Case law

Rugan v. Dole Co.

396 A.2d 1003 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jan 23, 1979

Rugan to present evidence to the Commissioner demonstrating a causal relationship between his physical limitations and his unemployment in order to qualify for the receipt of compensation benefits. … The record clearly demonstrates that Mr. Rugan’s being out of work was in no way related to his acknowledged physical difficulties. He was not working due to the simple fact that no work was available. Since Mr.

Portland Flying Service, Inc. v. Smith

227 A.2d 446 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 15, 1967

. * * * He was qualified to fly solo within a restricted area * * * not indiscriminately." … In doing so the plaintiff clearly intended to elicit facts which would prove negligence and he intended that a truthful account of the events leading to the accident, if he was successful in obtaining such an account from

State of Maine v. Arnold A. Diana

89 A.3d 132 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 20, 2014

¶ 54. [¶23] The court’s finding that the challenged juror could be impartial is supported by competent record evidence and is therefore not clearly erroneous. … In order for proffered evidence to qualify for admission pursuant to Rule 702, a court 3 Maine Rule of Evidence 702 provides: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of

Gilman v. F. O. Bailey Carriage Co.

125 Me. 108 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Dec 5, 1925

But if we apply the rules established by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act (1917, Chapter 257) the same conclusion is reached. A note like those in suit is not ‘ ‘regular upon its face.” (Section 52). … This defense is clearly available under the general issue. The other points made do not require extended discussion:- — ■ (3) It is contended that action upon two of the notes is barred by limitation.

Butler v. Rockland, Thomaston & Camden Street Railway

99 Me. 149 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 26, 1904

think it is only “in a qualified way.” … Surely if these conclusions were warrantable, and we think they were, it cannot be said that the verdict of the jury establishing the negligence of the defendant was so far unmistakably wrong. 2.

Lovejoy v. Inhabitants of Foxcroft

91 Me. 367 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Feb 24, 1898

Such is now the established law in this state. Otis v. Stockton, 76 Maine, 506; Brown v. Winterport, 79 Maine, 305; Hurd v. St. Albans, 81 Maine, 343. … The burden is clearly upon the defendant.

State v. Taylor

694 A.2d 907 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Apr 18, 1997

Because those factual findings are not clearly erroneous, the stop in this case was constitutional. 6 II. [¶ 10] Taylor also contends that the court erred in allowing Officer Green to testify regarding the results of the … Therefore the HGN test’s reliability must be established before its results are admissible in evidence in a criminal trial. [¶ 12] The seminal case regarding the admissibility of HGN test results is State v.

Stickney v. City of Saco

770 A.2d 592 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · May 2, 2001

Such a finding is not clearly erroneous. ii. … Regis Paper Co., 459 A.2d 1106, 1109 (Me.1983) (reiterating well-established notion that "all statutes will be considered to have a prospective operation only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is clearly expressed

Russell v. Belcher

76 Me. 501 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Dec 15, 1884

The opinion is qualified in the case of Aldrich, Appellant, 110 Mass. 189 , to the effect that the decision should stand upon the first named ground alone. … The limit at which an absolute disability attaches should be clearly marked and easily defined. The common good requires it.

Donahoe v. Richards

38 Me. 379 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 1, 1854

It is not necessary to consider whether they acted wisely or not; if they acted in good faith in the exercise of their duty, they must be regarded as most clearly within the principles established in Stephenson v. … In South Carolina the question arose, whether Jews could enjoy immunity from the law prohibiting sales on Sunday. This question was very fully considered in Charleston v. Benjamin, 1 Law Rep. N.

Worcester v. Lord

56 Me. 265 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 1, 1868

Unless qualified or controlled (as to this small parcel of lot 39, thus included with 110) by the foregoing facts, the ease finds that the tenant has been in the open, notorious, exclusive, adverse and continued possession … The character of his possession of the *273 little strip is clearly ascertained. The principal matter in dispute seems to have been settled in his favor at the trial.

Curran v. Clayton

86 Me. 42 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Nov 8, 1893

The plaintiff was declared by the warden to have 310 of 617 ballots cast for Alderman, received from the ward clerk a certificate of his election as Alderman, took the qualifying oath and entered upon the discharge of the … The ruling of the single justice that their action was subject to revision by this court, was clearly correct. Decree, below affirmed with additional costs.

Bank of America, N.A. v. Scott A. Greenleaf

2014 ME 89 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 3, 2014

Given this overlap in source, we have not always clearly distinguished between issues of standing and issues of proof. … Id. [¶19] In this matter, the Bank failed to establish two of the eight foreclosure elements.

Brine v. State

264 A.2d 530 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Apr 23, 1970

The finding by the single Justice that Petitioner had failed to establish his burden of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence is not clearly erroneous. Bennett v. State, 161 Me. 489 , 214 A.2d 667 . … Such findings were not clearly erroneous, and, therefore, must stand. Rule 52(a), M.R.C.P. Gordon v. State, Me., 232 A.2d 527 (1967).

Sirois v. Town of Frenchville

441 A.2d 291 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Feb 12, 1982

The defendant's Answer sets forth affirmative defenses based upon the impact of the legal concepts of the Statute of Frauds, the doctrine of municipal immunity and sovereign immunity, the Statute of Limitations, failure to … The letter was turned over to the plaintiff who offered it in evidence to establish a contract arising out of his reliance upon representations therein to establish terms of his asserted contract with the town.

Carter v. Clark

92 Me. 225 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Dec 3, 1898

The defendant’s objection is that the northern line of the Byron Carter place was a question for the jury to establish, and not the witness. … The question whether the witness was qualified to answer the inquiry was addressed to the presiding justice.

Murray v. Sullivan

158 Me. 98 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Mar 23, 1962

under the statute as of the termination of the life estate and not to the persons qualifying as of the time of the testator’s death. … The legislature seems to have made the same assumption in establishing its pattern in the second sentence *109 of the quoted statute.

State v. Robbins

318 A.2d 51 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Apr 3, 1974

Champagne again claimed the privilege, the State is empowered by statute to offer the witness immunity, in which case the Court would compel the witness to answer (unless the Court finds that to do so would be “clearly contrary … This area of discussion involves complex considerations of the concepts of fair trial, witness immunity, and separation of powers, among others.

State Tax Assessor v. Tracfone Wireless, Inc.

2022 ME 36 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jun 23, 2022

Lifeline is a program designed to provide universal access to telecommunications services,  3 specifically to qualifying low-income consumers. … To be eligible, ETCs must certify that they would pass through the full amount of the subsidy—$9.25 a month per consumer for the relevant time period—to “qualifying low-income consumer[s] and that [the ETC] has received

Ross v. Berry

49 Me. 434 · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · Jul 1, 1862

It appears that on the day named two justices, legally qualified to act, one chosen by the debtor and one by the creditor, organized properly the tribunal contemplated by the statute. … This was clearly an illegal charge, by the express words of the statute, c. 116, § 5.