Case law

Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.

227 N.C. 412 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · May 21, 1947

But, since two separate records, of like character, and even larger, are here on this appeal, we deem it expedient to direct attention to the rule to the end that a practice may not be established. … When so read, it is seen tbat the court fully, clearly and specifically instructed tbe jury as to tbe various provisions of tbe statute, G.

State v. Pinch

306 N.C. 1 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Jun 2, 1982

The record clearly shows that the photographs were properly introduced according to our rules of evidence. See State v. Mar *17 shall, 304 N.C. 167 , 282 S.E. 2d 422 (1981); State v. … We also have serious doubts as to whether “some” “mild” “chronic depression” qualifies as a bona fide mental or emotional disturbance under our capital punishment statute. Compare State v.

In Re Guess

327 N.C. 46 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Jul 26, 1990

Ed. 829, 838 (1954) (“It is elemental that a state has broad power to establish and enforce standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health of everyone there.”). … Examining the language of N.C.G.S. § 90-14(a)(6), we conclude that the legislature clearly wished to protect the public from “unprofessional conduct” by physicians, and gave as an example of such conduct that which does not

Bailey v. State

353 N.C. 142 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Dec 21, 2000

State, 352 N.C. 127 , 529 S.E.2d 448 (2000) ( Bailey IV ), this Court determined the limitations on who would qualify for eligibility as a class member. … This case is clearly a matter of public interest. The trial judge, recognizing this, allowed the attorney general to participate and be heard. The highest Court of the State should do likewise.

Waddell v. . Berry

40 N.C. 437 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Dec 5, 1848

The foregoing considerations have so much weight in establishing the proposition that a bargainor in such a deed of trust as that supposed, or a mortgagor, is not entitled to vote for a member of the Senate, that the judges … On the contrary, it was proper that the title to the vote should be defined clearly and rendered simple, so that the rights and duties of the citizen could be easily understood and readily determined.

State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Thornburg

325 N.C. 463 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Nov 9, 1989

Therefore, the investment in them does not qualify for inclusion in rate base and is equally unqualified for treatment as the source of an operating expense. … This decision, however, is clearly distinguishable from the case before us.

Holloway v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.

333 N.C. 94 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Dec 18, 1992

Before turning to our gift and contract analysis, we first note that the certificate of deposit in question does not qualify as a negotiable instrument under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). … It does not matter whether Crisp succeeded in establishing a legally binding agency relation *102 ship. Cf. Jackson v.

Brumley v. . Baxter

225 N.C. 691 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Dec 17, 1945

VII, sec. 7, which prohibits a city or other municipal corporation from contracting debts or levying taxes, except for the necessary expenses thereof, "unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein." … To justify declaring void an Act of the General Assembly, its unconstitutionality must clearly appear. Reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of its validity. S. v. Brockwell , 209 N.C. 209 , 183 S.E. 378 . 2.

Trustees of Rowan Technical College v. J. Hyatt Hammond Associates Inc.

313 N.C. 230 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Apr 2, 1985

Hammond agreed under section l-13(f) of the contract to “provide general administration of the performance of construction contracts,” including continuous inspection of all work “by qualified and mutually agreed upon representatives … “When two statutes apparently overlap, it is well established that the statute special and particular shall control over the statute general in nature, even if the general statute is more recent, unless it clearly appears

Sutton v. Duke

277 N.C. 94 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Aug 28, 1970

All changes in words and phrasing in a statute adopted from another state or country will be presumed deliberately made with the purpose to limit, qualify, or enlarge the adopted rule. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 371, (1953). … Such a complaint could clearly identify the issues since Rule 10(b) requires the claim or claims to be averred in numbered'paragraphs.

State v. Morgan

596 S.E.2d 244 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Dec 3, 2004

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying Agent Garrett as an expert. This assignment of error is overruled. … Defendant complains that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to be death qualified.

Miller v. North Carolina Railroad

220 N.C. 562 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Jan 7, 1942

It is also established by the weight of authority that it is not always imperative on a traveler to come to a complete stop before entering on a railroad crossing; but, 'whether he must stop, in addition to looking and listening … One ought not to invite and then not bear the responsibility of his invitation, except only as to those whose conduct is or borders clearly upon the lack of due care.

State v. Howard

129 N.C. 584 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Dec 3, 1901

The general rule is thus clearly stated in 11 Enc. … Clearly it was to order him out of his office with a threat to. denounce him to the authorities. He might well have gone farther.

In re J.M., N.M.

Supreme Court of North Carolina · Jun 16, 2023

During the adjudicatory phase, the burden of proof is on DSS to show by clear and convincing evidence that a juvenile qualifies as abused, neglected, or dependent as the Juvenile Code defines those terms. N.C.G.S. … Taken together, the above findings of fact establish that (1) Nellie’s life- threatening injuries resulted from intentional conduct and (2) no one other than respondents could have inflicted the injuries.

Carpenter v. Carpenter

244 N.C. 286 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Jun 26, 1956

Too, letters of administration were revoked, upon motion of a person adversely affected thereby, upon proof of facts establishing that the power to grant such letters was not within the jurisdiction of the clerk who issued … Clearly, the court could not make a final determination of this issue. Determination thereof had to be by jury in the divorce action.

Hughes v. . Hodges

102 N.C. 236 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Feb 5, 1889

In the second appeal ( 77 N.C. 379 ), a doubt was suggested whether Littlejohn's homestead had been laid off so as clearly to define it by metes and bounds. … Kinnery , in the qualified sense we have suggested as the true meaning.

N.C. Acupuncture Licensing Bd. v. N.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Examiners

371 N.C. 697 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Dec 7, 2018

” as “any agency regulation, standard, or statement of general applicability that implements or interprets an enactment of the General Assembly . . . .” 2 The Acupuncture Board attempts to argue that dry needling qualifies … Chapter 150B clearly covers both of these scenarios and does not provide that either path is exclusive. Ultimately, both are subject to exhaustion of administrative remedies and to judicial review.

State v. Simpson

341 N.C. 316 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Sep 8, 1995

Therefore, since defendant successfully elicited the same testimony through another witness clearly qualified in the field, we conclude that any error in excluding Landreth’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt … We do not find that Simmons dictates such a result, since under the facts of that case, the defendant was clearly not eligible for parole. Simmons is, therefore, inapplicable to the facts here.

State Prison of N. C. v. Day

124 N.C. 362 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Apr 11, 1899

When the Legislature of 1833, without deep foresight into the future, attempted to give immunity from taxation for all time to the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad Company, and the Company claimed that thereunder it could build … It is a cardinal principle that the Courts can not enter the legislative department and set aside a law they have madej unless it is clearly in conflict with the Constitution.

Rowe v. Rowe

305 N.C. 177 · Supreme Court of North Carolina · Mar 3, 1982

After all, the parties themselves are best qualified to deal with a division of their marital property and a settlement, of their marital rights in the first instance. … Under the facts of this case, she clearly should not have to bear that burden. See note 1, supra.