Case law

Wilkie v. City of Boiling Spring Lakes

370 N.C. 540 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Mar 2, 2018

In view of the fact that the expression “listed in G.S. 40A-3(b) or (c)” as it appears in N.C.G.S. § 40A- 51(a) is immediately preceded by “of a condemnor” and in view of the fact that the context does not clearly suggest … Although a condemning entity must establish that a proposed taking will further a public purpose before a condemnation can be authorized, we can see no reason why a reciprocal burden to establish the existence of a public

Smith on Demise of Kelly v. Spencer

25 N.C. 256 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Dec 5, 1842

It must be admitted that it seems to be clearly settled in England, that the statute, West. 2, c. 45, only requires a scire facias to revive a judgment *259 when no execution is sued within a year and day ; and that, if an … But the law allows not such an immunity to a sale by the defendant in execution. Per Curiam. Judgment reversed, and venire da novo awarded.

Lenoir v. Linville Improvement Co.

51 L.R.A. 146 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Jun 9, 1900

Spaimhour was duly qualified as receiver, and immediately thereafter took charge of the property and effects of defendant corporation according to the terms of the order appointing him receiver. 3. … We have quoted at length from this opinion because it expresses so clearly our own view of the law. It is cited and followed by the Circuit Court of the United States in Malcomson v. Wappoo Mills, 88 Fed. Rep., 680.

Alford v. Shaw

318 N.C. 289 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Oct 7, 1986

Maldonado, 430 A. 2d 779 , was handed down in May 1981 the trend among courts which have been faced with the choice of applying an Auerbach-type rule or a Zapata-type rule clearly has been to require judicial scrutiny of … In fact they are better qualified in this regard than are corporate directors in general. 419 N.Y.S. 2d at 929, 393 N.E. 2d at 1003.

State v. J.C.

372 N.C. 203 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · May 10, 2019

The statute contains a number of conditions, including that the qualifying offense not have been: (1) A Class A through G felony .... (2) An offense that includes assault as an essential element of the offense. (3) An offense … Analysis This case of first impression requires us to apply the plain language of the statutory framework established by the General Assembly for the expunction of certain criminal record information.

State v. Carter

289 N.C. 35 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Dec 17, 1975

Judge Ervin then ruled that the disclosure orders did not clearly indicate that the photographs should be furnished, but if they were included within the scope of the orders they were only competent to illustrate the witness … However, it is equally well established that the introduction by the State of an exculpatory statement made by the defendant does not preclude the State from showing that the facts concerning the crime were different.

State v. Best

292 N.C. 294 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Apr 14, 1977

We reemphasize that the standards are objective and, when met, exempt those who qualify from the proscriptions and penalties of G.S. 90-95. … dispensing of controlled substances, views Article 5 of Chapter 90 as establishing a parallel system.

State Ex Rel. Attorney-General v. Knight

169 N.C. 333 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · May 24, 1915

It is ordained and established by the people, and all judges are sworn to support it. … an act of the Legislature unconstitutional, it is a well recognized principle that the courts will not declare that this coordinate branch of the Government has exceeded the powers vested in it unless it is plainly and clearly

Holmes v. Moore

Supreme Court of North Carolina · Dec 16, 2022

a qualifying ID at the county elections board. … The majority cannot seriously contend that North Carolina is somehow immune from these abuses.

Holmes v. Moore

Supreme Court of North Carolina · Dec 16, 2022

a qualifying ID at the county elections board. … The majority cannot seriously contend that North Carolina is somehow immune from these abuses.

Bank v. . Doughton

189 N.C. 50 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Jan 24, 1925

Taylor's will, are residents of this State; and the Wachovia Bank and Trust Company is the duly appointed and qualified administrator, c. t. a., d. b. n. , of the estate of Mrs. Taylor, and guardian of her infant son. … They must resort to both in order to establish their full title, for the will of neither alone will suffice.

Pittman v. Thomas

307 N.C. 485 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Jan 28, 1983

Her son, James Miller Thomas, qualified as executor of her holographic will which was dated 1 October 1976. The taxable estate of Mrs. Thomas as finally computed for federal estate tax purposes exceeded $1,000,000. Mrs. … Thomas intended to establish a trust fund for her grandchildren for their educations in an unnamed amount and for an unnamed period of time.

Pigford v. . R. R.

160 N.C. 93 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Sep 25, 1912

We cannot assent to this proposition, except in a qualified sense. … There is a clearly marked line of divide between assumption of risk and contributory negligence, the former being confined to the ordinary perils of the service, and the servant could not be held by his contract, or upon

State v. Ortiz-Zape

367 N.C. 1 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Jun 27, 2013

Illinois for the proposition that “a qualified expert may provide an independent opinion based on otherwise inadmissible out-of-court statements.” … In doing so, the majority oversimplifies Agent Ray’s review process and testimony and glosses over the portions that most clearly implicate the Confrontation Clause.

State v. Annadale

329 N.C. 557 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Aug 14, 1991

Butts’ opinion testimony, together with the testimony of other witnesses, clearly establishes a death by criminal agency and meets the requirements of the corpus delicti rule. … Butts was well qualified to provide testimony which was within his area of expertise and helpful to the jurors. Dr.

State v. Daniel

319 N.C. 308 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Apr 7, 1987

The state concedes this statement was sufficient to “clearly establish her guilt of ... a murder.” We agree. … Hayes, 314 N.C. 460 , 334 S.E. 2d 741 (1985), held that a defendant who later retracts or repudiates an earlier “inculpatory statement” that might have qualified for this mitigating circumstance is not entitled to a finding

Smith v. Norfolk & Southern Railroad

114 N.C. 728 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Feb 15, 1894

A sober man, as we have seen, very clearly could not have recovered, and is a premium to be offered to negligence caused by the self-imposed disability of drunkenness, which prevents-one from using ordinary care by look * … The doctrine, however, was qualified by the ruling in Davies v.

Mayberry v. Home Insurance Company

264 N.C. 658 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Jun 18, 1965

Obviously, the insurer knew how to qualify the term “judgment” to achieve the result that it urges here. It did not do so. Powell v. T. A. & C. Taxi, Inc., supra; River Val. Cart. Co. v. Hawkeye-S. Ins. … Taxi, Inc., supra: “While this clause has not been discussed in the cases extensively, it does serve to strengthen the view that the liability insurer regarded such payment of interest and costs and other expenses as clearly

State v. Eason

328 N.C. 409 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Apr 3, 1991

The record before us clearly shows that the trial court acted with good cause to prevent the defendant from intimidating or tampering with the State’s witnesses. … First, the defendant failed to establish that Stroud would give newly discovered evidence.

State v. Copley

Supreme Court of North Carolina · May 23, 2024

Copley does not show gross impropriety because the prosecutor’s closing argument did not clearly misstate the law. As the Court of Appeals reasoned, the prosecutor—in context—appeared to address Mr. … It suggests that the castle doctrine can run in parallel with murder by lying in wait— in other words, that defensive measures sanctioned by section 14-51.2 can, at the same time, qualify as murder by lying in wait.