Case law

Prime Accounting Department v. Township of Carney's Point

212 N.J. 493 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 17, 2013

Bocceli clearly constituted an aggrieved taxpayer within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 54:3-21, and accordingly, had standing to file the tax appeal. … Later submissions to the Tax Court would establish that it was Zubair, not Aslam, who visited the tax assessor's office in April 2008.

Li Fu v. Hong Fu

160 N.J. 108 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 26, 1999

That plaintiffs’ action against Freedom River is precluded by virtue of an owner’s immunity for vicarious liability under New Jersey law is not contested. … Because the mandatory insurance law does not abrogate the owner’s common-law immunity from vicarious liability for permissive use, see Schimek v.

Marsh v. DEPT. OF ENVIR. PROTECTION

152 N.J. 137 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 18, 1997

The Act created the New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund (Spill Fund or Fund), which provides for qualified claimants reimbursement of the cleanup costs for environmental contamination. … However, the Appellate Division found that Marsh's mother was clearly a party "responsible for a hazardous substance" within the meaning of 11g(c) because she should have known of the existence of the leaking tanks on her

Skinkle v. Essex Public Road Board

47 N.J.L. 93 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 15, 1885

It must be presumed that the legislature intended that the review should be conducted in conformity with this established legal rule, and not in an arbitrary manner. … This language clearly gives the act a retrospective effect.

New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. P.W.R.

205 N.J. 17 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 26, 2011

Therefore a sixteen-year-old teenager like Alice clearly qualifies for Title Nine protection. … Clearly, there were problems within this family.

Schear v. City of Elizabeth

41 N.J. 321 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 20, 1964

He is an official of the municipality and therefore qualified for appointment to the planning board. … This is clearly evidenced by its inclusion in the statute of the general mandate that: “No member of tbe planning board shall be permitted to act on any matter in which he has, either directly or indirectly, any personal

Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster

20 N.J. 114 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 12, 1955

the public need; there cannot be unnecessary and excessive restrictions upon the use of private property or the pursuit of useful activities; a substantial intrusion upon the right infringes essential individual liberties immune … are detrimental to and inconsistent with the orderly development of the zone, for limited industrial purposes,” but in August 1954 the mayor and council “discovered that, through inadvertence,” the ordinance “failed to clearly

State v. Mayor of Newark

39 N.J.L. 380 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 15, 1877

In the then condition of the tax laws, no new legislation was indispensable to carry into effect the policy established in the adoption of this amendment. … Where it clearly appears that it was the intention of the law-making power to prescribe a uniform rule, which shall be the only rule applicable to the *391 entire subject, all laws inconsistent therewith are repealed, without

Toll Bros., Inc. v. BD. OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS, CTY. OF BURLINGTON

194 N.J. 223 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 31, 2008

Toll Brothers has abandoned its 870,000 square-foot office space design for Phase 2 and instead currently has municipal approval to build 122 age-qualified residential units. … Accordingly, if the resolution establishing the conditions remains in effect, the developer’s agreement can be enforced.

Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Division of Taxation

107 N.J. 307 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 22, 1987

Under ordinary dictionary definitions of “income," i.e., all that comes in without regard to expenditures, the windfall profit clearly constitutes “income.” … We find no readily apparent conflict with any federal law or any expressed or clearly implied federal policy. See Armstrong v.

State v. Farmer

48 N.J. 145 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Nov 21, 1966

It was said that such disclosure, although not required constitutionally, clearly promoted the quest for truth. State v. Johnson, 28 N. J. 133 (1958). … Actu *180 ally no such question was put specifically, nor did the cold appellate record reveal clearly that such was the intention of the United States attorney.

State v. McDonald

211 N.J. 4 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 23, 2012

It claims that the School clearly qualifies as “school property used for school purposes” under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-l(e)(3)(a) notwithstanding its status as a parochial school, because the statute is not limited to facilities … Although driving while intoxicated does not necessarily establish the element of recklessness, “a reasonable jury may use a defendant’s drunken state as evidence of his reckless driving.” State v.

Matthew J. Barrick, Jr. v. State of New Jersey, Department of Treasury, Division of Property Management and Construction

218 N.J. 247 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 23, 2014

governing the agency; (2) whether the evidence in the record substantially supports the findings on which the agency’s actions were premised; and (3) “whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly … The State and RMD urge this Court to establish a bright- line rule that would declare as moot appeals of bid awards where an unsuccessful bidder fails to seek a stay when pursuing appellate review of the bid award.

State v. David Bueso(074261)

225 N.J. 193 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 8, 2016

N.J.R.E. 601 provides that all persons should be qualified to testify, and that disqualification should be the exception. … “[O]ur ‘system of justice . . . has established as a general rule that all persons should be qualified to testify, and that disqualification should be the exception[.]’”

In Re Opinion 39 of the Committee on Attorney Advertising

197 N.J. 66 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 17, 2008

document [was] designed to be circulated amongst clients and potential clients, in order to create the impression that the attorneys designated ‘Super Lawyers,’ and particularly those featured in lead articles, are more qualified … Clearly, mere consumer unfamiliarity with a privately[ ]conferred honor or designation does not establish that advertising such honor or designation is actually or inherently misleading so long as the honor or designation

State v. Goodman

92 N.J. 43 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Feb 10, 1983

Clearly defendant’s case was “pending” under N.J. S.A. 2C:l-lc(l) on the effective date of the Code. … As such it would not qualify as a “material element of the offense” (N.J.S.A. 2C:l-14i) and therefore would not render the federal offense different from the state offense in terms of essential proof. See Illinois v.

GILLHAUS BEVERAGE COMPANY, INC. v. Lerner

78 N.J. 499 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 11, 1979

That privilege, however, does not confer immunity from investigation in these circumstances. … A careful review of the "plea bargaining cases," however, demonstrates clearly that the two situations are not analogous.

Central R.R. Co. v. Thayer-Martin

114 N.J.L. 69 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 11, 1934

This knowledge enables me to differentiate the testimony of the experts and properly qualifies me to determine which of the testimony has greater value.” … The board, as stated in its opinion, clearly set forth the method employed and the various factors which it considered in reaching its conclusions.

Fair Lawn Education Ass'n v. Fair Lawn Board of Education

79 N.J. 574 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 16, 1979

J. at 403] It is thus manifest that actions taken by a state agency which may substantially affect retirement age and thus the actuarial assumptions of a statutory pension system are impermissible unless clearly and unequivocally … In order to qualify for this bonus, the teacher also had to have been continuously employed by the Board for at least 15 years, and have given written notice of his or her intent to retire before April 1, 1977.

Grey ex rel. Simmons v. Mayor of Paterson

60 N.J. Eq. 385 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 19, 1900

The rights of such riparian owners are clearly stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Lippincott, in this court, in the case of East Jersey Water Co. v. Bigelow, 31 Vr. 201 . … This provision was intended to qualify and limit the extent of the grant so that the implication could not arise, that Jersey City *392 might without further legislation divert the water for other purposes than a water-supply