Case law

Otis Elevator Co. of Maine v. F.W. Cunningham & Sons

454 A.2d 335 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jan 4, 1983

It concluded that the policies underlying interspousal immunity would not be frustrated by allowing contribution and, therefore, “[t]he equities clearly preponderate in favor of just contribution for the third party rather … than of undeserved immunity for the joint tort-fea-sor husband.”

Stewart Carney Jr. v. Hancock County

2025 ME 36 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Apr 15, 2025

up to 4 hours per week of care coordination services with qualified staff to assess the behavior needs of inmates, consult with a psychiatrist about what interventions [are] needed, coordinate … “Cost or delay alone is insufficient to establish the irreparable loss of a right.” Fiber Materials, Inc. v.

Blier v. Inhabitants of Town of Fort Kent

273 A.2d 732 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Feb 19, 1971

Joseph’s College, 1967, Me., 233 A.2d 718 , at page 722 the well established rule of statutory construction that the common law is not to be changed by doubtful implication or overturned except by clear and unambiguous language … There appears no clearly expressed legislative design to broaden the scope of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Ziehm v. Ziehm

433 A.2d 725 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Aug 10, 1981

The latter provision would clearly be unnecessary unless the report was already before the court with full evidentiary effect. … (Emphasis added) Additionally, and to insure the objectivity and completeness of the report, the legislature, in 1965 (by P.L. 1965, ch. 299) granted qualified immunity from civil or criminal liability to whoever participates

Lewis v. Keegan

903 A.2d 342 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 28, 2006

, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (“[GJovernment officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly … established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).

Cushing v. Cohen

420 A.2d 919 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Oct 7, 1980

memorandum of law was submitted in which one of the points made was: “[t]hat the action is, in reality, one against the State, even though it has been brought nominally against the Attorney General and the Forest Commissioner clearly … (emphasis added) Thus, in its initial appearance in the case the counterclaim which is being urged upon us as the document establishing the abandonment of sovereign immunity itself belies the validity of that contention.

Farley v. Department of Human Services

621 A.2d 404 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 2, 1993

AFDC is a cooperative federal-state program that provides monthly welfare benefits to families whose income falls below an established level of need. … In view of the qualified nature of welfare rights, cases denying the defense of state immunity where plaintiffs property has been taken by the state without just compensation cannot be relied on as precedents controlling

Doe v. Graham

977 A.2d 391 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Aug 13, 2009

status conferred to nonstate mental health institutions and their employees when they admit, treat, or discharge involuntarily committed patients, see 34-B M.R.S. § 3861(1)(A); and (2) our precedent establishing that discretionary … We have indicated that discretionary function immunity does not extend to actions “that so clearly exceed the scope of the official’s authority that the official cannot be said to be acting in an official capacity.”

Fitzpatrick v. Greater Portland Public Development Commission

495 A.2d 791 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 11, 1985

It is likely that the Legislature sought to make doubly clear that the Commission, created in P. & S.L.1945, c. 123 as a “body corporate and politic,” was a State “instrumentality” qualified for priority under Section 13( … Whether or not it had done so before, the Legislature, by enacting P. & S.L.1947, c. 97, clearly affirmed that the Commission was such an agency.

Turgeon v. Bean

109 Me. 189 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 6, 1912

Both are designed to cover the same situation, that is, immunity from arrest made after petition filed. … So too, General Order No. 27, established by the U. S. Supreme Court in connection with the Act of 1867, covers the same ground as No. 30, 89 Fed. Rep. XII, in connection with the Act of 1898.

State v. Atkinson

458 A.2d 1200 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Apr 11, 1983

Defendant contends that Sukeforth was not qualified to give such an opinion. Whether an expert is qualified to testify in the area addressed by his testimony is largely within the discretion of the trial justice. E.N. … Testimony at the trial established that the tractor was in good working condition at the time of the theft.

LePage v. Bath Iron Works Corp.

909 A.2d 629 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Nov 14, 2006

. § 4572(1)(A) (2005), was untimely; that he failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination; and that he failed to establish a prima facie case of a Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (MWPA), 26 M.R.S … The Whistleblower Claim [¶ 17] The court concluded that Le-Page had failed to establish a prima facie case under the MWPA “because the only adverse employment action was BIW’s continued refusal to qualify LePage to carry

Hurricane Island Outward Bound v. Town of Vinalhaven

372 A.2d 1043 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · May 3, 1977

The burden of establishing tax exemption is upon the plaintiff. Exemption is a special favor conferred. … Science is not its only primary object and hence it is not entitled to enjoy immunity within 36 M.R.S.A. § 652(1)(B) from the tax imposed. The result reached by the Court below is erroneous as a matter of law. II.

Doughty v. Work Opportunities Unlimited/Leddy Group

33 A.3d 410 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Dec 13, 2011

she could establish that she did not work under the third-party employer’s control. … In this case, it is established that Doughty worked under Poland Spring’s control. .

Michael Fortin v. Jacob Titcomb

60 A.3d 765 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jan 29, 2013

A police officer’s conduct is typically entitled to discretionary function immunity unless the “egregious conduct clearly exceeded, as a matter of law, the scope of any discretion he could have possessed in his official … Maine law provides immunity to a police officer unless the officer’s conduct was so egregious that it clearly exceeded the scope of any discretion an officer could have possessed in his or her capacity as

State v. Christen

976 A.2d 980 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 28, 2009

The plain language of the statute clearly creates an affirmative defense, but permits its application only to certain charges, and trafficking is not one of them. … The second charge required proof of actual trafficking, and the State had failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that element. See id. § 1103(1-A)(H). 5 . Because the parties had stipulated prior to

Davies v. City of Bath

364 A.2d 1269 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Nov 30, 1976

Justice Traynor disposed of the same argument on the occasion of the abolition of governmental immunity in California: “We are not here faced with a situation in which the Legislature has adopted an established judicial interpretation … Ryder, supra, although we were critical of the doctrine, we stated clearly that the Legislature was the appropriate forum for the resolution of such crucial policy issues.

State of Maine v. Chad H. Tozier

115 A.3d 1240 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · May 7, 2015

“[Qualified witness” is not defined in the statute. [¶ 9] The trial court interpreted “qualified witness” to be synonymous with “expert witness.” … The Court stated that “[f]o-rensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation” and that “[a] forensic analyst responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure — or have an incentive

Couturier v. Penobscot Indian Nation

544 A.2d 306 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 13, 1988

the Penobscot Nation does not fall within the definition of “governmental entity” for purposes of the Maine Tort Claims Act. 3 However, the language of the federal and state legislation dealing with the Pe-nobscot Nation clearly … emphasis added). 4 That section 6206(2) does not refer specifically to the Maine Tort Claims Act is in keeping with the purpose of the Act to Implement the Maine Indian Claims Settlement, to serve as a basic, organic document establishing

Johnson v. Maine Central Railroad

141 Me. 38 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Aug 14, 1944

Travelers from other States who are mot familiar with the territory are not immune from the operation of this rule. … Such testimony is clearly inadmissible under our evidentiary rules.