Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Leggett v. Barton

    40 N.J.L. 83 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 15, 1878

    But the enactment forms part of the system, of bankruptcy which congress, in the exercise of its *85 constitutional power, has established. … a part of that section, it chose an appropriate and efficient means of evincing an intent to subject composition, proceedings to the force of the qualifying section, and to put the release of debts therein provided for,

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Neger v. Neger

    93 N.J. 15 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 24, 1983

    The United States Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1, on custody adjudications. See New York ex rel. Halvey v. … The California court’s jurisdiction was clearly not based on two of those alternatives.

    Cited 34 timesPublished
  • State v. SR

    175 N.J. 23 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 12, 2002

    Clearly, the phrase means something more than the mere collection of a VCCB penalty from an individual discharged from probation. … all or part of a sentence on intensive community supervision or all or part of a supervised release or parole term on intensive supervised release" are supervised by "a probation officer, a corrections agent, or any other qualified

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Mount v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.

    233 N.J. 402 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 5, 2018

    Under the standard established in Patterson v. … Although the shooting was clearly devastating to Martinez-an officer exemplary for his professionalism and compassion in highly stressful circumstances-it was not "undesigned and unexpected" under Richardson .

    Cited 65 timesPublished
  • In re Shelly

    140 N.J. 501 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 9, 1995

    In contrast, a four-member majority of the DRB found that the record clearly and convincingly established that respondent knowingly had misappropriated the $6,000 deposit. … Accordingly, we find that respondent’s conduct does not qualify as “knowing misappropriation” under Wilson, supra, 81 N.J. at 453 , 409 A.2d 1153 . Thus disbarment is not justifiable.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Howard Savings Institution v. Kielb

    38 N.J. 186 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 29, 1962

    . *190 The controversy originated in an application by The Howard Savings Institution for a construction of the will of one Eva Kielb under which will plaintiff had qualified as executor and trustee. … The divesting by statute of title so vested would clearly be unconstitutional. See 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed. 1943), §§ 2201, 2205.

    Cited 43 timesPublished
  • Js v. Rth

    155 N.J. 330 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 29, 1998

    Betraying the trust this relationship established, the neighbor, an older man, sexually abused both girls for a period of more than a year. … 109 , 642 A. 2d 372 (1994) (determining that it was appropriate to allow unmarried cohabitant to recover against defendant motorist under theory of bystander liability because she represented "an eminently foreseeable but clearly

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Goodman v. London Metals Exchange, Inc.

    86 N.J. 19 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 22, 1981

    When both the agency and the Appellate Division have made the same findings, we ordinarily would affirm unless both were clearly in error. See State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 163 (1964). … There was evidence that she was qualified to be a field representative and sought the position. Both sides acknowledged her rejection.

    Cited 102 timesPublished
  • Shelcusky v. Garjulio

    172 N.J. 185 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 22, 2002

    The fire danger clearly arises out of a predictable use of an E-type forklift in an industrial setting. [(emphasis added).] … The court stated that the doctrine established in Perrna should apply only when an affidavit is “clearly” or “blatantly” inconsistent. Ibid.

    Cited 61 timesPublished
  • Lee v. Carter-Reed Co.

    203 N.J. 496 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Sep 30, 2010

    From plaintiffs viewpoint, a corporation’s misleading advertising scheme through use of the mass media is no less immune to the class-action approach than other forms of consumer fraud. … Clearly, plaintiffs position has been that Carter Reed primarily markets Relacore as a weight-loss product, but plaintiff also has taken the position that all of Relacore’s purported benefits are illusory.

    Cited 96 timesPublished
  • Woodside v. Adams

    40 N.J.L. 417 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 15, 1878

    The cases clearly recognize the equity of redemption of a mortgagor as a legal estate, and as such it must subsist until extinguished in-the manner in which legal estates are by law extinguishable. … The expression so frequently used in the opinions of courts and in the books, that a mortgagee of chattels after default has an absolute title, has only a qualified meaning since the common law doctrine of the nature of a

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • State v. Leonardis

    71 N.J. 85 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 21, 1976

    Clearly, if we lack the jurisdiction, further consideration of the issues presented in this case is unnecessary. … By ignoring these factors, the criteria clearly contradict the rehabilitative purpose which underlies PTI.

    Cited 114 timesPublished
  • State v. Ragland

    105 N.J. 189 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 21, 1986

    The deep commitment of the nation to the right of a jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and … We decline to search New Jersey's judicial history to determine whether the “must convict" charge was either so clearly established or so clearly rejected as to warrant a conclusion that the reception of common law determines

    Cited 95 timesPublished
  • State v. Hamm

    121 N.J. 109 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 6, 1990

    We hold that the statutory penalties for DWI are not so severe as to clearly reflect a legislative determination of a constitutionally “serious” offense requiring jury trial. … And its deprivation is clearly a “consequence of magnitude.” See Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295 , 277 A.2d 216 (1971).

    Cited 40 timesPublished
  • In Re Police Sergeant (Pm3776v)

    176 N.J. 49 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 16, 2003

    The DOP denied petitioners’ request, indicating that the record did not establish conclusively that Durkin or any other make-up candidate had advance knowledge of the exam’s content. … Under these circumstances, and in the absence of statistical evidence to the contrary, petitioners have not established a basis to use a different examination for make-up candidates.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • State v. Hock

    54 N.J. 526 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Oct 20, 1969

    In taking Bird out with him to go through the car, the officer had two motives, one stated expressly and the other clearly inferable, but both in our judgment lawful. … Therefore the ground of appeal will not be considered unless it qualifies as plain error, that is, legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous

    Cited 182 timesPublished
  • Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Construction

    178 N.J. 513 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 10, 2004

    Apart from the reference to “sponsored” activities in the Joint Statement, the Legislature did not qualify the phrase “recreational or social activities.” Cotton v. … Williams, 639 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Okla.1981) (noting that “[o]ne who is expressly required to participate [in a *532 recreational activity] is clearly furthering the master’s business”).

    Cited 69 timesPublished
  • Den v. Geiger

    9 N.J.L. 225 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Sep 15, 1827

    The phrase “ private examination ” is qualified and explained by the superadded words “ apart from her husband,.” … If the law were established according to the views of the defendant not one verdict in ten would stand.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Owen v. CNA Insurance/Continental Casualty Co.

    167 N.J. 450 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 31, 2001

    That is clearly what plaintiffs intended to do in this case. … In our view, the underlying purposes of tort claim structured-settlements clearly are distinguishable from those of spendthrift trusts.

    Limited by F.K. v. Division of Medical Assistance & Health Services & Ocean County Board of Social Services, 374 N.J. Super. 126 (2005)Cited 24 timesPublished
  • New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission

    82 N.J. 57 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 6, 1980

    The statute clearly evinces a legislative intent»to require reporting by all groups which act to influence legislation. … The final factor is whether the statute can be made to conform to established standards. Thus in State v.

    Cited 143 timesPublished

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