the merits in the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits submitted on the motion, clearly shows … The pertinent statute, N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, declares that when, by express or implied agreement, the parties have accepted the provisions of the Compensation Act and the employee qualifies for benefits under the conditions of

Marshall v. Klebanov

188 N.J. 23 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 26, 2006

The dissent argued that the language of the statute clearly and unambiguously applies to plaintiff's situation, thereby abrogating the common law and precluding liability. … Because the trial court never ruled on whether plaintiff alleged sufficient evidence under the common law to establish *883 such claims, we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. V.

Visidor Corp. v. Borough of Cliffside Park

48 N.J. 214 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 21, 1966

Although the Borough’s action was declared to have been procedurally illegal, the establishment of one-way streets was admittedly within the proper province of the Borough and the procedural requirement for a duly approved … ordinance was clearly designed not for the protection of economic business interests but to advance the interests of safety and uniformity in traffic regulation.